

The K G B and SOVIET DISINFORMATION

An Insider's View


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The K G B and SOVIET DISINFORMATION

An Insider's View

Ladislav Bittman

Foreword by Roy Godson



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FOREWORD

In recent years the West has learned a great deal about the Soviet bloc's use of what they now call "active measures". As part of their political and military strategy, Moscow and its allies use a variety of overt and covert means to influence Western perceptions and to influence our decisionmaking about defense and foreign affairs.

Perhaps the most useful source of information about Soviet active measures has been former expert practitioners who have defected to the West. They have provided us with major insights into Soviet doctrine, institutions, resources, and techniques. Some may question the reliability of information provided by defectors, particularly those who practiced disinformation and other active measures techniques. Indeed healthy skepticism is always in order, especially in the murky world of clandestine activities. Nevertheless, prudent students who sift the information provided by defectors and cross-check it against the testimony and memoirs of statesmen, diplomats, journalists, information from historical archives, captured documents, the trials of convicted secret agents and other sources, cannot fail to deepen their understanding of contemporary Soviet strategy.

The information and analysis on active measures provided by Ladislav Bittman since his defection from the Czech intelligence and security service in 1968, is extremely useful. His book, *The Deception Game* (1972), the first by a former Czechoslovak active measures and disinformation specialist, was influential to many both in and out of government. Now in *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View*, he provides specific names, dates, and places to further document Soviet and Czech operations designed to influence Western behavior. In addition, based on his experience and understanding of the active measures ethos of the Soviet bloc, he seeks to describe and to explain Soviet operations since his defection. His account of recent developments in various parts of the world is fascinating. To further confirm Bittman's analysis of contemporary Soviet activities, we need additional information from new defectors and other sources of documentation. If recent experience is a guide, this additional information should not be long in com-

ing. Ladislav Bittman has helped us understand an important dimension of Soviet behavior. Now that we are aware of this significant element, the evidence more and more confirms his key propositions.

Roy Godson
Professor of Government, Georgetown University
Director, National Strategy Information Center
Washington, D.C.

Preface

WHY WE MUST BE CONCERNED

Purposeful and cunning games played in Washington to manipulate politicians, governmental bureaucrats, and the press involve many participants: domestic opponents of the current administration and foreign adversaries, friends and foes, public opinion experts, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, and, last but not least, spies. Of course, Soviet intelligence operatives among the participants are expertly disguised under the mask of American civil liberties.

While American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in the last fifteen years has been designed basically to protect the Western world and inhibit Soviet expansion, the Soviets have stepped up their continuing offensive in covert action. They are well known for their love of secrecy and political scheming, and they are masters of disinformation. Even CIA operatives suffer a kind of paranoia in the sense that they view every Soviet disinformation campaign as a part of a larger and more sinister plot.

I spent fourteen years in Communist intelligence, including two years as deputy commander of the Czechoslovak disinformation department. During this period I got involved in many operations against the so-called outside enemies of socialism. A few days following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 I defected and asked the American government for political asylum. After arriving in the United States I first wanted to forget my controversial past and undertake a new life, but as a devoted student of international relations and a newspaper addict, I found the task almost impossible. Signals about continuing Soviet covert action leaped out at me from the pages of newspapers and reminded me of my past. Shortly after publication of *The Deception Game* in 1972, describing my personal experiences in disinformation activities conducted by the Soviet bloc against the West, I started compiling data for a new comprehensive analysis of active measures taken by the Soviet Union against the United States in the period of détente.

The Soviets conduct two basic types of intelligence activities. The first, classified as a "passive" or an information-gathering role, focuses on the collection of a wide range of classified information about the strengths and weaknesses of an adversary as well as his plans and intentions. The second

type encompasses special covert operations, termed in Communist language, *active measures*. These measures are a vital element of Soviet foreign policy.

American research centers have produced a number of theoretical studies concerned with the character and role of propaganda, but they have largely ignored the techniques and impact of Communist disinformation and active measures. The press in the American system of democracy plays an important role not only as a communication channel but also as an active political force. It is then a frequent target of various international propaganda campaigns and disinformation tricks that attempt to influence and deceive professional journalists and, ultimately, the American public.

It is not the intention of this volume to suggest that the only problem faced by the modern world is the threat of a well-organized and calculated Soviet conspiracy directed by fanatics in the Kremlin. But one is naive and simplistic if he believes that the Russians pose no threat. Deception is a relatively easy game, particularly against anyone willing to be deceived. The purpose of this book is to describe disinformation methods and techniques used by the Soviet bloc and to assess the impact of these operations against the United States in the last decade. The major objectives are to show how Communist nations misuse democratic communication systems and to advocate more effective devices to protect the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

I am very grateful to the Carthage Foundation of Pittsburgh for providing me with the financial support for the final stages of my research and writing. Without this support, this project could not have been completed.

For essential research assistance, I would like to thank David Kogut. I am also very grateful to Henry LaBrie and John C. Smith for their editorial help.

The K G B and SOVIET DISINFORMATION

An Insider's View

Chapter 1

Recollections of a Former Perpetrator

After World War II, three superpowers—the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union—emerged on the international scene with well-organized propaganda systems. These systems embraced a wide range of promotional techniques to enhance prestige at home and undermine the strengths and morale of opponents. Their messages have influenced hundreds of millions of people around the world.

In the late 1950s and 1960s the Chinese celebrated major propaganda victories among the developing countries and the radical left in the industrialized nations. But the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the resulting power struggle inside the Chinese Communist party, and the deepening conflict with the Soviet Union forced the Chinese to reevaluate their priorities. Instead of exporting Maoist ideas, they were forced to deal with ideological and political tensions within the party, growing economic problems, and the Soviet military threat.

The United States developed a large system for disseminating overt and covert propaganda during the same period, but, for a number of reasons, it has failed to master the art of persuasion and disinformation. First, American culture ascribes to propaganda a clearly negative connotation that has restricted the imagination of U.S. propagandists. Second, Western overemphasis on technology has minimized the important emotional appeal characteristic of every effective campaign. Finally, extensive congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-1970s and an aggressive press dashed chances for the success of many operations by publicly exposing their objectives, strategy, and techniques.

The Soviet apparatus for propaganda and disinformation is undoubtedly the largest and most effective system in the world. Until the late 1950s, the Soviets conducted propaganda campaigns against the United States, its major rival, primarily through official governmental or party channels, but they were not skillfully designed or directed and their success was rather limited. In 1959 the Soviet Union established within the KGB (the State Security Committee) a

special unit called the Department for Active Measures, which specialized in black propaganda and disinformation, and between 1961 and 1964, all Soviet-bloc countries established similar departments and conducted intense anti-American propaganda campaigns throughout the world. By the late 1960s, the status and role of the Department for Active Measures, under the command of General Ivan I. Agayants, was further enhanced and the department became known as Service A. The 1970s was a period of intense covert operations and major qualitative improvements in the design of these operations.

In fact, the unprecedented increase in the number of KGB operatives sent to the United States in the 1970s surprised even the old-timers in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The KGB and Soviet satellite countries recruited individuals in all social and political categories, including American businessmen, scientists, Washington bureaucrats, and even CIA operatives.

American society during this decade witnessed a series of crises that left many people concerned and confused. A sense of guilt about American involvement in Vietnam and a growing conviction that no international cause is worthy of human sacrifice and military involvement became widespread, particularly among members of the younger generation. The revelations of Watergate and subsequent CIA and FBI investigations broadened the vacuum between the American government and the public and opened new arenas for Soviet propaganda and disinformation. With the help of satellite nations, the KGB launched hundreds of operations designed to create confusion and discredit the United States and other NATO countries through forgery of documents, well-placed agents of influence, and manipulation of mass media.

Although the major objective of the official propaganda abroad is the promotion of positive images of the Soviet Union, "active measures" directed by the KGB are designed for internal demoralization and erosion of power in target countries. Soviet disinformation operatives know that a single covert action, however precisely designed, cannot tip the balance of power between the Western Alliance and the Communist bloc. But they believe that mass production of propaganda and disinformation over a period of several decades will have a significant effect. The strategy seems to work.

YEARS OF LEARNING

My interest in special covert operations directed by the Soviet Union reflects more than mere academic curiosity. As mentioned earlier, I belonged to the Soviet intelligence apparatus for fourteen years as an officer in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, including two years as deputy commander of the Department of Active Measures. I began this career in Prague when the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party requested me to appear at party headquarters shortly before I graduated from Charles University's School of International Relations. In a large room decorated with a picture of Lenin and furnished like a courtroom, three party

bureaucrats asked me questions about my family, private life, and devotion to Communism. The verdict surprised me. The Communist party decided that, after graduation, I would become an operative in political intelligence. For a devoted young Communist like myself, it was the ultimate honor.

In February 1955, after six months of schooling in intelligence techniques, I became an analyst in the German section of the Evaluation and Research Department of the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. In addition to routine analytical work, I often designed and wrote forgeries with strong anti-American or anti-West German sentiments. It was a period of covert experimentation and testing.

Since Czech operatives in the directorate had little experience in covert operations, most of our efforts were unsophisticated tricks with limited impact. In 1955, for example, just a few days before a mass rally organized by West Germany's conservative and strongly anti-Communist organization, Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, we mailed from New York a letter addressed to its leader, Dr. Lodgman von Auen, and signed by the American Catholic dignitary Francis Cardinal Spellman. The forgery praised Dr. Lodgman for his firm anti-Communist stand and attacked his liberal social-democratic opponents as potential Communist allies. As we anticipated, Dr. Lodgman did not verify the authenticity of the letter and gave it to the press. It became headline news until Czechoslovak intelligence exposed it a few weeks later as a forgery. Dr. Lodgman von Auen was suspected as the perpetrator and Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft's image and credibility were harmed. Other active measures were more sophisticated than the Spellman letter, but most of them were little more than political pranks.

The structure of intelligence services in the Soviet bloc during the 1950s underwent radical changes, both in size and stature. Many new operatives were university graduates with sound educational backgrounds in history, political science, and international relations and their input visibly changed the quality and sophistication of many operations. Old-timers preferred not to involve these agents in disinformation games because they considered these operations too complicated and risky. But the intellectual input of the new generation helped to change traditional perceptions and simplistic operational standards. Consequently, increasing numbers of regular agents were used not only as sources of information but also as agents of influence.

I became an operative in the German department in 1958 and served as a case officer of several agents, including Alfred Frenzel, an emigrant from Czechoslovakia and one of the most valuable Communist agents in West Germany at the time. Until his arrest in 1960, Frenzel was a member of parliament and several parliamentary committees, including the Defense Committee. He left Czechoslovakia in 1946 with a large wave of expelled Germans and settled in Bavaria. After joining the Social Democratic party, he became a member of the Landestag in Bavaria in 1950 and, three years later, he was elected to the Federal Parliament in Bonn.

After several years of extensive research in state security archives, the German territorial department for Czechoslovak intelligence sent an agent to Klosterlechfeld in 1956 to confer with Alfred Frenzel. A few months later, Frenzel was forced to sign a commitment as a secret agent working "for peace and socialism," but his recruitment was not a difficult undertaking. For one thing, his daughter Elsa lived in Prague and Frenzel feared that he would threaten her well-being by refusing to cooperate. More important, public revelation of several dark spots on his life in Czechoslovakia would have brought his political career to an abrupt end.

Frenzel was a member of the Czechoslovak Communist party until 1933, more than ten years. During World War II, he served as a private in the Czechoslovak Army in Britain and worked for Czech military intelligence among Sudeten German refugees, who considered Hitler a war criminal but refused to fight with arms against their native country. From the time of his recruitment as a secret agent until his arrest by the prosecutor general of West Germany in 1960, Frenzel supplied Czechoslovak intelligence with numerous, extremely sensitive military documents to which he had access as a member of the Parliamentary Defense Committee.

Frenzel's intimate knowledge of many politicians and public figures had helped Communist intelligence to recruit additional agents, particularly among the Sudeten German exiles. On numerous occasions, Frenzel had received instructions on how to respond in public discussion of certain issues considered important by Moscow. Most Communist agents arrested in West Germany received relatively mild sentences, but Frenzel was an exception. The court sentenced him on April 28, 1961, to the maximum punishment of fifteen years. He was released after serving seven years of his prison term, and he returned to Czechoslovakia where he died a few days before the Soviet invasion in August 1968.

While the West German press and various security agencies debated the military and political implications of Alfred Frenzel's betrayal, Czechoslovak intelligence worked hard to compensate for the loss. Among the newly recruited agents was Dr. Carl Wittig, code named "Vtip." Wittig was not a newcomer to the world of international intrigues, for he had worked for at least five intelligence services and had been involved in several international deceptions of historical significance.

THE WITNESS AGAINST DR. JOHN

In the summer of 1961, Prague sent me to Berlin as an operative under diplomatic cover to direct several agents, including Dr. Wittig. Like many other Czechoslovak agents in West Germany, Wittig was a journalist who peddled a weekly newsletter to several hundred readers interested in his blend of soft news, rumors, and political gossip. Approximately sixty years

old at the time, he had several run-ins with the law before World War II, but we could never be certain as to whether his transgressions were political or criminal.

Dr. Wittig claimed, of course, that he had been one of Europe's many victims of Nazi political persecutions. We knew that Wittig had served time in Nazi jails and concentration camps and his record labeled him a criminal, but he attributed the label to the ruling of a friendly judge. The implication was obvious: it was safer in 1939 to be labeled a criminal than a political prisoner. Communist intelligence services, as a rule, refuse to deal with individuals who voluntarily offer their services as secret agents because they are usually provocateurs. We accepted Dr. Wittig's offer because he was listed as a Czechoslovak secret agent in the pre-World War II period and we had received no signals that he had cooperated with Western intelligence services.

Thus, in 1960, he again became a member of the Czechoslovak intelligence network, but my professional relationship with him ended in 1961 when we discovered that he was working for East German intelligence. A routine exchange of secret reports between East Berlin and Prague in October 1961 contained a verbatim copy of the statement Wittig had given me a month earlier. Further investigation by Prague and East Berlin revealed that Wittig also worked for the American Central Intelligence Agency and West German counterintelligence. After consulting with Moscow and Prague, the East Germans arrested him shortly thereafter.

Dr. Wittig played an important role in 1956 as an agent of influence in the sensational trial of Dr. Otto John, the first director of the Amt für Verfassungsschutz, West Germany's version of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The evidence indicating Dr. John's defection and betrayal was fabricated in East Berlin and presented in court as the testimony of Dr. Wittig, the star witness, who, at the time, was a secret agent for East German intelligence.

The life story of Dr. John is directly related to the post-World War II story of divided Europe and its accompanying political and human tragedies. As an opponent of Nazism, Dr. John participated in the conspiracy against Hitler in July 1944, and when it failed he escaped to Spain and then to Britain where he was assigned to the Soldantensender Calais, a radio voice for British propaganda intended to manipulate and influence Nazi strategists. At the conclusion of the war, Dr. John remained with the British and served in the War Office interrogating captured Nazi generals and preparing evidence for the Nuremberg trials. This was the last straw for many Germans, and, on his return to the Fatherland, Dr. John found himself friendless.

His enemies, led by Reinhard Gehlen, the powerful head of the new German espionage organization, mounted a strong lobby against the appointment of Dr. John to any post of political importance. But the Allies were masters of divided Germany at the time and backers in Britain proved more influential than Gehlen. After perfunctory hesitation in December 1951,

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer named Dr. John, then forty-one, the chief of political counterintelligence, one of the most important and politically sensitive positions in West Germany. Dr. John had reached the top, but he remained at the pinnacle for less than three years. On July 20, 1954, the tenth anniversary of the disastrous anti-Hitler coup, a group of antifascists in West Berlin organized a memorial service for resistance members who had been executed by the Nazis. Witnesses recalled that Dr. John, appearing nervous and exhausted, attended the service. Following the service, he was seen chatting with his old friend, Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, and they later drove off in Dr. Wohlgemuth's car.

West German police suspected Dr. Wohlgemuth of maintaining contact with East German intelligence, but despite their warning, Dr. John considered this information unreliable. After all, Dr. Wohlgemuth was the surgeon whose professional skills had saved the life of Dr. John's brother in 1942. The car carrying Dr. Wohlgemuth and Dr. John drove to a checkpoint and disappeared in East Berlin. Dr. John's disappearance produced many theories, including suspicion that he had defected to the East. Four days later, the suspicion was confirmed after Dr. John's voice was heard in propaganda broadcasts over East German radio. "Federal Minister of the Interior Schröder obstructed my work . . . Nazis are appearing everywhere in the political and public life of West Germany. In recent discussions with politically experienced individuals I concluded that West German policies had reached a dead end." Dr. John condemned Adenauer's pro-American policies, the rearming of West Germany, and the renaissance of Nazism.

The storm lifted a few months later when Dr. John was given political asylum and a comfortable villa in East Germany. Like many other prominent political exiles, he wrote his memoirs and made propaganda broadcasts against the West, leading to speculation that the Dr. Otto John affair was closed, but it was only a seventeen-month lull. On a visit to East Berlin's Humboldt University on December 12, 1955, Dr. John left his bodyguards outside, strolled through the building, slipped out a side door, and entered the car of Danish journalist Hendrik Bonde Hendriksen. Within minutes, he had passed through the Brandenburg Gate and had reached free soil in West Berlin. He was arrested in short order and charged with treason.

Through eight months of interrogation, he maintained that he had been kidnapped, drugged, and taken to Communist territory, but prosecutors remained skeptical and he was forced to stand trial in Karlsruhe Federal Court. The star witness against him was the East German secret agent, Dr. Carl Wittig, who testified that he had met Dr. John privately during a Schiller festival in East Germany. According to Wittig's sworn testimony, Dr. John admitted that he had defected and had not been kidnapped. His defense lawyer portrayed Wittig as a swindler with a long history of dubious intelligence contacts. But the court was not impressed and, in December 1956,

sentenced Dr. John to four years in prison for conspiracy and treason, slightly more than one year after his escape to West Berlin.

In his 1969 memoirs, *I Returned Twice*, Dr. Otto John wrote: "After my release from prison I found proof that Wittig had worked as a Communist agent for many years. As such, he appeared on the witness stand at my trial and perjured himself. When state authorities opened an investigation on Wittig, he disappeared in East Berlin." Dr. John was only partially correct. Wittig, a Communist agent for many years, indeed disappeared in East Berlin in December 1961, but not as a brother spy welcomed in from the cold. He was arrested as a swindler and double agent for the West.*

For years Dr. Carl Wittig, agent of the Third Reich, agent of prewar Czechoslovakia, agent of the United States, agent of West Germany, Communist Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, lived as a parasite on East-West hostilities, switching his loyalties several times to take advantage of momentary financial rewards. In 1962, he was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years in East Berlin, and when Bonn offered Communist Germany 80,000 deutsche marks for him in 1969, he was released and sent home.

GENERAL AGAYANTS' CONGRATULATIONS

In February 1964, Colonel Josef Houska, the commanding officer of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, appointed me deputy chief of a new Department for Active Measures. Structured according to the Soviet pattern and entrusted with designing and directing disinformation and black propaganda operations against the United States and its allies, it quickly became the favorite department of the Soviet advisors. Czechoslovak disinformation specialists successfully discredited West German politicians and American representatives and fooled the inexperienced leaders of the developing countries. Covert action became institutionalized, better orchestrated, and more diversified.

*Several weeks after Wittig's arrest, East German state security reported to Prague that Wittig admitted not only his cooperation with pre-World War II Czechoslovak and Nazi intelligence (Sicherheitsdienst) but also his personal involvement in the Tikhachevsky affair. A popular Soviet commander and the best military strategist in the Red Army, Tikhachevsky had fallen victim to Nazi intrigue and Stalin's paranoia. Labeled an imperialist agent, Tikhachevsky was accused of treason and shot in June 1937. According to the East German report, the plan to eliminate Tikhachevsky and his closest advisors was developed by Nazi intelligence, which manufactured several forgeries bearing Tikhachevsky's name, "proving" his treason. Wittig was supposedly used as one of the messengers. As soon as the disinformation about a conspiracy of high Red Army officers reached Prague, President Beneš passed it to Stalin without suspecting that it was a Nazi intrigue. Wittig's admission of his role in the Tikhachevsky affair during his interrogations in an East German prison is not very reliable evidence, of course. The interrogations were less than gentlemanly and the frail Wittig would probably have caved in and signed anything under pressure. Nevertheless, the reaction of Soviet advisors in Prague and the KGB headquarters in Moscow were surprising. They showed absolutely no interest in clarifying this tragic episode in modern Soviet history.

An operation designed in the spring of 1964 under the cover name "Neptune" and conducted in cooperation with the KGB became a test case of the new department's operational skills and imagination. One night during the last week of May 1964, I plunged into Bohemia's Black Lake and carefully placed four large asphalt-coated cases on the bottom. Several weeks later, the cases were "discovered" by a Czechoslovak television team shooting a documentary film on legends involving the lake. The find was presented to the public as an important set of Nazi archives. It marked the beginning of an extensive disinformation action against West Germany, and it was evaluated in Moscow as one of the most successful operations of that period.

Original Nazi documents from Soviet and Czechoslovak archives were presented to the press as documents recovered from the Black Lake and were used in Italy, France, Austria, and West Germany to compromise certain individuals and damage West Germany's public image. Although the operation did not convince the West European public that the present-day regime in West Germany was a practical and ideological outgrowth of Nazi Germany, it contributed to the decision by the West German government to extend the statute of limitations for the prosecution of war crimes.

Under direct Soviet supervision, the Czechoslovak disinformation department during the next few years designed hundreds of games against the United States, improved old deception techniques, and developed new ones. When Ivan I. Agayants, the commanding officer of the Soviet disinformation department, visited Prague in 1965, he congratulated Czech subordinates on their successes and emphasized the need to strengthen coordination among the Warsaw Pact intelligence services.

Most victories were scored in developing countries troubled with high unemployment, complicated social, linguistic, tribal, and economic problems, aggressive nationalism, influence of military officers on political affairs, and considerable naiveté among political leaders. Latin America, with strong anti-American sentiments, was particularly fertile and responsive to East European provocations. Using Mexico and Uruguay as operational bases for the remainder of the Continent, Czechoslovak intelligence focused primary attention on Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, as well as Mexico and Uruguay.

In February 1965, the service sent me to several Latin American countries, including Brazil and Argentina, to make a personal appraisal of the political climate there and search for new operational ideas. At the time, Czechoslovak intelligence had numerous journalists at its disposal in Latin America. It influenced several newspapers ideologically and financially in Mexico and Uruguay and even owned one Brazilian political journal until April 1964. But disinformation was traditionally linked in large measure to falsification techniques.

Operation Thomas Mann was approaching its finish when I arrived in Brazil. The objective of the operation was to prove that American foreign

policy in Latin America had undergone fundamental reevaluation and transformation since President John F. Kennedy's death. We wanted to highlight America's policy of economic exploitation and interference in the internal conditions of the Latin American countries. According to the fabricated theory, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas A. Mann was the author and director of the new policy. We wanted to create the impression that the United States was imposing unfair economic pressure on South Americans with policies that were unfavorable to the investment of U.S. private capital. We also wanted to create the impression that the United States was pushing the Organization of American States (OAS) into a more active anti-Communist stance while the Central Intelligence Agency planned coups against regimes in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba. The operation was designed to warn the Latin American public against the new hardline American policy, incite more intense anti-American outbursts, and brand the Central Intelligence Agency as the notorious perpetrator of antidemocratic intrigues.

The operation relied only on anonymous channels to disseminate a series of forgeries. The first forgery, a counterfeit United States Information Agency press release in Rio de Janeiro, contained the fundamental principles of the "new American foreign policy." The second forgery was a series of circulars published in the name of a mythical organization entitled "Committee for the Struggle against Yankee Imperialism." The stated purpose of this nonexistent organization was to alert the Latin American public to the hundreds of CIA, DOD, and FBI agents masquerading as diplomats. A third forgery was a letter allegedly written by J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Thomas A. Brady, an FBI operative. The letter credited the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency with successful execution of the Brazilian putsch in April 1964.

The forged USIA press release in Rio de Janeiro was mimeographed and distributed in mid-February 1964 in a simulated USIA envelope to the Brazilian press and selected Brazilian politicians. A cover letter attached to the release and purportedly written by a local USIA employee asserted that the American chief of the mission had suppressed the document because it was too frank. He revealed that he had managed to retain several copies and that he had given them to the Brazilian press because he was convinced that the public should know the truth. In conclusion, the anonymous writer stated that he could not reveal his name because he would risk losing his job.

On February 27, 1964, the forgery appeared in the Brazilian *O Semanario* under banner headlines "MANN FIXES HARD LINE FOR USA: WE ARE NOT PEDDLERS TO BE BARGAINED WITH," and an anti-American attack accompanied the text of the forged press release. Several days later, on March 2, 1964, Guerreiro Ramos, a member of the Brazilian Labor party, delivered a speech in which he commented on the new policy attributed to Thomas Mann and concluded that the United States had obviously returned

to the hard line of John Foster Dulles after President Kennedy's death. (He later acknowledged his mistake and explained that the statement attributed to Mann was based on a forged document.) In a published statement on March 3, the American ambassador in Rio de Janeiro answered Brazilian officials that Mann had never proposed such policies and that the embassy had never issued the press release.

In the months that followed, the leftist Latin American press used the name Thomas A. Mann as a living symbol of American imperialism. On April 29, 1964, the pro-Communist Mexican weekly *Siempre* printed an article referring to the so-called Thomas Mann Plan against Latin America, and added that the plan called for the overthrow of the governments of Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Cuba and the isolation of Mexico during 1964, and the Uruguayan journal *Epoca* repeated the accusation on May 20. Two weeks later, the first secretary of the Uruguayan Communist party spoke in parliament in the context of a discussion on American exports and accused Thomas Mann of "cynically favoring coup d'état." When the American embassy in Montevideo the following day published a reminder that the so-called Thomas Mann Plan was a forgery, the Communist organ *El Popular* responded on June 5, 1964, with an article eloquently titled "Mister Mann: Guerrilla Plan for All Latin America." Even as late as June 16, 1965, the leftist Mexican journal *El Dia* printed a quarter page announcement of the "National Coordinating Committee for Support of the Cuban Revolution." The article asserted that, in 1964, Mann had guided Operation Isolation, designed to undermine Cuba's position as the leader of the anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America.

As mentioned earlier, a second technique used in this disinformation campaign consisted of circulars and proclamations disseminated in the name of the fictitious organization, the Committee for the Struggle against Yankee Imperialism. Most of these documents identified American representatives in Latin America as spies, including diplomats, businessmen, and journalists. The selection of candidates was relatively simple. U.S. publications contained valuable biographical data on American diplomats and employees of various official and private organizations operating abroad. It was easy to select candidates whose biographical backgrounds were in tune with the purpose of the deception. These fictitious accusations were accepted in most cases as reliable information.

In July 1964, the Latin American public received additional "proof" of American subversive activities in the form of two forged letters signed by J. Edgar Hoover. Both were addressed to Thomas Brady, an FBI employee. The first, dated January 2, 1961, was a congratulatory message on the occasion of Brady's twentieth year of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Its purpose was to authenticate a second letter dated April 15, 1964, to the same person.

Washington, D.C.
April 15, 1964

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. Brady:

I want to take this means to express my personal appreciation to each agent stationed in Brazil for the services rendered in the accomplishment of "Overhaul."

Admiration for the dynamic and efficient manner in which this large scale operation was carried out, in a foreign land and under difficult conditions, has prompted me to express my gratitude. The CIA people did their part well and accomplished a great deal. However, the efforts of our agents were especially valuable. I am particularly pleased that our participation in the affair was kept secret and that the Administration did not have to make any public denials. We can all be proud of the vital part the FBI is playing in protecting the security of the Nation, even beyond its borders.

I am quite aware that our agents often make personal sacrifices while fulfilling their duties. Living conditions in Brazil may not be of the best, but it is encouraging indeed to know that because of loyalty and the realization that you are contributing a vital if not glamorous service to your country you stick to the job. It is this spirit which today is enabling our Bureau to successfully discharge its very grave responsibilities.

Sincerely yours,
J. E. Hoover

As the text implies, the intention of the forgery was to prove direct American involvement in the overthrow of Joao Goulart's Brazilian government. The Czechoslovak service would have preferred to place all blame on the Central Intelligence Agency, but the reason for including the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the American conspiracy was quite prosaic—the service had no sample of CIA stationery at the time. The falsification and one of the circulars mentioned earlier first surfaced in the Argentine journal *Propositos* on July 23. It was followed by a chain reaction in the Latin American press as individual journals took turns in spreading this "new wave of American subversive activity."*

THE POLITICAL SPRING

My assignment as an expert in covert action with the Czechoslovak Department of Active Measures ended in December 1966, when I landed in Vienna, Austria, under diplomatic cover as a press attaché with the Czechoslovak

**Ultima Hora*, Santiago, July 24, 1964; *Vistazo*, Santiago, July 27, 1964; *El Siglo*, Santiago, July 28, 1964; *El Popular*, Montevideo, July 28, 1964; *Prensa Latina*, Montevideo, July 28, 1964; *Marcha*, Montevideo, July 31, 1964; *Epoca*, Montevideo, August 1, 1964; *Combate*, Santiago, August 1, 1964; *El Siglo*, Santiago, August 2, 4-6, 1964; *El Dia*, Mexico City, January 17 and 20, 1965; *La Gacota*, Bogotá, March-April, 1965; and probably many others.

legation. Monitoring the activities of several prominent agents was part of my job. My major responsibility was to identify new espionage candidates among prominent Austrian politicians, journalists, and foreign correspondents stationed there. A year later the Czechoslovak Communist party, under the leadership of Alexander Dubček, moved toward what was called "socialism with a human face." A series of reforms were expected to revitalize socialism in Czechoslovakia and give it a more democratic image, but Prague's political spring of 1968 was neither antisocialist nor anti-Communist. Many party members involved in the process considered it the last opportunity for communism in Czechoslovakia. Their primary motive was to save communism, give it new life, and restore the people's trust in the party. They believed that a revival of communism was possible only if the Communist party openly admitted its mistakes, punished everyone responsible for the crimes of the old regime, and installed an entirely new type of political and economic management based on democratic principles.

By the end of February 1968, I sent to Prague a memorandum outlining the objectives and dimensions of a new Czechoslovak intelligence service strictly controlled by the parliament and the government. The idealism that led to formulation of this memorandum was as naive as it was inflammatory. Many state security offices in Czechoslovakia perceived the democratization process as a mortal danger. Deputy Minister of National Defense General Vladimír Janko shot himself in his official car on March 14; Josef Brestanský, deputy chairman of the Supreme Court, disappeared from Prague under mysterious circumstances and was found hanging by his neck in the woods near Prague on April 2; and Lieutenant Colonel Jiri Pocepický, chief of Prague's Department of Public Security, committed suicide on April 25.

Even the intelligence service was struck by fear. The smoke-filled offices of service headquarters saw more discussion than work. Many operatives had started their careers in counterintelligence as organizers of staged provocations against so-called domestic enemies. Now the past had suddenly become a merciless threat. Speculation about a democratic future brought many operatives to the same conclusions: the best that they could expect was loss of their jobs, high pay, and the standard of living to which they had become accustomed.

I often thought about my own situation during this period. Was I better than most Stalinists only because I submitted a courageous proposal identifying myself with a liberal element while many others were still waiting? I had to admit that I had been lucky during the early fifties—the worst years of post-war Czechoslovakia—because I had been in university classrooms instead of hunting and killing so-called counterrevolutionaries. If I had been a few years older, I might have become a murderer for the party like some of my colleagues because, at the time, I had followed party orders just as blindly as these men.

But the new socialist model was sentenced to death before it was allowed to grow and mature. Big Soviet brother did not approve of the democratic concepts and initiated a series of moves to crush the experiment. The final irony of my experience in covert action was to observe KGB agents in Prague apply disinformation techniques, black propaganda, and political extortion against Czechoslovakia, a loyal ally of the Soviet Union for more than twenty years. In May and June 1968, anonymous pamphlets and threatening letters frequently appeared on the doors of houses, telephone poles, and telephone booths and carried the following or a similar affectionate salutation:

Dear friends and comrades!

We workers, Communists, exhort you to fulfill your civic responsibilities to the socialist state! We are warning you against the revisionist group which has penetrated the Party and state apparatus and which, with the help of the press, radio, television, films, and literature, is demoralizing the people. This group stands intellectually against the workers and seeks to put an end to the leading role of the working class, to liquidate the Party as a whole, and thus to deliver a death blow to the socialist achievements of Czechs and Slovaks.

Put an end to unrestrained discussion, stamp out the screechers and careerists!

There was no signature, only the appeal, "Don't waste time or it will be too late!" Liberal journalists and writers considered by Moscow as the brain trust of the democratization movement received many threatening anonymous letters. Among these people was Eduard Goldstücker, the first Czechoslovak envoy to Israel, a victim of anti-Jewish hysteria in the 1950s and head of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in 1968. The Soviets and their collaborators in the Ministry of Interior were intent on terrorizing and intimidating the liberals and creating the impression of widespread opposition among the "healthy party cadres."

When Moscow needed visual evidence of imperialist intrigues and the danger of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, the KGB manufactured it. On July 12, 1968, for example, two days before a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries, employees of the Czechoslovak district security department in Sokolovsko were anonymously informed of a cache of weapons hidden under a bridge over a canal between the towns of Mýtina and Arnoldov. Security officials indeed found a store of weapons at the designated place, including 20 Thompson submachine guns; 35 full chambers, each with 21 cartridges; 756 machine gun cartridges in metal boxes; and 30 Walther pistols. This small arsenal was packed in five knapsacks with the English inscription "NORTH-OCEAN-PAK" and 1968, the year of production, stamped in white. The Soviet perpetrator left obvious clues to suggest shipment from the West.

The first to attack was the Bulgarian press in reports that forces of reaction in Czechoslovakia were actively preparing a counterrevolution. Hidden weapons were reputedly being discovered throughout Czechoslovakia, and waves of tourists were flooding the country, much the same as they had thronged into

Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Munich Agreement that preceded Nazi occupation of the country. The Bulgarian Communist daily *Rabotnichesko Delo* attacked Czechoslovak government and party officials for their passivity toward the dissidents. And, on July 22, 1968, the Czechoslovak Communist party daily newspaper *Rude Pravo* published a statement by the new liberal Minister of the Interior. The minister presumably stated that weapons had been found in Sokolovsko, but "the general consensus is that the hidden arms were a provocation aimed at dramatizing the situation in Czechoslovakia." The pseudoevidence represented by the weapons was discussed thereafter in many articles, commentaries, and speeches in the five Warsaw Pact countries that later participated in the invasion.

American imperialists and West German militarists were not the only scapegoats accused as behind-the-scenes directors. World Jewry was presented in a similar role. To lend credibility to presumed connections between Czechoslovak Jews and antisocialist forces abroad, a forged letter in the name of Simon Wiesenthal, the head of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna, was produced in poor German and mailed to several hundred people in Czechoslovakia. In the document, dated May 21, 1968, Wiesenthal called on Czechoslovak Jews to support the democratization process, since it would lead to improved relations with Israel and the German Federal Republic, and he also asked Jews to collect information on anti-Semitism in Communist countries, including Czechoslovakia. When he was informed of the incident, Wiesenthal issued a statement branding the document a forgery. The proof was simple: Wiesenthal had not used the letterhead shown on the forged document for years. The perpetrators had not done their homework.

After learning about the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia in the morning hours of August 21, 1968, I made the decision to defect. Several days later, I crossed the Austrian-West German border, asked American authorities for political asylum, and, two months later, I landed in the United States. Until August 1968, the Czechoslovak intelligence service was one of the best and most creative services in the Soviet bloc, and its operatives were politically more reliable than KGB operatives. After the invasion, an endless series of defections reflected the moral disintegration of a service that had once been a recognized pillar of the Soviet empire.

Chapter 2

Espionage Giant

I met many Soviet operatives during my fourteen years in the Czechoslovak intelligence service, and all of them were men of human strength and weakness. Some were ignorant, politically blind chauvinists for whom everything made in Russia was superior. Some had only vague ideas about the complexity of intelligence work and attempted to hide their ignorance behind official smiles and positions. Others were skillful professionals who enjoyed the adventurous nature and financial benefits of their jobs and showed little concern for Stalin, Brezhnev, or Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Operatives who entered Soviet intelligence immediately after World War II were for the most part dogmatic and ignorant of foreign cultures, but a new generation of KGB officers, far more polished, sophisticated, and accomplished in manners and foreign languages, appeared in the late 1950s. Chosen for their loyalty, appearance, and family connections with party and agency officials, the new breed of KGB candidates includes graduates of Soviet universities and institutes, particularly the prestigious Institute for International Studies in Moscow. In addition to courses dealing with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they study foreign history, culture, languages, and official diplomatic techniques. After joining the KGB, they are subjected to intensive schooling in methods and techniques employed by the intelligence service. When a KGB officer completes training in foreign policy and clandestine techniques and begins to operate in a foreign area, he radiates more self-confidence and personality than a diplomat without the KGB connection. The mundane and boring Russian diplomats are not usually KGB members. A KGB official dresses more elegantly, entertains more freely, and shows more individuality even in discussing sensitive foreign policy issues and Soviet politics.

Alexander Bogomolov belonged to the new breed. I met him in October 1961 on a hunting trip arranged by the East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for members of the diplomatic corps. Our friendship ended two years later when the Czechoslovak intelligence service reassigned me back to Prague. Nevertheless, the small, slender press attaché of the Soviet embassy in

Berlin was an exception among his colleagues. He spoke perfect German, and he could play the role of a native German and even use one of the difficult local dialects without a trace of foreign accent.

Bogomolov's father served as a Soviet diplomat in Germany before World War II and sent his son Alexander to German rather than Russian schools, a feat considered a major violation of political and security policy by orthodox Soviet officials. Like many other supposed traitors in the late 1930s, he was arrested and executed—a victim of Stalin's conspiracy paranoia. Soundly educated in international relations and world history and well informed about the latest international developments, Alexander Bogomolov was more realistic in his political judgments and perceptions than most of his colleagues, but he was exactly like them when he was allowed free expression of his feelings about Germans. His experience as a soldier in the Red Army during World War II left an ugly scar on his stomach and blind, physical hatred of Germans.

We spent many evenings and weekends together, enjoying music, political conversation, fishing, and scuba diving, but we never discussed the subject of espionage. Violation of the elementary rule of professional secrecy seemed very unprofessional to both of us. But I observed his performance at numerous diplomatic meetings and private parties, which both of us attended in our search for new victims. A charming conversationalist, Bogomolov easily mixed with a crowd of Western politicians, journalists, or artists and attracted their attention because of his intelligent and witty remarks rather than his official label as a Soviet representative. Operatives of the Bogomolov type became visible at Soviet embassies in the 1960s and they continue to fill KGB ranks. In comparison with American operatives, KGB officers are better trained in the cultural traditions and customs of their host countries, and they maintain a wider range of human contacts than their American counterparts because of their skill in local language patterns.

In an article on Soviet spying in the San Francisco area, the *San Francisco Chronicle* in May 1978 noted that employees of the Soviet consulate are part of a new breed of spy, meticulously trained and often young and attractive. They tell deprecating and disarming jokes in fluent English about their own country, and their initial contacts are invariably friendly, low-keyed, and seemingly innocuous. Of forty-two consulate employees, at least fourteen were positively identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as KGB operatives, among them the vice-consul, Vasili Khlopyanov, and the commercial vice-consul, Vladimir Alexandrov.

Dimitri I. Yakushkin, a KGB station chief in Washington, D.C., from March 1975 until January 1982, is an example of the new breed of Soviet operatives. Since he had served previously for six years as head of the KGB at the United Nations in New York City, his twelve years in the United States

gave him unique perspective and knowledge of the American adversary. With a degree in economic science and the rank of major general, the fifty-eight-year-old Yakushkin is fluent in English and is one of the best Soviet intelligence strategists. American diplomats describe him as a political moderate supposedly interested in human rights issues.¹ The image of a moderate Communist with a human face is one of the elementary tactics employed by KGB operatives.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti—the Committee for State Security) is the latest name of an organization that was established by order of the Council of People's Commissars on December 20, 1917, as an investigative agency under the name CHEKA (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage). As the title suggests, the CHEKA was initially charged with defensive intelligence directed toward surveillance and penetration of anti-Soviet movements at home and abroad. It rapidly became a political force committed to extermination of domestic opponents of the Soviet system and subversion of the non-Communist world. The first head of CHEKA, Felix Dzerzhinski, who is hailed in Eastern Europe as a dedicated and unscrupulous revolutionary, stated in 1918: "The CHEKA is not a court . . . The CHEKA is obliged to defend the Revolution and conquer the enemy even if its sword does by chance sometimes fall upon the heads of the innocent."² Despite protests by party officials that CHEKA was recruiting many sadists, criminals, and degenerates, both Lenin and Trotsky approved Dzerzhinski's terrorist methods.

Over the years, CHEKA has been renamed several times and known as the GPU, the OGPU, and NKVD, the NKGB, the MGB, and finally, the KGB. Officially subordinate to the Council of Ministers but directly controlled by leaders of the Communist party, the KGB is an intelligence agency, a counterintelligence organization, and an internal security policy force with its own uniformed military branch. With administrative offices in every city and operatives occupying positions in the regular police, army, government, factories, universities, and mass media, it effectively controls the whole Soviet structure.

According to estimates by American and West European intelligence organizations, the KGB involves approximately 500,000 people, of which 90,000 are believed to be directly employed in intelligence and counterintelligence work.³ Most members of the KGB staff direct prisons and labor camps, guard Soviet borders, and insure the personal safety of party and government leaders. The KGB's budget has grown steadily to an estimated \$10 billion in 1977

compared with the \$7 billion spent by the United States during the same year on the CIA, NSA, and other intelligence agencies combined.⁴

U.S. foreign intelligence and domestic counterintelligence are assigned to several agencies to prevent a dangerous accumulation of power, but the KGB synthesizes both. It is divided into various "directorates" whose number and functions are changed from time to time. The First Main Directorate, consisting of some 20,000 officers, is responsible for foreign intelligence and covert action and is headed by Lieutenant General Aleksander M. Sakharovsky. From 1967 to 1982, the entire KGB apparatus was commanded by General Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, who became a full member of the Politburo in 1973. The following year he was awarded the Order of Lenin for his revolutionary services. A man of contradictions, Andropov was more intelligent and better informed about the Western world than any other member of the Politburo. He stepped down as head of the KGB in May 1982 after he was reappointed to the Communist party's ten-member secretariat, which manages the day-to-day affairs of the party. A sequence of several important changes followed. Vitaly Fedorchuk was named the new head of the KGB but kept the job for only seven months. Shortly after Leonid Brezhnev's death in November 1982, Yuri Andropov became Brezhnev's successor as the general secretary of the Communist party and Fedorchuk was appointed minister of internal affairs. Viktor Chebrikov, one of the KGB's two first deputies and Andropov's close supporter, became the new KGB chairman.⁵

The KGB's First Main Directorate is not the only clandestine organization that collects secret information abroad. A military intelligence service known as the GRU (the Main Intelligence Administration) is a highly professional and generally effective service attached to the General Staff. For about two decades after its establishment in 1918, the GRU maintained considerable independence against the gradually expanding predecessor of the KGB who finally took clear precedence in 1937 at the expense of the GRU. With some 10,000 officers, the GRU is much smaller than the KGB's First Main Directorate, and its operatives are primarily army, navy, and air force career officers who have completed postgraduate training at the Military Diplomatic Academy in Moscow.

The occasional transfer of experienced KGB officers to the GRU as professional reinforcements and political watchdogs insures substantial KGB control over its major domestic competitor. From 1959 to 1963, for example, the chief of the GRU was General Ivan Serov, former chairman of the KGB. Like other national military intelligence services, the GRU collects and evaluates mainly military information, but the scope of its operations is much broader. Technological and scientific discoveries with military implications and economic and political developments that may influence foreign military perceptions and decisions are also in great demand. Naturally, there is considerable

duplication with the KGB, which conducts perhaps three-fourths of all Soviet foreign intelligence.*

When the Western press reports clandestine activities of the Soviets, it usually combines the GRU with the KGB although a considerable volume of public information is available on GRU operations. Some of the more notable GRU networks were maintained in the United States under Colonel Boris Bykov in the 1930s, in Canada under Colonel Nikolai Zabolotin in the mid-1940s, in Western Europe under the name of the Rote Kapelle during World War II, and in Shanghai and Tokyo under Richard Sorge in the 1930s and 1940s. The atom spies—Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and the Rosenbergs in America and Britain and Colonel Stig Wennerström, arrested in Sweden in 1963—were also GRU operatives.

Except for the first few years after the Revolution, Soviet foreign intelligence operated behind a wall of official secrecy, and Soviet leaders refused even to admit its existence. As late as 1962, Nikita Khrushchev claimed that "espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage."⁶ Beginning in 1964, however, the Soviets publicized pre-World War II, wartime, and a few postwar espionage cases as part of a campaign to improve the KGB image. Richard Sorge's adventures in Japan, Colonel Abel's mission in the United States, and Kim Philby's services as a Soviet spy in Britain are notable examples. When Ivan Udal'tsov, the Soviet ambassador to Greece, was accused in 1976 of funneling \$25 million to the Greek Communist party, he called a press conference and among other things said: "I was not upset by those reports of the KGB connection. The KGB is a highly respected organization set up by Lenin to protect the socialist revolution and the Soviet state."⁷

AGENTS

Just as modern war still requires the soldier, modern espionage depends on the agent. Despite such incurable diseases as excessive bureaucratization, obsession with secrecy, rigid compartmentalization, political purges, and continuing defections, the Soviet Union maintains the world's largest and most

*The literature authored by Soviet defectors also mentions Soviet Naval Intelligence as a specialized branch, but nothing is known about its activities and it probably ceased to exist as a separate branch years ago. The same is probably true of the Border Guards Intelligence, which was dissolved in 1965 as a special branch in Czechoslovakia, a step taken only after the KGB took a similar measure in Russia. Until then, the Border Guard Intelligence operated in a narrow strip of territory along the Czechoslovak-West German border focusing primarily on the quality of border protection on the opponent's territory. Neither the Naval Intelligence nor the Border Guards Intelligence was entrusted with active measures or deception operations.

efficient intelligence system. Many Soviet agents were discovered in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and Third World countries between 1950 and 1982, but one can logically assume that they represent only a fraction of the total number still operating.

The Burgess-Maclean-Philby-Blunt case, a classic example of successful Communist infiltration of Great Britain, was aided by the reluctance of the British Foreign Office's elite to admit that any of its members could betray their country. Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, two British diplomats spying for the KGB, fled to Moscow in May 1951 after learning that British counterintelligence wanted them. Kim Philby, the man who warned Maclean and Burgess, was a former British intelligence officer who later served as correspondent for the British press in the Middle East and fled to Moscow in 1963. The fourth man, Sir Anthony Blunt, advisor to the Queen's Pictures and respected member of British high society, was publicly unmasked in November 1979 after publication of Andrew Boyle's *The Climate of Treason*. Blunt acted as a talent spotter for the KGB before World War II and passed intelligence regularly to the Russians between 1940 and 1945 while he was a member of British intelligence.*

Bruno Pontecorvo, an Italian atomic scientist and long-time Communist who helped develop the United States nuclear reactor and atomic bomb, disappeared in Eastern Europe with several leading Allied scientists in September 1950. Although no American court has convicted Pontecorvo of spying for the Soviets (GRU), there is no doubt of his guilt.

Another agent who helped the Russians with their atomic bomb was British nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs, who was sentenced in 1950 to fourteen years in prison. Released in June 1959, Fuchs flew to East Germany where he became deputy director and later director of the Central Institute for Nuclear Research at Rossendorf.

Heinz Felfe held a key position in the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, the West German equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency, and for ten years supplied the Russians with some fifteen thousand frames of microfilmed documents, including the names of West German agents in the East, codes, courier routes, regular copies of the *Bundesnachrichtendienst's* weekly digests, and monthly reports on Communist agents in West Germany. He almost completely destroyed West German intelligence operations in the Soviet Union. Felfe was arrested in 1961 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.

Dutch-born British intelligence officer George Blake was recruited in 1952. He admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had passed to the Russians numerous top secret documents of the British secret service. He spent only a short

*Andrew Boyle, the British author who unmasked Anthony Blunt in his book *The Climate of Treason*, states that Blunt was only the tip of the iceberg and claims that at least twenty-five top Soviet spies operate in Britain. "Some have died and quite a few—half a dozen—are walking free."

time in prison. With the help of an inmate and the KGB, in 1966 he escaped to Eastern Europe where he still lives.

Sweden discovered in 1963 that air force Colonel Stig Eric Wennerström had provided many secrets of the Swedish defense system to the Russians. And, while serving as an attaché in Washington, Wennerström provided data on modern American weapons to the Russians. Sweden sentenced him to life in prison.

Herman Lüdke, a rear admiral in the West German navy and deputy chief of logistics for the NATO command, committed suicide in 1968 after positive identification as a Communist agent.

Following the defection of KGB officer Oleg Lyalin, who operated in London under cover as a trade official, the British government felt compelled in 1971 to expel 105 Soviet diplomats, trade mission officials, and other representatives involved in espionage.

Egyptian President Nasser's chief confidant and intelligence adviser, Sami Sharaf, was recruited as a Communist agent during the heyday of Egyptian-Soviet relations, and served until he was arrested by President Sadat in 1971. Through Sharaf, the KGB controlled the intelligence provided to the Egyptian president for most of his decisions on national and international policy.

Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire, retired commander of Switzerland's civil defense troops, was sentenced in June 1977 to eighteen years imprisonment for passing top secret information about Switzerland's 680,000 militia to the Soviets. Although he was thought to be a militant anti-Communist, Jeanmaire developed a close relationship with the Soviet military attaché in Switzerland. He was recruited and served as a Soviet spy for thirteen years.

Stanislav A. Levchenko, a KGB operative who worked in Japan under journalistic cover as a correspondent for the magazine *Novoe Vremya* (New Times) until his defection to the United States in 1979, named several prominent Japanese politicians as his informants: socialist politician Shigeru Ito, former Labor Minister Hirohide Ishida, and Takuji Yamane, editor-in-chief of the daily paper *Sankei*. Levchenko characterized Japan as a "paradise for spies." Fifty-nine-year old Major General Yukihiisa Miyanaaga, an official in Japanese intelligence before his retirement in 1972, and two of his accomplices in the Japanese Defense Agency were arrested in January 1980 as Soviet spies.*

In January 1983 the South African police arrested Commodore Dieter Felix Gerhardt, the commanding officer of the country's major naval base at Simonstown near Capetown, and his Swiss-born wife, Ruth. He transmitted South African military secrets to the Soviets from 1962 to 1983, and his wife

*Since World War II, Japan has had virtually no laws applying to official secrets, and freedom of the press provides the Soviets with much important political, economic, and military data. The major objective of spies is simply to confirm or supplement what has been openly obtained. From 1945 to 1978, Japan prosecuted only forty-eight espionage cases, including six Russians.

helped him as typist and courier. He was later sentenced to life in prison, and she was sentenced to ten years.

Soviet-bloc agents today occupy decision-making positions in many countries around the world and their influence is growing. No country is immune. Even the United States with its modern, politically alert and technologically superior counterintelligence is vulnerable.

THE MAIN ENEMY

The United States has been an important target of Soviet intelligence since 1917, but it has been the "main enemy" since World War II. In the early period the Soviets relied heavily on agents among Communist party members and political sympathizers, but for the last three decades, the major source of secret information has been mercenaries and victims of blackmail.

When the first Soviet operatives arrived in the United States in the early 1920s, they encountered a problem that did not exist in other Western countries. Most members of the American Communist party were uneducated recent immigrants with no access to classified information and no productive contacts with the American working class. By 1925, the party had only 16,325 members.⁸ Although Soviet representatives and travelers to the United States spent considerable effort to recruit agents, they achieved negligible results and acquired only a limited volume of information. But the situation changed when the United States officially recognized the Soviet Union in 1934 and provided Moscow with the opportunity to use diplomatic cover for its operatives. The growing threat of Nazi Germany and a worldwide campaign inspired by the Communist International for a united front against fascism helped to open the door even further for Soviet intelligence.

British-born Harold "Kim" Philby explained why he became a Soviet spy in the August 1980 issue of the Soviet weekly magazine *Nedelya*. In recalling his early days as a student, Philby stated that he found himself in a prewar Europe racked with unemployment, oppression of the working masses, and emerging fascism. "I desperately sought the means to be useful to the great movement of the time, whose name was 'communism'."⁹ He became a Soviet agent in 1934, joined British intelligence in 1940, rose to head a department for the Soviet Union and, at one time, expected to take over the whole British service. The resolute anti-Nazi and antifascist Soviet campaign also found many American supporters. Michael Whitney Straight, an American student and, in later years, editor and publisher of the *New Republic* magazine, was recruited as a Soviet agent at Cambridge University in the early 1930s. As a member of the rebellious leftist group known as "The Apostles," Straight received orders to break publicly with the Communist party at Cambridge, return to the United States and work secretly for the Soviets. According to his testimony, he met a Soviet operative in Washington approximately ten times

between 1938 and 1942 and gave him copies of various papers and reports that he had written as an official in the State Department and, later, in the Interior Department. He became disillusioned with Soviet policies and communism after the war but waited until 1963 to give his story to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In January 1983, he stated that he could name eight or ten people in the House of Lords and House of Commons who were members of the Communist party. And he estimated that an additional "150 moles have gone to their graves quietly" in England.¹⁰

Pro-Soviet sympathizers in the United States during World War II included several who had held middle-level positions with the United States government. Among them were Nathan Witt from the Department of Agriculture, Alger Hiss from the Justice Department (later State Department), and Victor Perlo from the Treasury Department. The story of Alger Hiss, who climbed to a high position within the State Department hierarchy while working as a Soviet spy, was typical of Soviet efforts at the time to use the membership of the American Communist party as a recruiting ground. Another Communist sympathizer and Soviet spy within the ranks of the State Department was Noel Field. Caught up in East European political purges after World War II, Field spent several years in a Hungarian prison as a suspected CIA spy. But he was released during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, and in the early 1960s he again worked for Hungarian intelligence, mainly as a translator and editor of anti-American forgeries. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to death in 1951 and were executed two years later as Soviet spies or passing atomic secrets to Moscow. Julius Rosenberg, a very devoted Communist, actually volunteered his services.*

The last major espionage group consisting of members of the U.S. Communist party was the Jack Soble ring. Originally an admirer and supporter of Trotsky, Soble was recruited in 1931 and instructed to penetrate Trotsky's inner circle. When Trotsky became suspicious, Soble came to the United States and in 1941 established a spy ring that received a variety of assignments ranging from theft of classified U.S. government documents to penetration of Zionist and Trotskyite organizations. Upon his arrest Soble pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven years in prison, and his brother Robert Soble was convicted for the same offense in 1961. Several members of the Soble ring were warned by the Soviets and managed to escape to Europe.

After the exposure of several prominent agents in the early 1950s, the Soviets realized that continuing recruitment among the members of the

*Although the trial of the Rosenbergs has been challenged by the American Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case and by numerous journalists, lawyers, and the Rosenbergs' children, none of them were able to provide new evidence proving the innocence of the Rosenbergs. According to the 1982 public statement of Robert J. Lamphere, who was with the FBI from 1941 to 1955, the FBI knew of the Rosenbergs' involvement with the Soviets through decoded KGB messages.

United States Communist party was increasingly risky and dangerous. The FBI penetrated the party with informers, and some agents, frustrated by massive exposure, refused further cooperation. In 1952 intelligence services in the Soviet bloc received a directive stating that they should no longer use local party members except in extraordinary circumstances. The directive forced the KGB to rely primarily on blackmail of new candidates or direct purchase of their services.

A major Soviet success was penetration of the supersecret U.S. intelligence agency—the National Security Agency (NSA), which is responsible for intercepting and deciphering the secret communications of foreign governments. Despite extremely tight American security procedures, the KGB was able to recruit several NSA officers, among them Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Both Mitchell and Martin escaped to Moscow in 1960 and were joined by Victor Norris Hamilton in July 1963 after he was threatened with arrest in this country. These men supplied the KGB with information about U.S. electronic intelligence and its technical capabilities, including locations of supersecret sensors used against the Soviet Union.

Joseph George Helmich, a former army warrant officer, was recruited in 1963 while he was a code custodian at a communications relay station for the Army Signal Corps in Paris. He supplied the Soviets with highly sensitive technological data about the KL-7 cryptosystem, a top secret coding machine, and received \$131,000 for the information. His espionage services spanned more than seventeen years and caused serious damage to U.S. security. Helmich was sentenced to life imprisonment in October 1981.¹¹

The Vietnam syndrome penetrated university campuses, congressional offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Watergate affair and the subsequent investigation of American security agencies further demoralized the ranks of the Washington bureaucracy and introduced the latest period of Soviet penetration. Although the Soviets have substantially increased their efforts on Capitol Hill since 1975, they do not rely on direct help from senators and congressmen. From the operational point of view, it is easier to approach congressional staff members because they usually know as much as congressmen, and such selected panels as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee receive copies of the CIA's *National Intelligence Daily* prepared for the President. American political secrets are still in demand but they are not the number one priority. Collection of military, scientific, and technological information is paramount. For a relatively low price, KGB operatives purchase scientific information that would cost the Soviet government hundreds of millions of dollars to develop in its own research centers. Scientific and technological data are also systematically collected by visiting Soviet scholars, engineers, and students, most of whom are specialists in the physical sciences.

In 1977, the KGB successfully penetrated TRW Defense and Space Systems Group, a California defense contractor, and obtained secrets about U.S. communication processes. Christopher John Boyce, a former TRW employee, and his associate, Andrew Daulton Lee, were convicted of selling the precious information to Soviet agents in Mexico City for \$70,000. In a major espionage coup a year later, the KGB acquired a manual for America's satellite surveillance system from twenty-three year old William P. Kampiles, a former CIA clerk who quit the agency when he was unable to become "a real spy."

Electronic intelligence has become an important source of information within the last two decades for both the American and Soviet intelligence services. The United States, for example, developed the ability some years ago to listen, via satellite poised over Moscow, to the conversations of Soviet leaders over radiotelephones installed in their limousines, and, with the help of American technology, the Soviets initiated a similar operation in Washington and New York. Officials of the National Security Agency, which also has the responsibility for insuring the security of domestic communication, became aware in 1974 that the Soviets were intercepting and recording telephone conversations within the United States between government officials, military leaders, and even private citizens. After some deliberation, President Carter approved a costly program in November 1977 to reroute all government telephone messages through underground cables rather than less secure microwave radio towers.

FBI experts discovered that the KGB uses microwave facilities in San Francisco to spy on international oil companies, the city's science meetings, computer and electronic industries and complexes. The parabolic antenna on the roof of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco can pick up the microwave traffic even if the transmissions are made more than one hundred miles away.

In the words of Hugh Tovar, former CIA Chief of Covert Action, "the Soviets are permitted to operate within the United States on a huge scale and in a manner which not only enables them to collect vast amounts of intelligence but also entails flagrant violation of the privacy of individual Americans."¹² FBI operatives referred to the wide-ranging Communist espionage offensive of the 1970s as a "totally new phenomenon." Clarence M. Kelly, FBI director in the Ford administration, stated in 1977:

The size of the Communist-bloc diplomatic, business, and cultural presence in this nation has expanded dramatically in recent years. In the last four years, the number of communist-bloc officials alone has increased 50 percent. The number of bloc visitors, including those participating in commercial, cultural, and educational exchanges, has more than doubled since 1972. Such an increased presence obviously means increased potential for intelligence operations.¹³

In a speech to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles in December 1981, Attorney General William French Smith admitted that the Soviet Union was

sending a growing number of spies to the United States under various guises: diplomats, trading company representatives, students, scientists, reporters, immigrants, and refugees.

Over the last dozen years the number of official representatives of governments with hostile intelligence activities in our country has increased by 400 percent . . . Although virtually nonexistent prior to 1973, Soviet immigration here has since then amounted to some 150,000. More recently, there has been a vast influx of Cuban refugees who, last year alone, exceeded 100,000. We believe that a small but significant fraction of these recent refugees have been agents of Soviet and Cuban intelligence.¹⁴

And, in January 1982, FBI Director William Webster confirmed that "there has been a rather extensive increase in the number of foreign intelligence-trained individuals here, mostly under diplomatic cover." For years, the FBI was able to match suspected spies on a one-to-one basis, but in the early part of the 1980s, the number of Soviet-bloc operatives increased to the point that FBI counterintelligence officers were greatly outnumbered.¹⁵

Other Western countries have had similar experiences. Disturbed by the rapidly expanding Soviet espionage network (from 200 to 700 persons in ten years) France, in early April 1983, expelled forty-seven KGB officials who had worked under official cover as diplomats, journalists, and trade representatives. The action was comparable only to Britain's expulsion of 105 Soviet spies in 1971. The French stated that the Soviets were engaged in a systematic search for technological and scientific information, particularly in the military area.¹⁶

Quite obviously, the KGB's potential in the West far outweighs the covert capabilities of the United States and its allies in the Soviet Union. And the KGB potential is further enhanced by officers and agents from satellite intelligence organizations. In 1970, the Soviet Union and its allies had fewer than 1,000 diplomats, trade representatives, and journalists in the United States, but by 1975, the number had grown to almost 1,700 and, in 1979, had reached 1,900 individuals,¹⁷ of whom more than 500 were positively identified as intelligence officers.* Considering the fact that the United States is the number-one target country, the ratio of representatives with clandestine assignments is at least 50%.** In addition to the personnel actually stationed in the continental United States, the Soviet intelligence services also use Mexico and Canada as espionage bases.

*The number does not include family dependents. Of the total number of 3,500 individuals from Soviet-bloc countries in 1975, approximately 1,700 were officials and 1,800 their dependents.

**Although the percentage of Communist intelligence operatives masquerading under diplomatic or official cover is usually under 50 percent of the staff, in certain countries it can go much higher. In 1968, for example, the Czechoslovak intelligence personnel occupied 80 percent of diplomatic positions at the Czechoslovak Legation in Vienna.

The unprecedented number of KGB operatives using this type of cover is only part of the picture. FBI officials admit that they cannot possibly monitor the activities of all Soviet-bloc nationals entering the country each year. In 1978 more than 30,000 Russian scientists and other visitors came to the United States, of whom 60 to 70% were given some kind of intelligence assignment. And TASS offices abroad are notoriously overstaffed to provide cover for KGB operatives. Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer and TASS correspondent who defected to Britain in April 1980, testified that all Soviet correspondents abroad are KGB agents to a greater or lesser extent:

A Soviet journalist is by definition an agent of political influence whether he works directly for the KGB or not. . . . Some correspondents are pure journalists while others are simply KGB agents who use journalism as a cover. Pure journalists send their information to TASS while KGB journalists have their own channels. In the final analysis, however, both perform the same function: all Soviet correspondents are agents of the KGB in some sense and all report back their conversations with Westerners.¹⁸

International agencies, including the United Nations, are also favorite KGB covers. According to Arkady N. Shevchenko, Moscow's top UN diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, approximately half of Russia's one hundred-member delegation at the United Nations are spies. West European intelligence experts estimate that some 130 KGB agents are assigned to United Nations offices in Europe.¹⁹ The highly sensitive post of personnel director at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva, for example, has been occupied since 1978 by Geli Dneprovsky, a KGB operative. The position gives Soviet intelligence direct access to confidential files on approximately 3,000 United Nations employees.

Every intelligence service, a Communist one in particular, is influenced by the political system it serves. In Communist countries, the intelligence apparatus is allied ideologically with the most conservative elements of the party and government since they appear to offer the best protective umbrella. Nevertheless, in dealing with their Western contacts, KGB officers usually express more liberal views than regular Soviet diplomats, but such tactics are used primarily to gain the confidence of a targeted individual and not to express ideological deviation from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. KGB operatives, for the most part, are professionally competent and cynical and, as Donald Jame-son, former CIA covert action specialist, states, "One must also note the difference between them and their professional grandfathers, the Comintern agents. The grandfathers believed; the youngsters don't. They are professional intelligence officers of the Soviet Union. They pursue power. Their grandfathers—most of them—thought that they were serving mankind."²⁰

One factor that motivates KGB operatives more than Marxism-Leninism is Russian nationalism. Nationalistic pride and a feeling of special contribution to Mother Russia's well-being and growth legitimate the power of KGB

operatives and simplify their identification with the Kremlin's expansionist foreign policy. Military rank, high salaries, access to foreign currency, and early retirement are KGB privileges enjoyed by very few other professionals in the Soviet Union.

SERVING BIG BROTHER

The Washington chic set referred to the masculine, elegantly dressed Teofilo Acosta as "very beguiling," "gregarious," "the life of the party," and "a bit of a ladies' man" who "even remembers your kid's birthday." American intelligence files stated in more prosaic language that he is an officer of the Directorate General for Intelligence who operates in the United States under diplomatic cover of First Secretary for the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. Until 1977, he was a member of the Cuban mission to the United Nations. Since coming to the United States in 1970, Acosta had developed a wide circle of contacts among politicians, businessmen, scholars, and journalists, most of whom were apparently not concerned about his intelligence mission. "If his assignment is to make friends for Cuba, he has done a hell of a job," said Frank Mankiewicz, then the head of National Public Radio, and he added that he did not consider Acosta a spy. "I assume any diplomat has higher patriotic loyalties."²¹ The charming Cuban who characterized himself as "a Cuban, a Communist, and a human being, in that order" is one of the top intelligence operatives in the Soviet bloc.

Operatives from the satellite countries often have more opportunities to acquire sensitive information in Washington than their Russian colleagues. Congressional staff members who would never go to lunch with anyone from the Russian embassy will talk openly with Hungarian or Polish diplomats. Many American leftists, particularly in the "radical chic" milieu, consider Marxism-Leninism a boring doctrine and ignore the Soviet Union, but they are intrigued by Cuba. Some of them have visited Cuba as members of the so-called Venceremos Brigade to cut sugar cane. After careful assessment of the participants, Cuban intelligence selects suitable candidates who may some day hold positions in the United States government or serve in some other intelligence capacity and attempts to recruit them either during their stay in Cuba or later in the United States.

In Western Europe, Canada, and particularly the United States, many citizens of Eastern European or Cuban descent maintain sentimental attachments to their ancestral homelands. When recruiting West German citizens, for example, the East German service plays upon the feeling that these individuals would work for the "other Germany" rather than the Soviet Union. Large Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian minorities in the United States are considered important vehicles for penetrating Congress and such key federal agencies as the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. When they are blackmailed and threatened with reprisals against their relatives in Communist countries, some of the selected victims agree to become spies.

The covert KGB presence in developing countries is also augmented by the personnel of satellite intelligence organizations from Eastern Europe and Cuba. Third World countries perceive East German or Czech diplomats, technicians, or advisors as representatives of small socialist countries rather than Soviet tools. This is particularly true of Cubans. Although some revolutionaries in the Third World and radical subculture in Western Europe and the United States are unsympathetic to the Soviet brand of socialism, they maintain contact with Cuban intelligence and naively believe that they are free of Soviet influence. The American Weathermen, for example, received regular instructions from Cuban intelligence in the early 1970s through one of its officers attached to Cuba's mission to the United Nations, and the Cuban mission was for some time a contact point for Weathermen members.²²

The Western press tends to underestimate the role of satellite intelligence services. It focuses occasionally on the KGB, but it largely ignores the East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Cuban services although they have made striking improvements in their techniques and operations. The satellite services are formally subordinated to their governments, but, in fact, they are directed and exploited by the KGB. Soviet intelligence is informed about every major aspect of their activities, and Russian advisors (called liaison officers) participate in planning major operations and assessing the results. No important decision is made without them.

Every satellite intelligence service adheres to a threefold chain of command. Each service is officially subordinated to the Minister of Interior (or State Security) and the Prime Minister of a given country. The second line of subordination runs directly from the intelligence service to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist party, and the third an most important line leads to KGB headquarters in Moscow. The application of the Soviet version of proletarian internationalism to relations between the Soviet and the satellite intelligence services is based on the concept of "national interests" and "international responsibilities" of each service. Under the label of international obligations is hidden the imperative of absolute obedience and fulfillment of objectives and orders from Moscow.

Long-term directives from Moscow are usually passed to commanding officers in official correspondence or at regular consultations between the KGB and satellite representatives, and Soviet advisors participate in day-to-day supervision. Until the mid-1960s, they supervised the planning and execution of every operation abroad and their instructions were unquestioned, but since then their number has been gradually reduced and they concentrate only on major operations. The advisors are secretly ridiculed by officers of the satellite services, but their professional capabilities are usually quite high. Most of

them have spent years abroad as case officers or station chiefs. They maintain a cordial tone but formal distance from the rank-and-file satellite officers, and they live very private personal lives somewhat isolated from the local population.

The Soviet intelligence school in Moscow represents another form of control. Beginning in the early 1950s, candidates for posts in the satellite espionage bureaucracy have been sent for two-year (later one-year) courses of training at this mecca of espionage science. Instead of maintaining one school for all satellites, the KGB follows strict rules of conspiracy and separates the students into several training camps according to their nationalities. The cost of these courses, including salaries for instructors, security personnel, and housing, is covered by the satellite governments. The school provides mediocre professional instruction in elementary espionage techniques and administers heavy doses of ideological indoctrination. On the other hand, it gives the Soviets a unique opportunity to familiarize themselves with the elite of the satellite services, analyze their strengths and weaknesses, and, above all, measure their political reliability. The value of such information was proved in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

An article published by *Time* magazine on February 6, 1978, analyzed the comparative strength and weaknesses of Soviet and American intelligence operations and listed KGB, Czechoslovak, and Polish organizations among the ten major services in the world. But the authors totally misjudged the East German service, although it is second only to the KGB in Eastern Europe. During the first decade after its birth in 1949, the East German service worked primarily against the Federal Republic of Germany and Western occupation forces. Growing diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic by developing countries since the early 1960s has enhanced the strength and influence of East German intelligence in these countries. For some years, East Germany has played a role with the Soviet Union and Cuba in providing not only technical and military aid to some African countries but also internal security assistance and support for black liberation movements.

Nevertheless, the Federal Republic of Germany remains the major and most vulnerable target country. Common language, history, culture, close family relationships among individuals living in East and West Germany, and compromising materials from the Nazi era give East Berlin a distinct advantage over the KGB in West Germany. Many Nazi officials found refuge in Latin America after World War II and East Berlin has used confiscated Nazi documents to recruit agents among them by guaranteeing that they will not face prosecution for their wartime offenses.

According to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, the West German equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, some 3,000 to 4,000 East German spies operate on West German territory. The East German espionage organization, now ranking among the top spy agencies in the world, has been

commanded for almost thirty years by General Markus ("Mischa") Wolf. While in the 1950s the service was known for many defections and leaks, the new generation of operatives is well trained and disciplined. Continuing distrust of the service by the KGB, Czech, and Polish officers is rooted more in the traditional Slavic anti-German sentiment than in realistic assessment of its weaknesses. As a matter of fact, today's East German operatives are more politically reliable than their Polish, Czech, or even Russian counterparts.

Until August 1968, the Czechoslovak intelligence service operated as an extremely reliable and productive component of the Soviet-bloc network in more than fifty countries. Listed among Czech agents were prominent Western journalists, and deputies in parliament, as well as foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers. The Soviet, East German, Polish, and Hungarian services were troubled by numerous defections, but the Czechs were almost totally immune to this dangerous Communist disease until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. After the military takeover of the country, several high-ranking officers defected to the West and almost brought the service to a standstill. Beginning in the 1980s, the Czechoslovak service entered a new phase of development with some 2,000 operatives. The ruthless, dedicated officers who helped the Communist party to usurp and maintain power for nearly forty years are retiring. Undoubtedly the new generation possesses better general and professional education, but it does not have the revolutionary idealism and dedication of the older generation.

The Polish service relies on the country's extensive diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and scientific contacts with the outside world. The service has some 2,000 officers stationed at home and abroad and is listed among the ten largest espionage institutions in the world. The Polish commercial fleet and large ethnic communities in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and France insure even further opportunities for the Polish service. Traditionally warm cultural relations with France offer Polish intelligence particularly favorable operational conditions in that country. The anti-Soviet outbreak in Poland in 1956 tended to isolate the Polish service from other members of the Soviet bloc. Although relations stabilized somewhat during the early 1960s, they have not reached the level of intensity and openness typical of other Communist intelligence services. Political turmoil caused by the Polish independent trade union Solidarity in the early 1980s created a new barrier of mistrust between the Soviet and Polish services.

The Revolution of 1956 interrupted development of the Hungarian service and necessitated a complete rebuilding of the Hungarian apparatus at home and abroad. For several years after the revolution, Soviet-bloc countries, with the exception of Poland, maintained operatives on Hungarian territory, recruited regular agents there, secretly collected information, and even conducted influence and disinformation operations to help the new regime wipe out the opposition. Today, the scope of activities conducted by the Hungarian

service seems much narrower in comparison with its East German or Czechoslovak counterparts and its financial resources are more restricted. Among the major operational targets are the United States, West Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Vatican. According to numerous signals, the Hungarians have been quite successful in penetrating the Vatican's hierarchy. Another asset is represented by the Hungarian refugees who left after the Revolution of 1956 and settled in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States.

Bulgarian intelligence was ridiculed even among its Communist allies as primitive and ineffective in the 1960s, but, ten years later, it had become the most aggressive and ruthless service among the Soviet-bloc countries. The Soviets have used the Bulgarians in a number of politically sensitive covert operations, such as sending arms to leftist insurgents in South Africa and Angola, smuggling weapons into Lebanon or drugs to West Germany, or assassinating prominent political activists among East European exiles in the West. Staffed with some 1,000 officers known for their loyalty and obedience to Moscow, it gives special attention to neighboring Greece, Turkey, Italy, and the Arabic countries. The assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II is perhaps the most visible action blamed on the Bulgarians.

Rumania remains an official member of the Soviet-bloc system, but since the early 1960s, relations between the Rumanian and other intelligence services within the Soviet bloc have gradually deteriorated to the point of formal, unproductive contacts. The few reports occasionally sent from Bucharest to Moscow prove only that Rumanians still consider themselves part of the East European community. But it is only a defensive gesture. The KGB does not know the identity of Rumanian agents and materials related to Rumanian unorthodox foreign policy remain locked in Bucharest.

The Cuban intelligence service was established shortly after the revolution with the help of Czech, rather than Soviet, advisors. Known as DGI (*Dirección General de Inteligencia*), it maintained relative independence until 1968 when Moscow forced Fidel Castro to subordinate the Cuban service totally to Soviet foreign interests and install an unreservedly pro-Soviet regime.

The Soviets first attempted to remove Fidel Castro in 1962 because they perceived him as too undisciplined, erratic, and difficult to control. The plan failed, however, and Castro denounced the conspirators as domesticated revolutionaries, dismantled the monolithic political party, exiled a few old-time Communists, and expelled several Soviet diplomats and KGB officers. A second Soviet plot four years later depended on help from KGB agents in the Cuban mass media, the Party Central Committee, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, and a few other central institutions. The objective of the conspirators was to draw Cuba closer to the Soviet Union, but the plot was discovered, and several KGB officers, Soviet journalists, and other officials were expelled for maintaining contact with anti-Castro dissidents.²³ Moscow drastically curtailed its economic support

during the next few months of ice-cold relations between the two countries and brought Cuba to the verge of economic collapse. The pressure proved more effective than the KGB. In return for increased supplies of raw materials, machinery, and oil, the Soviets demanded a permanent halt to all criticism of Soviet policies and supervision of the Cuban economy, as well as state security. They achieved this objective, and, in August 1968, Fidel Castro was one of the few foreign Communist leaders who openly defended the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Cubans have been particularly successful in Africa and Latin America, playing upon a revolutionary image no longer enjoyed by other member of the Soviet bloc. A large Cuban exile community in Florida and Hispanic minorities throughout the United States are vehicles used by the DGI to penetrate the "main enemy's" territory.

For many years operational contacts and cooperation among satellite services was limited to occasional consultations at the highest levels and exchange of information considered of mutual interest. But in 1965, Moscow introduced an important structural change that allows direct, regular contact among satellites at the departmental level but retains the Soviet role of chief coordinator. The new policy includes East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. At the time the Cuban service was still perceived as a young, undisciplined offspring without much to offer and Bucharest's independent foreign policy toward the West and friendly relations with the People's Republic of China practically isolated the Rumanian service from the rest of the Soviet bloc.

Eastern Europe is far from a Communist monolith and frictions stemming from various issues cause considerable problems between the Soviet Union and its satellites. But the principle Soviet demand for close cooperation on matters of security remains unchallenged. Satellite countries know that subordination of their own security organs to the KGB is viewed in Moscow as the ultimate proof of loyalty.

Table 2.1. Estimated manpower of satellite intelligence services as of December 1980.

East Germany	3,000
Poland	2,000
Czechoslovakia	2,000
Hungary	1,500
Cuba	1,000
Rumania	800
Bulgaria	1,000

NOTES

1. *Boston Globe*, 2 January 1982, p. 6.
2. As quoted by John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 88.
3. *Time*, 23 June 1980, p. 39.
4. *Time*, 6 February 1978, p. 25.
5. *Boston Globe*, 18 December 1982, p. 2.
6. As quoted by Bernard Newman, *The World of Espionage* (London: Souvenir Press, 1962), p. 125.
7. *Time*, 6 February 1978, p. 25.
8. Herbert Romerstein, "Soviet Intelligence in the United States," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence*, edited by Roy Godson, (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 165; *Fourth National Convention of Workers Communist Party*, (Chicago: Daily Worker Publishing Co., 1925), pp. 27, 37.
9. *Boston Globe*, 10 August 1980, p. 41.
10. *Boston Globe*, 23 January 1983, p. 61.
11. *New York Times*, 17 October 1981, p. 7.
12. B. Hugh Tovar, "Strength and Weaknesses in Past U.S. Covert Action," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*, ed. by Roy Godson, (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, National Strategy Information Center, 1981), p. 201.
13. *U.S. News & World Report*, 17 October 1977, p. 89.
14. *New York Times*, 7 December 1981, p. 32.
15. ABC News telecast, 3 January 1982; *U.S. News & World Report*, 18 January 1982, pp. 30-31.
16. *New York Times*, 6 April 1983, p. 1.
17. *U.S. News & World Report*, 23 February 1976, p. 18, and *U.S. News & World Report*, 10 December 1979, pp. 36-40.
18. *Times* (London), 23 May 1980, p. 8.
19. *Time*, 6 February 1978, p. 25.
20. Donald Jameson, "Trends in Soviet Covert Action," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*, ed. by Roy Godson, (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, National Strategy Information Center, 1981), p. 172.
21. *Wall Street Journal*, 21 December 1979, p. 1.
22. *New York Times*, 25 September 1980, p. B 18.
23. Barron, *KGB*, pp. 203-204.

Chapter 3

Disinformation Mills

COMMUNIST TRADITIONS

Western politicians, journalists, and scholars since the Russian Revolution in 1917 have studied, analyzed, and debated the Soviet threat to the non-Communist world. And the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 gave new impetus to the discussion. Is the Soviet threat real? George F. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the leading scholars on Soviet affairs, commented shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan:

In general, I have seen the Soviet leadership in recent years as much more preoccupied with problems that confront them than with plans for our undoing . . . I think in the immediate circumstances [in Afghanistan] their objective was primarily defensive. I don't see Afghanistan . . . as a very important strategic position for an attack on other countries.¹

For years, Kennan had a major detrimental influence on American foreign policy. Exiled Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated that George F. Kennan is "one of the more persistent architects of the myth of the moderates in the Politburo, despite the fact that no such moderates have ever revealed themselves by so much as a hint."²

Scholars and journalists of the Kennan school still believe that Soviet foreign policy is essentially defensive—to keep enemies off balance and to make the world safe for communism. Practitioners of international deception games, regardless of their loyalty, know that deception is easy to perpetrate against anyone willing to be deceived.

The Soviet love affair with disinformation and active measures began long before the Revolution of 1917 even though the operations were not identified under these labels. Vladimir I. Lenin emphasized the importance of informal penetration techniques, propaganda, agitation, and political deception as integral elements of the Communist party's strategy. In his booklet, *What Is To Be Done?* the crusader for proletarian revolution discussed the potential strength of a well organized and disciplined group of revolutionaries, tactics of infiltration and conquest, the necessity of enforcing revolutionary discipline, and the strategy required to operate simultaneously on legal and illegal levels. The booklet was required reading for generations of Marxist revolutionaries.

Shortly after the Revolution of 1917, the era of international deception and informal penetration entered a new stage. The first step in the Soviet strategic plan was to recruit large numbers of disciplined agents totally dedicated to proletarian revolution and penetration of capitalist society. A directive adopted at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 stated that the "fundamental principle of all organization work of the Communist party and individual Communists must be the creation of Communist nuclei everywhere they find proletarians although even in small numbers."³ Joseph Stalin publicly denounced Trotsky's theory of permanent, uninterrupted revolution in 1923, and the secret police branded Trotsky's supporters as enemies of the Soviet Union and Marxism/Leninism. Despite the heretical label, however, the concept of permanent revolution survived and, with certain modifications, became an integral part of Soviet strategy.

Revolutionary activities included calculated use of deception, guerrilla strikes at the nerve centers of capitalist society, and other clandestine political activity. CHEKA and its heirs became directly involved in such covert action programs as Operation Trust (1922-1927), which was a combination of strategic and political deception, counterintelligence, and provocation that humbled several Western governments, security services, and emigré centers. Over a five-year period, CHEKA planted stories in the Western press about an anti-Soviet organization operating in Russian territory, lured a number of emigrés back to Russia, and then saw that most of them were executed.

The 1930s was a period of bloody purges in the Soviet Union and in the international Communist movement. A substantial number of active measures were directed against Russian exile organizations and their leaders, particularly in Western Europe. Soviet agents infiltrated many of these groups, manipulated their leaders, and played them against each other.

Soviet intelligence recruited with minimal effort many agents among members of foreign Communist parties, and such ideological sympathizers as Kim Philby in Great Britain and Alger Hiss in the United States. These individuals were used mainly as sources of secret information and occasionally as agents of influence. And, during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Soviets sent military equipment, weapons, instructors, and a large number of intelligence and secret police operatives to implement "revolutionary justice." Hunting counterrevolutionaries, political deviants, and suspects was a routine procedure.

Most Soviet covert activities during World War II were concerned with the military situation. Soviet intelligence agencies conducted many strategic and tactical military operations focused on disinformation and psychological warfare. Special units and agencies assigned to these operations included the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate), NKVD (the predecessor of the KGB), and the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. Established in 1941 by the Central Committee of the Communist party, the Central Staff of the

Partisan Movement organized and directed espionage, sabotage, guerrilla operations, and assassinations behind German lines. According to General G. K. Tsinev, former deputy KGB chairman, these special units were also involved in disinformation and deception:

Operating in close contacts with the Red Army Staff and taking advantage of various opportunities of the moment, military counterintelligence agencies systematically misled the fascist command and its intelligence services relative to the plans and intentions of the Soviet command and to the situation on various sectors of the front. From the end of 1941 until March of 1943 alone, 80 radio stations captured by Soviet CHEKA agents from German secret agents were used to transmit false information to the enemy.⁴

The Soviets conducted another kind of psychological warfare with the help of an organization called the Free Germany Committee, which consisted primarily of German Communists and politically reliable German prisoners of war. This organization used public address systems and dropped leaflets and newspapers across battlelines to convince German soldiers that they should surrender, and over a radio station called Free Germany, statements and commentaries by prominent German military officers captured by the Soviets labeled Hitler a war criminal and suggested that German soldiers should refuse to fight.

Soviet active measures after World War II passed through several stages. The first stage (1945-1948) was characterized by revolutionary idealism of a liberated Europe and the strong ideological appeal of communism. Through skillful diplomatic maneuvering and the help of local Communist parties and secret agents, many of whom were recruited among governmental officials and military and state security operatives, the Soviets gradually changed the political system of all Central and East European countries they had helped to liberate, with the exception of Austria and Yugoslavia.

Under Soviet guidance, the Czechoslovak Communist party in February 1948 orchestrated a successful coup d'état that changed the country's democratic system into a Communist dictatorship. In Prague on March 10, 1948, two weeks after the takeover, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk, a popular public personality and a dedicated libertarian, was found dead under a window in his apartment in Czernin Palace. The new Communist regime labeled his death a suicide and arranged a state burial, but for millions of Czechs and Slovaks, Masaryk's name was the symbol of an independent, democratic Czechoslovakia. His father, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, a philosopher, skillful diplomat, and politician, was the founder of the independent Czechoslovak Republic. Jan Masaryk became the foreign minister of the Czechoslovak government in exile in London during World War II and had retained the position after the war and even after the Communist coup d'état until his tragic death. Perceived as a potential troublemaker for the new Communist regime, Jan Masaryk was assassinated by Czech state security

operatives under the command of Jindřich Veselý, who followed Soviet orders.*

The next period (1948-1959) was characterized by a visible decline in the ideological appeal of communism, considerable expansion of Soviet active measures through satellite services, and creation of a network of international front organizations to support Soviet foreign policy. The new Communist governments of the satellite countries—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania—opened the door for Soviet advisors who helped these countries build large counterintelligence and intelligence organizations based on the Soviet model and objectives. Satellite intelligence services conducted several hundred active measures in the non-Communist world between 1950 and 1959, but, since there was no central department or body concerned with design, orchestration, and coordination, their operations had only a limited impact.

Forgery was the most popular disinformation technique of the time. Various anti-American charges were supported by falsified evidence such as that contained in the so-called Rockefeller letter. In February 1957, an East German Communist daily, *Neues Deutschland*, published several pages of a letter supposedly written by Nelson Rockefeller to President Dwight Eisenhower. The forgery outlined a plan to use military and economic aid for influencing and manipulating foreign countries.⁵ Despite many misspellings and unusual political terminology that betrayed the perpetrator, all major East European Communist newspapers and a few liberal West European publications reprinted it. And, during the Korean War (1950-1953), the KGB conducted a worldwide disinformation campaign accusing the United States of using bacteriological warfare. With the help of Western journalists like Wilfred Burchett, the Soviets publicized the forged evidence in Communist as well as Western newspapers.

The decade of the 1950s was also a period of extensive terrorist activities. Some of these operations were conducted against prominent political exiles and refugees from Communist countries, like the assassination of Stefan Bandera in 1957 in West Germany. Others were conducted solely for disinformation purposes. For example, Czechoslovak intelligence was behind extensive anti-American, anti-British, and anti-French campaigns in West Germany

*In 1968, during the short "political spring" in Czechoslovakia, the Ministry of Justice in Prague opened a new investigation into Masaryk's death, but it was interrupted by the Soviet invasion in August 1968. Later, in December 1969, the Ministry of Justice came out with a predictable statement. It rejected any Soviet or Czechoslovak state security involvement in Masaryk's death and changed the original verdict from suicide to unfortunate accident. Jan Masaryk had supposedly slipped and fallen while sitting on a window sill during a bout of insomnia. The most extensive journalistic investigation of Jan Masaryk's death was conducted by Claire Sterling. Her book, *The Jan Masaryk Case* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) makes a persuasive case for political murder.

in the name of a nonexistent, neo-Nazi organization known as Kampfverband für Unabhängiges Deutschland (the Fighting Group for Independent Germany). Fascist proclamations and threatening letters against allied units in West Germany were mailed to American, British, and French diplomats and to officers and soldiers stationed there. In May 1957, Marie Tremeaud, the wife of André Tremeaud, the French Prefect of the Lower Rhine Department in Strasbourg, was killed by a bomb when she unpacked a box of cigars that had been sent to her husband. Evidence discovered by the French police pointed directly to the Kampfverband für Unabhängiges Deutschland but the real perpetrator was Czechoslovak intelligence. The objective of the operation was to prove that West Germany was still a fascist seedbed and to mobilize world public opinion against it.

The KGB established a new department within the First Directorate of the KGB in 1959 and charged it with the responsibility of dissecting enemy weaknesses, analyzing failures and mistakes, and exploiting these vulnerabilities in a massive and systematic covert offensive around the world. The department was staffed with approximately fifty to seventy highly experienced and imaginative covert action specialists. This development marked the beginning of a new era of secret games and intrigues against the non-Communist world. In the preceding period active measures had been considered secondary to the gathering of secret information. But in the decade of the sixties, the active measures became everyday occurrences in some areas of the world, particularly in Third World countries.

Between 1962 and 1964, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland followed the Soviet example and formed similar departments. The Czechoslovak Department for Active Measures alone directed and coordinated over one hundred operations in 1965. At that time, all intelligence services in the Soviet bloc conducted 300 to 400 similar operations each year. The KGB retained the role of chief coordinator but permitted and even encouraged direct operative contacts among satellite services. The Soviet disinformation department was further upgraded in 1970 to the rank of a special section known as Service A, one of only two such sections within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.

SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DÉTENTE

When Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin opened his talks with the Nixon administration in 1969, détente promised closer economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It encompassed discussions on control of water pollution, research in space biology, joint space missions, the European Security Conference held in Helsinki in 1975, and numerous diplomatic negotiations to achieve stability and peace in many areas of the world, including the Middle East. On a visit to

Moscow in 1972, President Richard Nixon signed the first strategic arms accord, and two years later, his successor, Gerald Ford, signed an interim agreement in Vladivostok for a numerical ceiling on strategic weapons.

American hopes that détente would ultimately lead to Soviet recognition of human rights and restrictions on expansionism in developing countries proved to be an illusion. Intervention by the Soviet bloc in Angola in 1975, Soviet-Cuban support of Ethiopia in its war with Somalia in 1978, and continuing suppression of human rights and jailing of human rights activists in the Soviet Union have further weakened American-Soviet relationships. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was the latest test of American patience and reduced détente to its lowest level since the large-scale Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Many American journalists mistakenly view official statements of Soviet policy as major criteria for evaluating foreign policy objectives. Even the closest analysis of official Soviet documents reveals only a superficial and quite often distorted picture of Soviet foreign policy relations. The history of the Russian Communist party before and after the Revolution explains why Soviet leaders are more confident of secret games played by the KGB to manipulate international relations than of conventional diplomatic instruments. Every change in the party's leadership has been preceded by secret behind-the-scenes games and intrigues and followed by retaliation against the supporters of the losing side. Members of the Soviet elite have always considered secret channels and methods more effective than open public statements. Marxist-Leninist principles placed severe restrictions on Soviet perception of détente from its very beginning. According to Lenin, Communists are obligated to extend the revolutionary system to all countries. The Kremlin regards détente not as a retreat or compromise and not as a political mechanism for getting along with the capitalist world; it is a strategy of class struggle and a vehicle for changing the world in the Soviet image.

To enhance their prestige and power, the Soviets interfere in, and create, troubled areas around the world. In the blockade of Berlin in 1948, military intervention in Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet tactics have been the same. Immediately after each act of aggression, Soviet leaders claim that peaceful coexistence is threatened by American and Western imperialists who seek to initiate a new cold war. They use all available propaganda to mobilize so-called progressive forces around the world against the danger of a nuclear war, and at the same time repeat the most outrageous lie that Soviet troops are either invited in or are only temporarily stationed in the invaded country.

The late Leonid Brezhnev included the following comment in his election speech on February 22, 1980: "I wish to say quite definitely that we shall be

ready to begin withdrawing our troops as soon as a complete stop is put to all forms of external interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan. Let the U.S. and the neighbors of Afghanistan guarantee this, and there will be no more need for Soviet military aid."⁶ As of 1983, twenty-seven years after the Hungarian revolution and fifteen years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Russian armies are still deployed there, and they have no intention of leaving Afghanistan.

Soviet leaders know that public outrage in the West will subside two or three years after an aggression, the press will find other more interesting topics, and American politicians will be ready for a new "constructive" dialogue. The Soviet Union has a well designed long-term offensive foreign policy strategy, but the West has no long-term counterstrategy and there is no indication that such a strategy is being developed. Thus the West will continue to react to events in a vain attempt to catch up with the Soviets rather than anticipate developments and take steps to control them.

One familiar Western observation cites continuing disputes and factions within the Communist movement and suggests that the Soviet Union is only a latter-day empire seeking to maintain its domination. For example, *Time* magazine reported on June 13, 1969, that the Communist movement had never been in greater disarray and characterized Castroism as "essentially romantic, evoking the image of the lone defiant man, bristling with machismo, who dares to shake his fist at the citadel of capitalism." Although Castro "hoped to export revolution to all of Latin America, nowhere did he score a real success." Many American journalists who subscribed to this theory argued that a faltering economy and the strains imposed by simultaneous conflict with China and the West on Soviet industrial and military resources made détente a necessity. And historic Soviet agricultural problems would make food and grain imports from the West a top priority. Unfortunately, these predictions proved wrong. *Time* admitted in 1980 that the Soviet Union was far from being an empire in decline and that Castro had extended his influence far beyond the Latin American continent.⁷

Nevertheless, the Soviets suffered a series of setbacks in their worldwide offensive during the 1970s. In Western Europe, Portugal emerged as the key Soviet target country. After the coup by General Antonio de Spínola's military junta in 1974, Alvaro Cunhal, the Secretary General of the small but well-disciplined pro-Moscow Communist party, became a minister without portfolio in the new government. The Soviets hoped that the Portuguese Communist party would gradually gain dominant influence and the country would become loosely associated with the Soviet bloc. Permission to establish military bases in Portugal would give the Kremlin a major strategic advantage vis-à-vis the United States and Western Europe. Squeezed and threatened by the Soviets from two sides, the remainder of non-Communist Europe would live

under growing psychological and political stress and eventually break completely with the United States. Despite intensive diplomatic maneuvering and massive covert operations, the Soviets were unable to divert Portugal's alignment with the West. In Africa, the Soviets show a mixed balance sheet of successes and failures. With the help of East European satellites and Cuba, they expanded their influence in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, but they suffered major setbacks in Sudan, Somalia, and particularly Egypt, once considered the key to controlling North Africa and the Middle East. American defeat in Vietnam and the Communist coup in Cambodia appeared for a time as another Soviet victory, but Pol Pot's bloody regime preferred China to the Soviet Union as its major protector. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 resolved the problem but imposed additional pressure on the Soviet economy.

Traditional Soviet expansionist strategy is based on the assumption that every successful penetration of a target country requires a relatively long period to solidify the new pro-Soviet regime and convince the West that its vital interests are not jeopardized. A major mistake by Kremlin leaders in the 1970s was their attempt to extend political and military power too far, too fast. The Soviet economy was simply not capable of meeting the demands of new and old clients.

Continuing domestic economic problems brought Russian economic growth almost to zero. Although official propaganda blames the poor harvest and even administrative inefficiency, military spending and support for Cuba, North Vietnam, and other client states consumed billions of dollars that otherwise could have been allocated to Soviet citizens. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union and improving Chinese relations with the United States forced the Kremlin to keep almost one-third of its armed forces (some one million soldiers) stationed along Chinese borders.

Americans find it difficult to play tough and preach détente at the same time. On the one hand, they are ashamed of intelligence failures and embarrassed at successes on the other. The Soviets consider covert operations as normal activities, and they are not concerned with their morality or legality. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the KGB plays a direct role in Soviet foreign policy and receives encouragement and total support for "active measures" conducted in other countries. Ten months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Akhtar Mohammad Paktiawal, a United Nations delegate from Afghanistan, rose from his seat at a United Nations conference in Belgrade and, without notes, delivered a speech that nobody expected. While the Soviet delegates sat impassively, he first denounced Soviet military intervention in his country and then turned to the hushed delegates around him: "It is up to you. We have this problem today. You will have it tomorrow."⁸

THE ART OF LYING

*All warfare is based on deception . . .
Generally in war the best policy is to
take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior
to this . . . To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.*

Sun Tsu, Chinese strategist and philosopher

It is rather difficult to find an English expression that conveys the precise meaning of the Soviet term "active measures." Such terms as psychological warfare, informal penetration, covert action, or "dirty tricks" reflect most but not all characteristics of Soviet active measures. The Soviets perceive no sharp distinction between propaganda and action, political operations and military actions, or overt and covert actions. Andrew M. Scott discusses the dilemma in *Revolution in Statecraft—Intervention in an Age of Interdependence*:

Informal techniques [active measures, covert action] are as much instruments of foreign policy as formal ones. Each can be used in conjunction with the other, and, in combination, they have often proved deadly. Hitler was adept at using diplomatic pressure on a country in conjunction with the internal pressures generated by a dissident minority or Nazi-supported movement.⁹

If we accept John E. Marston's characterization of public relations as "any situation, act, or word that influences people,"¹⁰ Soviet active measures would fall in that category. Both public relations and active measures depend on various forms of persuasive communication, but their basic objectives are different. The public relations expert wants to improve his client's public image, but the perpetrator of active measures uses public relations principles and techniques in reverse. He evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of public interest in the target country, and implements a program of action aimed at damaging the country's image, creating misunderstanding, and undermining policies and programs.

The Soviets perceive active measures (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) as clandestine operations designed to extend Soviet influence and power around the world. As the offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy, they systematically disrupt relations between other nations, discredit Soviet opponents, and influence the policies of foreign governments in favor of Soviet plans and policies. They include a broad range of secret operations involving disinformation; black propaganda; forgeries; rumors; use of front organizations; influence agents; exploitation of foreign academic, economic, or scientific elites; clandestine broadcasting; paramilitary operations and deception; support of guerrilla groups; and such terrorist activities as kidnappings and

assassinations.* Unlike American concepts of covert action, Soviet active measures include a much broader spectrum of operations, and the KGB's active members are well integrated with the mainstream of official Soviet foreign policy and propaganda. The primary target of Soviet active measures—the United States—is systematically attacked, vilified, and labeled as the major obstacle to world progress and well-being. Nevertheless, the Soviets have employed active measures on numerous occasions against other Communist countries and allies, such as Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets conduct active measures in two major categories. The first category includes operations initiated and designed within KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation techniques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds of these operations every year even though their impact is rather limited. The second category consists of operations initiated, coordinated, and orchestrated by the International Information Department of the Communist party of the Soviet Union or the International Department of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. These operations usually include both covert and overt activities and their impact is much broader. The International Information Department was established in March 1978 to improve the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda against the West. The International Department maintains contact with more than seventy Communist parties, such international front groups as the World Peace Council, and so-called national liberation movements around the world.

The creative process for active measures begins with what operatives perceive as elementary mistakes and vulnerabilities of the Western world, but the criteria for these value judgments are not necessarily shared by Western experts in foreign policy. Analysis of the delicate relationship between cause and effect, like interpretations of strengths and weaknesses, is considerably contaminated by the Marxist bias of Soviet strategists. American beliefs in contractual ethics in the conduct of international relations, the concept of reciprocity, the function of diplomacy, the role of the press, and perceptions of sovereignty and freedom are discounted as empty propagandistic slogans without substance.

Most active measures focus on an adversary's vulnerabilities and any festering malaise that may plague his politics. The successes of anti-American operations, particularly in developing countries, relate directly to the failure of American foreign policy to understand the internal problems of these nations, insensitivity of the U.S. government to their cultural and national

*In the report, "Soviet Covert Action—The Forgery Offensive," submitted in February 1980 to the Congressional Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA estimated that Moscow spends more than three billion dollars a year to prepare and disseminate foreign propaganda and disinformation.

pride, and alliances with regimes labeled as rightwing because of their anti-Communist attitudes.

On numerous occasions, particularly when official Soviet policy is in trouble, the KGB and official Soviet mass media conduct campaigns to divert attention from Soviet problems. For example, a Soviet nuclear-equipped submarine on an intelligence-gathering mission in 1981 ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. To counteract negative publicity in Western Europe and North America, the Soviet mass media immediately after the incident began promoting a Soviet plan for a Nordic nuclear-free zone, and they accused the Swedes of spying on Soviet communications systems for NATO.

Do ethical norms and principles influence the conduct of active measures? Lenin had this to say about ethics: "We repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas that are outside class conceptions Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. Everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat." In his book *Propaganda—the Formation of Men's Attitudes* Jacques Ellul states that the propagandist is not and cannot be a believer. "A propagandist who believes in what he says and lets himself become the victim of his own game will have the same weakness as a surgeon who operates on a loved one or a judge who presides at a trial of a member of his own family." The same is true of disinformation.

All effective intelligence services stage operations that grossly violate the laws of their adversaries. In fact, the effectiveness of any intelligence service is directly proportional to the degree to which it is prepared to break the laws of its adversary. The complexity and top secret nature of these operations, at times, force an intelligence service to violate the laws of its own country. The Communist services have carried out operations in direct conflict with the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Thus ethics pose no problems for Soviet active measures.

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES

Moscow's disinformation specialists know that a single covert action, however precisely designed and skillfully executed, cannot tip the balance of power between the Western Alliance and the Communist bloc. But they believe that mass production of active measures will have a significant cumulative effect over a period of several decades. Active measures are conducted according to a long-term plan usually covering a period of five to seven years. A plan is prepared initially by the KGB's First Main Directorate (A) and approved by the Politburo. Guided by Soviet advisors, every satellite service then formulates its own long-term plan for operations directly related to so-called national interests and operations characterized as international responsibilities. The second category of operations is dominant. Paradoxically,

satellite intelligence organizations expend vast financial and human resources on activities in countries where their own national interests are minimal or nonexistent.

The long-term plan states the major objectives without specifying how these could be achieved. Some reflect tactical Soviet foreign policy interests while others remain permanent objectives which cannot be achieved within the designated period.* The following statement of the Soviet-bloc long-term goals in the 1970s is based on the analysis of detected Soviet-bloc operations against the United States during that time and the author's expertise as a former insider:**

1. The United States remains the "main enemy" and major target. As such, it must be continuously discredited as an imperialist, neocolonialist power threatening world peace and the economic well-being of other nations. The Soviet bloc conducts active measures specifically aimed at

- turning world public opinion against U.S. foreign policy;
- creating favorable conditions for Soviet foreign policy by confusing the world public about the real nature of certain Soviet policies;
- isolating the United States from its allies and friends in Western Europe by creating new rifts or exploiting current differences;
- paralyzing NATO from within by convincing NATO countries that U.S. military strategy is against their national interests; and
- expanding traditional mistrust of Third World countries toward Western Europe and the United States, preventing closer economic, political, and military cooperation between the two groups, and demonstrating that U.S. goals and policies are incompatible with Third World ambitions.

2. The Soviet decision-making elite views the Central Intelligence Agency as the most important instrument of U.S. foreign policy. As such it must be paralyzed both at home and abroad through the following disinformation measures:

- capitalizing on the continuing demoralization, disappointment, frustration, and feeling of guilt within CIA ranks and encouraging further defections or public exposure of CIA operations;
- exposing the names of actual CIA operatives in a worldwide campaign;
- labeling aggressive U.S. foreign service officers, correspondents and business executives as CIA staff members;

*A list of Soviet propaganda and covert action objectives in the CIA study on Soviet Covert Action submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, on February 6, 1980, is rather narrow. It leaves out important areas like science disinformation and manipulation of U.S. domestic affairs.

**Under Soviet supervision the author participated in 1965 in the formulation of the Czechoslovakia long-term plan for active measures.

- creating opinion that the agency works not only against the Soviet bloc and the Third World but also against American allies in Western, Northern, and Southern Europe; and labeling the agency as the major source in international terrorism.

3. Unlike political disinformation, which is largely but not exclusively the responsibility of the KGB, *military deception* games are closely coordinated with the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and the GRU. The Soviets rely on deception in this area to

- deceive U.S. military experts and government officials about the actual strength, strategy, and plans of Soviet bloc armed forces, including the location of missile ramps and storage of strategic nuclear weapons;
- send out systematically distorted messages about the significance of certain Soviet military maneuvers and exercises on Soviet bloc territory; and
- influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military programs.

4. The military type of covert action goes beyond dissemination of misleading messages, however. Long-term objectives include

- physical and political demoralization of U.S. military units stationed overseas by encouraging drug addiction and exposing them to systematic propaganda aimed at undermining morale and willingness to fight for American foreign policy interests;
- supplying damaging material to the local press in countries where U.S. troops are stationed and directly or indirectly advocating their withdrawal;
- creating and misusing existing conflicts between the population of the host country and American troops; and
- providing financial support to local political parties, organizations, and movements advocating withdrawal of American troops.

5. Intelligence services in the Soviet bloc rely on overt and covert measures in U.S. internal affairs to

- build up a network of agents of influence inside the federal bureaucracy to manipulate the decision-making process;
- penetrate the American press;
- conduct smear campaigns against presidential, congressional and other public figures considered hostile or dangerous by Soviet leaders;
- conduct operations that create racial tension within American society; and
- prevent Eastern European ethnic minorities from becoming a unified bloc in the United States and undermine the public reputations of prominent East European ethnic leaders who have aggressive anti-Communist sentiments.

6. The major long-term objective of Soviet *economic warfare* and disinformation is to deprive the U.S. economy of resources vital to its prosperity and growth and to influence American economic relations with the outside world to the benefit of the Soviet Union by

- deliberately misleading the West about the Soviet economy and its needs;
- helping Soviet negotiators to achieve the most advantageous foreign trade deals with American and other foreign companies;
- manipulating the international market (e.g., gold) for the benefit of the Soviet economy;
- using foreign trade for political influence in Third World countries; and
- systematically damaging U.S. commercial relations with foreign countries by labeling American business representatives as CIA operatives and encouraging terrorist action against U.S. property and personnel.

7. In the early 1950s, the KGB and the satellite services established special departments for collecting scientific and technological information abroad. A decade later, the disinformation specialists took another step forward and began considering the developments of scientific and technological disinformation to

- mislead American, West European, and Japanese scientists and technological experts about the state of Soviet research projects, particularly those of military nature, and
- paralyze Western scientific projects considered important to future East-West military and economic competition.

THE DISINFORMATION GAME

The British police did not realize that Geoffrey Arthur Prime was one of the most important Communist spies of the post-World War II period when they arrested him on June 28, 1982, on three charges of molesting children. For nine years ending in 1977, Prime worked for the British secret electronic eavesdropping center near Cheltenham in southwestern England. At this time, the center employed more than 10,000 officers around the world in such places as Scotland, Cyprus, and Hong Kong where they listened twenty-four hours a day to radio, television, and satellite communications of foreign powers and transmitted them to the center in Cheltenham. Translators and cryptologists then decoded the messages and determined their intelligence value. The operation was conducted in close cooperation with American intelligence, which provided both financial and technological expertise.¹¹

Unlike many other prominent Soviet spies in Britain, Prime had attended a small technical college in Staffordshire rather than Cambridge University. He was recruited by the Russians in the early 1960s when, as a member of the Royal Air Force, he was stationed in West Berlin. His sexual deviation made the recruitment much easier. During his nine years with the British-American

eavesdropping center, Prime was considered an unusually quiet, private, but otherwise pleasant fellow, and nobody suspected his strange sexual escapades or contacts with the Russians. He had access to tape recordings and transcripts of all intercepted Soviet telephone, radio, and satellite communications. This material allowed the Soviets to determine very quickly not only the codes that had been broken but also how and eventually by whom. It enabled them to change codes, and feed the eavesdropping system with a massive, steady stream of disinformation. Many decisions of serious consequences for the defense of Western Europe and the United States were based on deliberately distorted information by Soviet intelligence experts. After leaving the agency in 1977 for reasons not quite clear, Prime supported himself as a taxi driver and later held a job selling wine to restaurants and hotels, but, until the end, he stayed in touch with the Soviets. In November 1982, he pleaded guilty to spying for the Soviets for a period of fifteen years and was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for espionage and an additional three years on the morals charges that led to his arrest.

Disinformation is not recognized as a word in *Webster's New World Dictionary*, and until recently, the American press avoided the term and spoke of covert action or, more directly, "dirty tricks." In the etymological dispute over meaning, many people reject "disinformation" in favor of "misinformation." *Webster's Dictionary* defines misinformation as false or misleading information based on error or ignorance, but disinformation has clearly malicious intent—it implies deception. The official *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* defines disinformation as "the dissemination (in the press, radio, etc.) of false information with the intention to deceive public opinion." The interpretation is slightly distorted because public opinion is only one of the potential targets. Many disinformation games are designed only to manipulate the decision-making elite, and receive no publicity.

Disinformation is a carefully constructed false message leaked into an opponent's communication system to deceive the decision-making elite or the public. Disinformation can be of political, economic, military or even scientific nature. To succeed, every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views, especially when an intended victim is a seasoned veteran of such propaganda practices. Without a considerable degree of plausible, verifiable information, it is difficult to gain the victim's confidence. A KGB manual discusses the role of the disinformation in these terms:

Strategic disinformation assists in the execution of State tasks, and is directed at misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of the State policy, the military-economic status, and the scientific-technical achievement of the Soviet Union; the policy of certain imperialist states with respect to each other and to other countries; the specific counterintelligence tasks of the organs of State Security

Disinforming on strategic matters falls within the jurisdiction of the government, the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the

country's armed forces. The organs of State Security constantly render assistance to the other departments on this matter


Tactical disinformation makes it possible to carry out the individual task of strategic disinformation and, in fact, comprises the principle disinformation work of the organs of State Security.¹²

Disinformation is a kind of game in which the participants play one of three roles: operator, adversary, or unwitting agent. *The operator* is author and conductor of an operation. *The adversary* may be a foreign state, its ruling authorities, or even individual citizens of the state: the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Israel, and the People's Republic of China are most often cast in the role of adversary. *The unwitting agent* is a gameplayer who is unaware of his true role and is exploited by the operator as a means of attacking the adversary. An unwitting agent can also be the target of countermeasures by an adversary who mistakes him for the real operator. The role of unwitting agent is most often assigned to personalities and agencies or the press in developing countries. The roles of adversary and unwitting agent are not circumscribed necessarily by national frontiers, even though this is most often the case. The roles of adversary and unwitting agent can also be played by governmental agencies, institutions, or even individual persons within a given country.

In one version of the game plan, the operator strikes indirectly at an adversary through an unwitting agent.




In this case the operator gears his efforts to influencing the actions of the unwitting agent who voluntarily, though unaware, takes on the indirect role of operator and strikes at the adversary on his own initiative. This occurs even at the risk of becoming the target of countermeasures by the adversary.



2) In another version, the operator strikes at the adversary, who defends himself but, without clear and concrete evidence to the contrary, mistakes the unwitting agent for the real operator.


The unwitting agent thus becomes the target of countermeasures by the adversary and takes action to defend himself. This action, in turn, leads to an exchange of charges and accusations between the adversary and the unwitting agent, to the advantage of the operator. The latter can include this eventuality in his basic operational plan, but he can also resort to this tactic on a contingency basis.

3) In still another version, the operator strikes directly at the adversary who is unable or unwilling to interpret such an attack as a hostile act.



Instead, he perceives it as a consequence of his own shortcomings or regards it as an element of the natural course of events and does not categorize it as an attack per se.

4) Finally, the operator may strike the adversary and the unwitting agent simultaneously, assuming that his thrust will trigger another exchange of hostile moves between the adversary and the unwitting agent.



To use this version of the game plan, the operator must convince the adversary or the unwitting agent, preferably both, that the unwitting agent is the real perpetrator vis-à-vis the adversary and the adversary is the real operator vis-à-vis the unwitting agent.

All of these involved relationships between the operator, adversary, and unwitting agent share one common characteristic: the initiative, impetus, or triggering of an attack emanates from the operator, who conceals his identity, either by hiding under a cloak of anonymity or by launching his moves indirectly, via the unwitting agent or even the adversary himself. These variations constitute ideal situations, in which the real operator is able to keep his role secret. There are, of course, instances in which the operator is partially or completely exposed and subjected to countermeasures taken by the government of the target country. This happens rather rarely, however. Even though an adversary occasionally may "break the code" of some operation, usually he does not have enough evidence to identify the operator or to prove his guilt beyond a shadow of a doubt.

THE GAME AGAINST DR. KISSINGER

Rumors of Dr. Kissinger's role as a Soviet spy have circulated among Washington officials, diplomats, and journalists for a long time. Old-timers in the KGB state that everybody has his breaking point, depending on the approach, circumstances, and time, and the personal histories of many prominent Westerners who have been recruited as KGB agents seem to confirm the theory. Nobody is perfect, neither Dr. Kissinger nor Michael Goleniewski, a former Polish intelligence officer who defected in 1960 and who, according to some reports,* is the original source of rumors against Dr. Kissinger. After coming to the United States, Goleniewski claimed that he was the Grand Duke Aleksei Nicholaevich Romanoff, who secretly escaped from Russia to Poland with his father, Czar Nicholas, after the Communists seized power in 1917.¹³ Goleniewski stated during the debriefing process that he had personally seen evidence of a KGB spy ring in which an American, code-named Bor, was working for the KGB, and he said that Bor was actually Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard professor and foreign policy advisor.¹⁴ Goleniewski's theory, written down by Frank Capell and published in 1974 by the Herald of Freedom under the title *Henry Kissinger: Soviet Agent*, did not attract much attention. Two years later, the conservative monthly *American Opinion* repeated the accusation and stated that Henry Kissinger had been named "by the extremely well-placed source whose accuracy in such matters has been faultless as a member

*See "Secret Police" by William P. Hoar, *American Opinion*, April, 1975, p. 35.

of the KGB ring known as Odra, going back to his World War II days in Germany.”¹⁵

While these accusations were undermining his reputation and loyalty at home, Dr. Kissinger was smeared abroad as the principal author of the “treacherous, selfish American foreign policy.” In November 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger signed an eleven-page memorandum and sent it to American diplomatic and consular posts in Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Vienna, and London. The memorandum was prepared by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, approved by the National Security Council, and distributed under Dr. Kissinger’s signature. It set priorities for all overseas U.S. intelligence-gathering units, open or covert. Kissinger’s memorandum surfaced in Western Europe in the summer of 1976—this time as a forgery. American diplomats learned about its existence when the government of an allied country protested sharply against American interference in its domestic affairs. The fake document demanded information about ministers and officials who might be corruptible in each country and heads of state who might be disloyal to the NATO Alliance. The original document asked for the perceptions and objectives of policymakers, but the forgers demanded information about the personal feelings of “the President of France, the Chancellor of West Germany and the prime ministers of Britain, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Canada” and “detailed information relevant to their disloyalty to policies and objectives in the NATO alliance.”

The original State Department memo requested economic information that would help it understand the changing world financial situation. The pseudo-document referred to bribes: “Detailed reporting is needed on the possibilities and ways to influence, financially and otherwise, individual ministers, law-breakers and other significant political and bureaucratic elements in these countries to adopt strategy and policies beneficial to U.S. interests.” The perpetrator maintained most of the original wording, but typed additions in relevant places. For example, one original paragraph requested “information as to the likely content and timing of projected domestic and foreign economic policy decisions by government or actions by major economic groups such as unions or producer associations and the sources of uncertainty as to timing and/or content.” The forgers added these words to the request: “Current and forecasted development of their trade with the USSR, China and other Eastern bloc countries and timely detailed information on possibilities to eliminate their competition and to protect important U.S. commercial interests in this area.”¹⁶ The purpose of the forgery was to show that the U.S. government worked closely with big business in conspiratorial ways for commercial exploitation of American allies.

A year later Dr. Kissinger’s name reappeared in connection with another Soviet disinformation scheme. This scheme involved an official of the Soviet

Foreign Ministry, Anatoly N. Filatov, who had become a CIA spy and supposedly one of the most valuable operatives on the CIA payroll. Sent to Algeria in the early 1970s, Filatov agreed to become a CIA spy after an American agent caught him in a sex trap and confronted him with compromising pictures. Shortly after his recruitment, he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and continued supplying the U.S. government with information considered valuable by CIA analysts. Filatov's reports then began to conflict with other CIA sources, and CIA operatives feared that he had been discovered and turned by the KGB. Suspicions heightened in the early months of the Carter administration when Filatov's reports became obviously misleading. The Soviet disinformation department had stepped in and started feeding Washington with falsified data. In 1977, Filatov provided Washington with a verbatim copy of a cable sent by Soviet ambassador Dobrynin to the Politburo recounting a private breakfast conversation with former Secretary of State Kissinger. The meeting was supposedly requested by Kissinger, who used it as an opportunity to attack Jimmy Carter's handling of the SALT II negotiations.

According to the cable, Dr. Kissinger blamed the Carter administration rather than the Russians for the lack of progress in the arms negotiations and told Dobrynin that President Carter was a prisoner of his own ideological illusions and his national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski who was dogmatically anti-Soviet. Dobrynin's cable also stated that Dr. Kissinger asked him to pass along his best wishes to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. The document was potentially damaging to Dr. Kissinger but most CIA officials involved in the case doubted its authenticity and dismissed it as disinformation. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that he had breakfast with Dobrynin in April 1977 but that the allegations were totally false. Dobrynin requested the meeting, but Dr. Kissinger offered neither solace nor advice about the new SALT proposals.

The Filatov-Kissinger story, printed in *Newsweek* on July 21, 1980, opened the gates of Washington rumor mills and attracted the interest of other reporters who uncovered additional bits of information concerning further bizarre episodes. After a closed military trial, the Soviet court sentenced Anatoly Filatov to death on July 14, 1978, on charges of spying for an unnamed foreign power, but the sentence was never carried out. Filatov's lawyer, Leonid M. Popov, told Craig Whitney, *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow, that the sentence was commuted to fifteen years in prison.¹⁷

Disturbed by continuing rumors and speculation, Senators Daniel P. Moynihan and Malcolm Wallop, members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, requested an investigation of the case in early September 1980. Their letter to the chairman of the committee included these remarks:

Over the past year we have seen the daily press, *Newsweek*, and even the London Daily Telegraph discuss details of what appears to be a major intelligence failure which the U.S. has suffered—the loss of an important human source in the Soviet

Union. According to these articles, suspicion has even arisen that a mistake by a senior government official may have contributed to this problem. It is unhealthy for suspicions of such matters to fester, and it is, of course, intolerable for the issue to be debated in the press by a series of leaks and counterleaks. . . . We therefore ask you to convene a series of closed hearings to explore what has happened to our human intelligence collection in the Soviet Union in recent years"¹⁸

Rumors circulating among Washington bureaucrats, diplomats, and journalists suggested that Filatov's identification as a CIA agent was caused by a leak. David L. Aaron, deputy assistant to President Carter for national security affairs, supposedly exposed Filatov by inadvertently mentioning his activities to a Rumanian diplomat at a Washington party. The Senate Intelligence Committee announced on December 5, 1980, that it had found no credible evidence of any kind to support the allegations. A few days later, both FBI and CIA investigators reached the same conclusion.

Why did the Soviets try to hurt Dr. Kissinger's public image even after he left Washington and what did they accomplish? For Soviet propagandists, the name Kissinger is a valuable commodity. It is well known around the world and is thus very useful as a vehicle for propaganda. By spreading disinformation about Dr. Kissinger's loyalty and undermining his reputation, the KGB attacks the whole American political system. The results are not statistically measurable, of course, but the KGB evaluates these deception games in broader political terms. To an American political analyst or journalist the episode might appear as wasted effort with an uncertain and negligible impact. But, in the eyes of Soviet strategists, the Kissinger game might have contributed to the anti-American psychosis around the world. Nobody can say that they are totally wrong.

Propagandistic Disinformation

Official Soviet propaganda directed at developing countries tends to present the Soviet Union as the unchallenged champion of peace and disarmament and systematically attacks the West, particularly the United States, as imperialists who are by nature unsympathetic to the needs and ambitions of the Third World. Soviet propaganda beamed through official channels to the West is more sophisticated and subtle in the sense that it avoids blatant distortions of truth and seeks to influence Western audiences with messages depicting the economic well-being or the peaceloving nature of Soviet bloc citizens. The major objective of official Soviet bloc propaganda abroad is the promotion of positive friendly images of the Soviet Union.

Propagandistic disinformation developed by the KGB strives for internal demoralization and erosion of power in target countries, but the source and the goals promoted are hidden from the audience. Disinformation messages

frequently contain large segments of correct information and, to inspire confidence, may even criticize the leadership of the country from which the disinformation originates. Every effort is made to present the message in such a manner that it dissuades leaders of a target country from critical analysis of the deceptive segments. The overall purpose is not only to deceive but to cause damage to the target. The victim of disinformation must be led to inflict harm upon himself, directly or indirectly—either by acting against his own interests on the basis of spurious information or by remaining passive when action is needed.

Propagandistic disinformation takes many forms: rumors, leaked forged documents, campaigns organized in the world press with the help of agents of influence, books, and radio and television campaigns. Any communication channel can be used to disseminate the message, but, since the purpose of the message is to trigger a chain reaction in the mass media, choice of the best medium for surfacing the story is most important. In making this choice, Soviet bloc operatives have always preferred newspapers or magazines to broadcast media because disinformation published in print media has a touch of permanency and history. More important, it offers easier surfacing and orchestrating. The broadcast media usually cover eight to twelve major stories in a single newscast and thus do not give the perpetrator the proper attention and opportunity to transplant the message.

The KGB measures the success of propagandistic disinformation in two ways. First, it is interested in the attention given to the message outside the Soviet bloc, the amount of public discussion generated by the message, and the prevailing political tone of the discussion. Second, it determines whether a message forces a target country to make any political changes that could directly or indirectly benefit the Soviet Union.

What makes the disinformation message credible and acceptable even if the source is anonymous or unreliable? Most disinformation clearly serves the receiver's needs by playing upon his prejudice and bias. In developing countries, for example, disinformation focuses on existing stereotypes and prejudices against Western countries, their cultures and social order. Even a crude forgery of an American governmental document is readily accepted and used as a visual symbol of the American evil because it gives the audience consistency and psychological solace. Extremists on each end of the political spectrum, left or right, are usually the easiest targets for deception. Without a healthy degree of tolerance and skepticism, they tend to accept even bizarre accusations and reports of conspiracy reaching them from unreliable sources if the messages are tuned to their political bias.

The United Nations is an international organization that deserves special attention for the role it plays in overt and clandestine propaganda campaigns conducted by the Soviets. As an organization that helps to shape world public opinion and plays a vital peacekeeping role, the United Nations is a major

battlefield for the Soviet Union and the United States. Among the 32,000 members of the UN diplomatic community in New York, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Israel, the People's Republic of China, and other countries have large contingents of intelligence operatives. But the Soviet Union maintains the most impressive intelligence organization, consisting of the largest single concentration of Soviet spies anywhere in the West. One American intelligence operative estimates that the Soviet network, including KGB and GRU officers and ideological collaborators among Soviet officials employed by the UN Secretariat, totals approximately 1,000 people.¹⁹ Spying in New York is so pervasive that some diplomats refer to the United Nations as "the stock exchange of global intelligence operations." Electronic spying and counterspying are not only obvious but tolerated. Most UN delegates reject protection against spying because it would give the impression of police surveillance.

Skillful Soviet diplomacy, propaganda, and disinformation campaigns largely changed the political direction of grievances in the Third World. The traditional North vs. South character of the UN discussions (developed versus less developed countries) has been redirected by the Soviets into an East vs. West conflict.²⁰ In the 1982 General Assembly, Third World nations voted with the Soviet Union an average of 83.4% of the time, and the same group voted an average of 20.4% of the time with the United States.²¹

Most propagandistic disinformation employs the simple technique of forging a document with outrageously compromising content and delivering it anonymously to the mass media.* On Tuesday, September 16, 1980, a number of black-oriented radio stations, several newspaper offices in Washington and New York, and UN diplomatic representatives from black Africa received a copy of a document with potentially explosive political consequences. The following day, a group of black ministers called a news conference at UN headquarters in New York to expose "racist American foreign policy toward black Africa." The ministers demanded a series of administrative actions, among them immediate dismissal of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council. The Reverend William A. Jones, leader of the National Baptist Convention and convener of the National Conference of Black Pastors, presented the evidence: a copy of what appeared to be a thirteen-page presidential memorandum stamped Secret on every page and bearing Brzezinski's

*To enlarge the collection of letterheads and signatures of prominent Western individuals, Soviet intelligence services use a very simple but efficient method. Operatives stationed abroad under official cover as diplomats, journalists, or representatives of various trade organizations send out a large number of greetings to their foreign counterparts and prominent individuals each Christmas. As etiquette dictates, they receive similar messages signed and sometimes even written on letterhead stationery.

signature. When asked how he acquired the document, Jones stated that he had received a copy from "a reliable source"²² and that the implications would be a priority item for the National Conference of Black Pastors in Chicago later that year. The compromising revelations were discussed the same evening on several radio stations in the New York and Washington area.

The White House became alarmed when a number of journalists called press secretary Jody Powell to verify the authenticity of the document. At a quickly arranged press conference on September 17, 1980, Powell distributed a copy of the document to reporters "in order to put this story down because," as he said, "this document is indeed a forgery, fabricated with some skill and disseminated in a calculated manner." Entitled "Presidential Review Memorandum NSC 46," the lengthy document was purportedly a study of the relationship between the black movement in the United States and black Africa and was requested by Brzezinski on March 17, 1978. It was addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The content was indeed embarrassing for the Carter administration, since it called for American support of South Africa and surveillance of black American leaders. It also recommended action against "coordinated activity of the black nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States" and suggested that American intelligence agencies monitor and collect sensitive information on black UN representatives who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The document further proposed "a special program designed to perpetuate divisions in the black movement," neutralize "groups of leftist radical orientation," and stimulate "dissension and hostility" among black organizations. The perpetrator obviously intended to turn American blacks against their government, damage the public image of Zbigniew Brzezinski, and turn the black diplomatic community at the UN against the United States.

Twelve national security papers were declassified during the Carter administration in response to requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act. At least one of them fell in the hands of the perpetrator who used it as a model for formulating the NSC 46 pseudodocument. White House officials familiar with the format of NSC presidential review memoranda pointed out that the document used government jargon adopted during the Nixon administration but abandoned by the Carter staff. Instead of referring to the Policy Review Committee, a term used by the Carter administration, the document referred to an NSC Interdepartmental Group on Africa, a term used during the Nixon era. The actual NSC 46 was a paper dated May 4, 1979, and was a review of U.S. policies toward Central America. When asked about the possible perpetrator of this disinformation, Jody Powell stated that it was unclear whether the forgery was the work of a hostile power or domestic political opponents of President Carter.

The NSC 46 forgery had all the earmarks of forgeries by the Soviet bloc, but none of the major daily newspapers reporting the incident related it to the forgery offensive analyzed in a comprehensive CIA report and distributed to the press in February 1980. Despite White House denunciation of the document, it left a residue of suspicion among black diplomats stationed in the United States and black American leaders. Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, a lobbying group for more aggressive policy toward South Africa remarked: "It certainly is possible that the administration could be responsible for the document."²³ The possibility that the document was a product of the Soviet disinformation mill was briefly considered, but in the opinion of most Washington officials interviewed at the time, the forgery had been produced by a domestic group either on the left or the right.

The NSC forgery more or less exemplifies the problem of identifying proliferating Soviet forgeries and exposing the real face behind this international menace. Because of their strong political bias, American leftist media tend to accept forgeries without giving much attention to the elementary verification procedure. And such prominent middle-of-the-road newspapers as the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* usually report incidents in a serious, detached manner, but in the absence of verifiable proof of Soviet involvement, they remain cautious. Perhaps the extensive costs and time would not justify their own in-depth investigations. On the other hand, ultraconservative publications and media critics devote much time and energy to the danger of Communist penetration, but their balance sheet is also mixed. Considerable volumes of unsubstantiated suspicions and accusations cast doubt even on their respectable disclosures of Soviet mischief. Meanwhile the Soviets continue their disinformation games.

Rumor

Another widely used disinformation technique is rumor, employed particularly against political exiles, refugees, and defectors from Communist countries. Jerzy Kosinski, a refugee from Poland and a prominent writer in the United States, has for years been a target of Communist slander. The campaign seemed to reach its zenith on June 22, 1982, when the *Village Voice* of New York published a lengthy article accusing Kosinski of two unforgivable sins: plagiarism and cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency. The paper stated not only that Kosinski's novel, *The Painted Bird*, was written in Polish and then translated into English without crediting the translator but also said that the author had fabricated facts about his biography: "Kosinski, it appears, has a habit of saying anything that he thinks his listeners will find interesting, or attractive, or flattering. The net effect is that almost nothing he says can be relied on, everything must be checked." And the paper charged that the Central Intelligence Agency "apparently played a clandestine role" in

the publication of his first two books. The article opened an argument with strong political overtones in several prominent publications, including the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, the *Boston Globe*, and others. Kosinski, a refugee who became a highly successful writer and celebrity, is an important target not only because he serves as an example and an inspiration for many young Poles but also because he has made strong political statements against the current Polish regime. For example, he spoke over the Voice of America in March 1982 and asked Western countries to deny financial loans and economic support for the military government of Poland, and, on numerous occasions, he has campaigned for the release of political prisoners in Poland. Kosinski's eccentric lifestyle, unusual past, and exotic private life offer Polish intelligence endless opportunities for slander, of course.

The key figure and source of most anti-Kosinski disinformation has been Wieslaw Gornicki, a correspondent for the Polish press agency PAP at the United Nations in the sixties and a high official in General Jaruzelski's military regime in the early 1980s. During his stay in the United States, Gornicki systematically spread rumors against Kosinski among his American contacts and friends. He was also the author of several articles published in Polish newspapers and magazines repeating the accusations. In 1969, for example, he referred to Kosinski as

the bard on duty, wordly genius and typical gigolo Every emigré child knows that it is not Mr. Kosinski who writes so well in English, but a man called Peter Skinner—an authentic Englishman with an Oxford education, who has been hired as a ghost writer Jerzy Kosinski is the biggest literary fraud in the last several years.²⁴

A series of other attacks in the Polish press followed and the Polish literary periodical *Tworczosc* (Creativity) stated in 1973 that Kosinski plagiarized the novel *The Career of Nikodem Dyzmy*. The Polish campaign against Kosinski is not an isolated case. Soviet, East German, and Hungarian intelligence services use similar techniques against prominent political refugees. For example, the Czechoslovak disinformation department spread rumors in the 1960s among political dissidents at home and Czechoslovak refugees abroad that Pavel Tigrid, a prominent writer and publisher of the literary quarterly *Svědectví* (Testimony) in Paris, was actually a Communist agent who only pretended to oppose the current regime. The operation was designed to undermine Tigrid's influence among Czech and Slovak intellectuals and it seemed to work until the political spring of 1968 when it was exposed in the press.

Agents of Influence

When Sergei Kauzov, a third-rank Soviet official, married the Greek shipping heiress Christina Onassis in Moscow in August 1978, the mass media around the world speculated as to whether the marriage was based on

Kauzov's extraordinary masculinity or on Onassis' conversion to Marxism-Leninism. But the most significant question was how the Soviet authorities (KGB) permitted a loyal Soviet citizen to wed a capitalist aristocrat. When the marriage ended in divorce in May 1980, on grounds of "irreconcilable differences," the KGB was disappointed because Kauzov's romance with Onassis would have been an opportunity to use him as an agent of influence. Gaining at least partial control over Onassis' oil shipping empire would have been a major asset in Soviet strategy.

According to Soviet intelligence doctrine, an *influence agent* is an individual who occupies an important position in the governmental, economic, journalistic, scientific, or social hierarchy of the target country and, in one way or another, is capable of influencing the decision-making process or public opinion. Candidates for this demanding role are not necessarily in total agreement with Soviet political perceptions. For example, foreign students attending East European universities are potential agents of influence recruited during their stay in Moscow or East Berlin on the basis of their anticipated careers upon returning home. This long-term approach pays handsome dividends in Third World countries where a university education is an extraordinary asset.

The KGB collects, from open and clandestine sources, a great volume of information on the vulnerabilities, ambitions, prejudices, and irregularities in the sexual lives of potential candidates. Equipped with this intimate profile, Soviet bloc operatives decide whether to manipulate the individual through blackmail, play upon his idealism, or exploit a desire for revenge. The effort usually pays off. In 1954, for example, the First Directorate of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior (foreign intelligence) blackmailed one of the top operatives in Austrian counterintelligence. For more than a decade, this agent, operating in the network under the cover name Number Seven, successfully manipulated Austrian security, and thanks to his reporting, the Soviet bloc operatives and agents in Austria were relatively safe. More important, he engaged Austrian counterintelligence in actions that amounted to nothing more than a waste of time and money.

Agents of influence who collaborate with the Soviets on the basis of mutual political or ideological sympathy are handled with greater caution and sensitivity. Instead of receiving regular financial payments, some influence agents are rewarded with high medals, honorary degrees, and ranks. The story of Günther Guillaume, a former West German government official who worked for Chancellor Willy Brandt, is an example of an agent of influence par excellence. Günther Guillaume was an East German intelligence operative who arrived as political refugee in West Germany with his wife, also a spy, by faking their escape from the German Democratic Republic. For some time, he was in charge of a spy ring in Frankfurt while he quietly worked his way up in the ranks of the Social Democratic party. When he became a personal assistant to Chancellor Willy Brandt, his primary responsibility was to act as an agent of influence. He had access to highly sensitive information and, at the

same time, an opportunity to manipulate the Chancellor's decisions on many important issues. Guillaume and his wife Christel were finally arrested in 1974 and sentenced to thirteen and eight years, respectively, but his case had a major impact on West German political life even after his arrest. It prompted Willy Brandt's resignation and prematurely ended his "Ostpolitik" of improved relations with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The couple was exchanged in 1981 for a group of Western spies imprisoned in East Germany.

Government officials in Bonn, including Günther Nollau, the Director of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (the West German equivalent of the FBI), conceded that other spies of Guillaume's caliber were probably operating at the highest levels of government. A short time later, speculations surfaced in the press that the best placed East German agent in Bonn was not Guillaume but Günther Nollau himself. Nollau had also left East Germany as a refugee in 1950. Although these allegations were probably KGB disinformation intended to discredit West Germany's major spy hunter, the Social Democrats had committed a major mistake by appointing a refugee from a Communist country to occupy this highly sensitive government position.

Some individuals in Washington, D.C., are funding controversial public campaigns, buying influence in the mass media, and arranging junkets for congressmen, senators, government officials, and journalists within the framework of the law. Lobbying, sometimes called the "fifth estate" for its influence on American government, is rated among the ten most powerful American institutions. The term is used for any attempt by a private interest group or a foreign government or company to influence the decisions and actions of the legislative, executive, or even judicial branches of the government.

In April 1977, there were 633 registered agents of foreign interests in the United States: lawyers who once held high government positions, former congressmen, senators, campaign managers, and media experts. The largest group of registered lobbyists of foreign interests represents the biggest trading partners of the United States (i.e., Japan, Canada, France, and West Germany). Under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, an individual representing foreign interests must be publicly registered. The law includes criminal penalties for failure to register, but the U.S. government's policy under several administrations has been to pursue only civil prosecutions. The last criminal prosecution under this law occurred in 1963.²⁵ The General Accounting Office states that many lobbyists violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to inform the Justice Department of their activities on behalf of foreign governments. In a 1980 survey of 1963 foreign agents, the office found that only 30 percent of them were adequately reporting their activities to the Justice Department.²⁶ Soviet leaders do not think

highly of the American system of lobbying and the KGB does not instruct its lobbyists to register. Actually, it considers them agents of influence and maintains secret contact with them.

The *New York Times* published an article on U.S.-West German relations on March 20, 1975 by Jonathan Story, European Institute of Business Administration, Fountainebleau, France, and James F. Sattler, who identified himself as "a foreign affairs consultant and writer on European-American relations." The article maintained that, behind the appearance of harmony in West German-American relations, there were growing economic problems, friction, and conflicts of interest. "America has ever more economic and ever less political interest in West Germany, America wants Germany as the European paymaster, but Germany balks at being 'Europayer,' " the authors said. Although they described the American-West German relations as a time bomb, the article was written in a cold, scholarly manner and attracted only minimum attention.

The author, James Frederick Sattler, had worked since 1972 for the Atlantic Council of the United States, a nongovernmental organization established in 1961 to promote better understanding among the nations of the NATO alliance and Japan. He completed a major project dealing with East-West trade to the satisfaction of the director general of the council. When he applied for a job as minority staff consultant to a sub-committee for the House International Relations Committee, it seemed that he would be hired, but he was rejected. The FBI informed Congressman Findley, who recommended Sattler, that Sattler's connections to Eastern Europe were highly suspicious. In short, he was an agent of the East German intelligence service.

When Sattler learned about the investigation by the FBI, he came out of the cold and, on March 23, 1976, filed a foreign agent's registration statement with the Department of Justice, hoping it would get him off the hook, but he disappeared shortly thereafter. When asked if he had any knowledge of the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage tactics of a foreign government or foreign political party, he responded positively and described his recruitment in 1967 by an East German intelligence officer named Rolf. He also stated that, in the following years, he transmitted to East Berlin "information and documents which he received from NATO and from individuals and government agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Canada and France."²⁷ He photographed a portion of this information with a microdisc camera, and placed the microdisks in packages that were mailed to West Germany and then to East Berlin. According to his own statement, he occasionally photographed documents with a Minox camera and delivered them himself or handed them to a courier. In addition to an "honor decoration" awarded him by the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic, he received approximately \$15,000 for his services.

American espionage law applies precisely to information related to national defense, which, when transferred to a foreign country, would be detrimental to the United States or advantageous to a foreign country. Sattler disappeared, but the Justice Department did not intend to prosecute him anyway. A spokesman for the Justice Department stated that there was a "lack of essential witnesses." Sattler was still missing as of May 1982.

Front Groups

The Soviet Union has a wide range of propaganda assets at its disposal: the news agencies TASS and NOVOSTI, international radio broadcasting, such as Radio Moscow and, smaller but more aggressive, Radio Peace and Progress; clandestine radio stations stationed in Eastern Europe, such as the National Voice of Iran and the Voice of Italian Emigrant; large numbers of books and magazines distributed worldwide in more than fifty languages; and some seventy-five pro-Soviet Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc.

To lend credibility and mass appeal to its foreign and domestic policies, the Soviet Union has also established a network of international organizations which serve as facades for their operations. Among them are the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the World Peace Council. The organizations are used to influence the public behavior of various social groups in support of Soviet policies and to provide Communist intelligence services with useful cover.

The peace movement, for example, is one of the most important vehicles of Soviet deception. The long-term Soviet policy of using peace and pretending to report unsolicited reaction against the militaristic U.S. foreign policy was initiated in September 1947 by Soviet representative Andrei Zhdanov at a Comintern meeting in Poland. The World Peace Council was established in 1949, and it operated from headquarters in Paris until the French government expelled the organization in 1951 for what it called "fifth column" activities. Since the first World Peace Congress held jointly in Paris and in Prague in April 1949, meetings and assemblies have been staged roughly every three years in the following cities: Warsaw 1950; Vienna, 1952; Helsinki, 1955; Stockholm, 1958; Moscow, 1962; Helsinki, 1965; East Berlin, 1969; Budapest, 1971; Moscow, 1973; Warsaw, 1977; Sofia, 1980; Prague, 1983. All these meetings, carefully staged to achieve their propagandistic and political objectives, regularly endorse Soviet foreign policy and attack policies of the United States and other Western nations. The KGB participates as a silent, invisible operator connecting secretly broken lines and occasionally instructing its agents to take part in the campaigns.

The international front groups masquerade as financially and politically independent, non-Communist institutions, but in 1978, they received financial support from the Soviet Union in the amount of \$63 million. They mirror

official Soviet foreign policy and spread major Soviet propaganda themes to create an impression of massive public support for Soviet policy throughout the world. And, the front organizations are occasionally used as channels of disinformation or black propaganda.

Extensive use of front organizations has exposed many of them as instruments of Soviet foreign policy and has forced the Soviets to search for new forms of cover. In the 1950s, for example, the International Union of Students, with its emphasis on international solidarity, cooperation, and social justice, attracted many Western students who rebelled against what they perceived as an exploitative and highly competitive Western social system. Twenty years later, the International Union of Students is still a useful vehicle for manipulation of Third World countries, but the Soviets have switched to different tactics in the West. Instead of creating a new international front organization, they try to penetrate and manipulate a number of legitimate national and international organizations, think tanks, and foundations.

Scientific and Technological Active Measures

The Scientific and Technical Directorate (Directorate T) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB is the most profitable component of the Soviet espionage establishment. KGB operatives claim that, in terms of money, the Scientific and Technical Directorate's contribution to the Soviet economy far outweighs the financial cost of maintaining the entire Soviet intelligence system. It is entrusted with the theft of Western industrial, scientific, technological, and economic secrets, including data on nuclear and space research. With more than 500 operatives, primarily graduates of Soviet universities and technology institutes and a large number of consultants, advisors, and agents in prominent Soviet research and industrial centers, the Scientific and Technical Directorate has, for the last twenty five-years, been the fastest growing operational sector of Soviet foreign intelligence. The mission of the directorate is to enhance both the Soviet economy and the military with technological and scientific data that would cost the Soviet Union billions of dollars to develop at home. It cooperates closely with the State Scientific and Technical Committee (GNTK), which coordinates and regulates basic scientific research and dictates scientific priorities according to directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Shortly after World War II, several top Soviet agents in the American and British scientific elite (Pontecorvo, Fuchs, and the Rosenbergs) gave the Soviets the most valuable information they had ever received: the secret for manufacture of the atomic bomb. With it, the Soviets gained equal status as a superpower in the international arena. Agents are recruited among Western scientists, technological experts, and scholars to collect secret information of a scientific and technological nature abroad, and to conduct active measures that may strengthen the Soviet economy and science and weaken opponents.

Most of these operations involve smuggling Western technology to the Soviet Union. Between 1981 and the end of 1983, U.S. customs agents confiscated more than 2,300 illegal shipments worth almost \$150 million.²⁸ In 1983, for example, the Soviets secretly bought a giant VAX 11/783 computer manufactured in the United States by Digital Equipment Corporation of Maynard, Massachusetts, for possible use in guiding missiles and keeping track of troops. It was seized in Hamburg shortly before it was to be transported to the Soviet Union via Sweden.*

Development of scientific disinformation has proven to be a more difficult intelligence assignment than work in other areas. Deception of top scientists in the enemy's camp involves more than a few propagandistic slogans or skillfully formulated forgeries. It requires a high level of scientific expertise that can be obtained only from top Soviet scientists and not all of these have been willing to risk their reputations. An exception is the area of social sciences. Marxist/Leninist doctrine justifying the mingling of social science with politics and requiring an intensive ideological struggle against international capitalism simplifies the KGB's task of recruiting helpers among Soviet social scientists.

The KGB has far more confidence, authority, and freedom of action in the political arena than in economic or scientific games. Failures of active measures to achieve political objectives are easily explained to the Politburo as "objectively existing obstacles," but the KGB loses much of its self-confidence and aggressiveness when large amounts of Western currency are at stake in the conduct of economic and scientific measures. A loss of several million dollars in a complicated international campaign might be interpreted as a hazardous waste of state property, and the authors could be sent to prison for damaging the Soviet economy.

The rapid growth of computer technology offers perpetrators of Communist disinformation opportunities totally unknown several years ago. If a few bright American high school students can break computer codes and manipulate sophisticated business and university computers, professionally trained KGB operatives and computer specialists can accomplish the same feat. Extracting valuable intelligence from a computer or feeding a computer network with skillfully designed disinformation creates a new challenge. On a small scale, it can continuously irritate the victimized institution or company but the potential is much larger. Successful penetration of a computer center can temporarily disorient and eventually paralyze the nation's military defense; it can lead a group of scientists to the wrong conclusion on an important project; and it can interrupt trade between companies or even between countries.

*Sweden is quite often used as a route for illegal traffic of high technology from the West.

Terrorist Active Measures

The Soviet love affair with terrorism is deeply rooted in Russian history, but, until the end of World War II, the West showed little concern for the terrorist threat. The Soviets were not strong enough to threaten the Western capitalist establishment and their terrorist tactics were employed mainly against domestic opponents, defectors, or such exiles as Leon Trotsky, who was assassinated in 1940 in Mexico by Soviet secret agent Ramón Mercader.*

It was only after World War II that Western governments began to think seriously about Soviet terrorism after anti-Communist opposition was wiped out in Europe. The decade of the 1950s was a period of extensive Soviet terror both at home and abroad. Two individuals living in the United States today are intimately acquainted with Soviet assassination practices: both of them are former Soviet intelligence officers who were ordered to kill. Nikolai Y. Khokhlov spent thirteen years in Soviet espionage before he was sent to West Germany in 1954 to assassinate a prominent official of an anti-Soviet emigré organization. He refused to carry out the order, turned himself over to Western authorities and defected to the United States. The second witness is Bogdan Stachynskij, a KGB officer who defected to West Germany in 1961 after assassinating two prominent Soviet exiles living in that country. Professor Lev Rebet, a Ukrainian writer and chief ideologist of the Ukrainian community in West Germany, was found dead on the stairway leading to his office on October 12, 1957. The autopsy stated that he died of a heart attack. Two years later, on October 15, 1959, another Ukrainian refugee leader was found unconscious on the stairs of a house in Munich. Stefan Bandera, the chief of a militant Ukrainian organization (OUN), died on the way to the hospital. This time, the post mortem examination found cyanide in his body. Both Professor Rebet and Stefan Bandera were killed by Bogdan Stachynskij with a gas pistol filled with cyanogen. Stachynskij gave himself up voluntarily, and the West German court sentenced him to only eight years.²⁹ He moved to the United States after his release from prison in December 1966.

The period from 1959 to 1968 witnessed a degree of moderation in Soviet activities. As a precautionary measure after the Stachynskij defection, the Soviets dropped assassination from the repertoire for several years. During this time, however, East European intelligence services developed close contacts with several radical leftist groups that later adopted terrorist tactics, among them student groups in West Germany, Italy, France, Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico. Although they dismissed the possibility that the New Left could become a decisive force in the socialist revolutionary process, the Soviets

*After spending 20 years in prison, Mercader obtained his release and departed for Czechoslovakia. In Moscow a short time later he received the Order of Lenin and the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

recognized and welcomed the new movement as a threat to the stability of the capitalist establishment. With the help of a few reliable agents, Communist intelligence services were able to use these radical groups as loudspeakers against American, British, and West German capitalism.

In the mid-1970s, the KGB and its satellites again adopted terrorist methods against defectors and exiles. In 1974, for example, the Bulgarian service kidnapped Boris Arsov from Denmark and sentenced him a few months later to fifteen years in prison. He was found dead in his cell in 1975. Nikolai Artamonov Shadrin, a defector from the Soviet Union, disappeared in Austria in December 1975. Soviet world champion canoeist, Vladas Cesiunas, was kidnapped from West Germany in October 1979, shortly after asking the West German government for political asylum.

Since the mid-1970s, the Bulgarian state security service—today one of the most brutal of all espionage services—has conducted a series of assassinations, primarily against defectors. Vladimir Kostov, once a prominent journalist in Bulgaria, defected and began working for Radio Free Europe. While leaving the Paris metro with his wife in August 1978, he suddenly felt a sharp pain in his back, and when he looked around, he saw a man with an umbrella hurrying away. Kostov suffered severe fever for several days and eventually recovered, but his colleague in London was not so lucky. On September 7, 1978, Markov, a writer, broadcaster, and outspoken critic of the Bulgarian government, was passing a bus station when a man with an umbrella bumped into him, murmured his apologies, jumped into a taxi, and disappeared. The following day, Markov suddenly began to feel ill and discovered a red spot on his right thigh. He told doctors at the hospital that he had been stabbed with a poisoned umbrella the previous day but the doctors could find no wound. Four days later he was dead. Upon closer examination of his body, surgeons found a platinum pellet 1/15 of an inch in diameter buried under his skin. The pellet contained two pockets, each 16/1000 of an inch deep, carved at right angles and designed to hold a trace of poison. After hearing about Markov's death, Vladimir Kostov reported to his doctors in Paris his experience. They found an identical pellet containing a highly toxic poison.³⁰ As expected, the Bulgarian embassy in London issued a statement categorically denying any involvement in Markov's death. Circumstantial evidence clearly pointed to Bulgarian intelligence, but it was not strong enough for the British government to accuse the Bulgarian government of complicity.

Communist intelligence organizations are currently involved in two kinds of terrorist acts. The first involves such operations as kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings against prominent refugees, exiles, defectors, and their organizations. In the huge explosion that shattered the Radio Free Europe building in Munich on Saturday evening, February 21, 1981, three workers at the Czechoslovak desk—Marie Pudlová, Alan Antalic, and Mr. Skutalek—were injured. Speculations about the perpetrator's motives pointed to Czechoslovak intelligence, but the assailant remained hidden and unpunished.

The second category involves direct or indirect support of various terrorist groups such as the Baader/Meinhof gang in West Germany, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Irish Republican Army. Some of these groups, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, are now labeled as "movements of national liberation" and receive more or less open support from Eastern Europe. Others, like the Red Brigades and the Irish Republican Army, get help in the form of weapons, ammunition, and training. Without this kind of support, the groups would be unable to function.

NOTES

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19. *New York Times*, 3 September 1979, p. B 1.
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21. *New York Times*, 29 December 1983, p. 7.
22. *Los Angeles Times*, 17 September 1980, p. 4.
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24. *New York Times*, 7 November 1982, Section 2, pp. 1, 28, 29.
25. *New York Times*, 7 August 1980, p. B 9.
26. *New York Times*, 5 August 1980, p. A 10.
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Chapter 4

The Messenger

“What are we going to do with Agayants tonight?” Major Stejskal asked me.

“Maybe a few pretty girls would change his mood,” I said.

The socialist striptease show at the Alhambra bar in Prague did no good for Colonel Ivan Ivanovitch Agayants.* In fact, he became even more nervous as the girls removed pieces of their clothing and during the first break indicated that he was ready to return to the embassy. The chief of the KGB’s disinformation department came to Prague in the summer of 1965 to investigate the operation of the Czech department. The tall, elegantly dressed Armenian with a small mustache and aristocratic bearing did not seem like a Communist revolutionary. He preferred to talk about nineteenth century Russian literature and painters, and political jokes ridiculing Communist leaders or Marxist-Leninist doctrine—popular among Czechoslovak operatives—brought no response from him.

He spent more than a week in Prague, meeting with commanding officers, rank-and-file operatives, as well as KGB advisors, and asking pointed questions about Czechoslovak active measures. He was genuinely impressed. During one year, some twenty-five operatives in the department had been able to conduct more than one hundred operations around the world, some with considerable results. The day before he departed for Moscow, the usually formal Agayants seemed to relax for the first time in my office overlooking the Vltava River, Charles Bridge, and Castle Hradčany. He pushed aside a huge file of newspaper clippings related to a recent operation and commented, “Sometimes I am amazed how easy it is to play these games, if they did not have press freedom, we would have to invent it for them.”

THE SECRECY DILEMMA

At the annual military-media conference at the Naval War College in November 1978, Seymour Hersh, then an investigative reporter with the *New*

*Several years later Agayants was promoted to the rank of general.

York Times, observed: "Our job is to get any secret we can. . . . We decide what to publish I don't think there is any other way to describe it. It is our arrogance that keeps the system going." The press, sometimes known as the fourth estate or fourth branch of government, plays a special role in the American system of checks and balances as opener of clogged communications between the government and the public. The dilemma for the journalist is whether to inform the public or withhold information that might threaten national security. It is an endless struggle between journalists operating under rights provided by the First Amendment and government officials responsible for protecting legitimate secrets.

All government bureaucrats, including Americans, have a natural tendency to stamp "secret" on almost everything that comes across their desks. The General Accounting Office estimates that, in 1977, all departments of government combined classified between seventy and one hundred million documents.² Many communications with foreign governments receive secret classification with little or no justification, with the possible exception that classification forces superiors to read them. Bureaucrats know that unclassified material is often left untouched. In general, the more sensitive the issue, the more restricted the need to know. One major reason is fear of leaks to the press.

A "news leak" is a term characterizing information passed to a newspaper by anyone with a personal reason for publicizing the information, while certain other people prefer to keep the information secret. Many news leaks involve important aspects of government policy, often relating to national security. The leaks are usually passed to newspapers rather than broadcast media because the latter are not perceived as media of record. Some leaks have furthered the public interest by exposing corruption, crime, and abuse of power, but others have violated national security requirements. Disclosure of the identity of numerous CIA agents and operatives during the 1970s, for example, caused the Central Intelligence Agency to lose the services of key espionage contacts and harmed its relationships with friendly foreign intelligence services.³

The Washington establishment is divided on the best way to deal with the problem of leaks. President Ford once stated that he would gladly share government secrets with all Americans, if such information would go no further, but obviously the government must protect the confidentiality of certain information. While many government officials would like to see national violators prosecuted to the full extent of the law, others believe that a totalitarian system is the only possible means of stopping leaks. The arguments on both sides are basically the same today as they were a decade ago but most journalists agree with James Reston of the *New York Times* when he states that leaks are the safety valve of democracy without which the public would have access only to government-controlled news.

American democracy is rooted in constitutional guarantees of a free press. In a letter dated January 16, 1787, to Colonel Edward Harrington, Thomas Jefferson wrote:

The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Thus, a reporter has the right, even the obligation, to seek information from any official of any rank, in order to present the public with an accurate picture. Many journalists stress that without this guarantee the press would be no more than official spokesmen of government. In his article "CIA Contacts with Reporters," Terrence Smith states:

When this relationship is perverted by government officials who subordinate newsmen or newsmen who lend themselves to subordination, that system goes awry. . . . The tradition of government openness to reporters, even in the intelligence of field, is found only in the United States. Even in Britain the contacts between a correspondent and intelligence officials are likely to be much more narrow and constrained than those of their American counterparts.⁴

American journalists are quick to respond whenever government actions appear to threaten freedom of the press, but very few consider the fact that foreign governments, particularly nations controlled by the Soviet Union, sometimes exploit the American mass media. Leaking secrets to the press for political advantage is one of Washington's oldest games, but very few participants realize that the KGB, properly disguised of course, is a regular game player.

Until the mid-1960s, American newspapers were rather cautious in handling controversial information from unreliable or anonymous sources, particularly documents dealing with sensitive national security issues. The implications of leaking the Pentagon Papers to newspapers and the resulting gap between the executive and the press led to major changes. In July 1971, for example, the cover of William F. Buckley's conservative *National Review* surprised readers with the bold headline, "The Secret Papers They Didn't Publish." The fourteen-page article quoted memoranda not published in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* but exclusive to *National Review*. The documents, allegedly signed by Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State, and Admiral Arthur Radford, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended draconian measures against North Vietnam, including a "demonstration drop of a nuclear device" and "use of nuclear bombs where militarily suitable," if Hanoi did not respond to American peace proposals. The *Washington Post* printed the story on the front page, and the Voice of America broadcast it around the world. Buckley, bombarded by telephone calls, disappeared from public view. When he returned to New York, he revealed

that the papers in the *National Review* had been “composed *ex nihilo*”—out of nothing. It was a hoax used to demonstrate that “forged documents would be widely accepted as genuine, provided their content was inherently plausible.” Here is Buckley’s own description and interpretation of the incident:

I assembled three or four artisans and together we sat down and in three days composed, even unto imitating the prose style of generals and admirals and assistant secretaries of defense, memoranda, the difference between our own and the real ones being that ours were intelligent analyses of the deteriorating Indo-Chinese situation under the subversive attrition of the North Vietnam-backed Viet Cong. *The Washington Post* assigned us a small platoon of reporters to check out what we had labeled as the “Secret Pentagon Papers.” The results were quite extraordinary. A reporter would call e.g., retired Admiral Radford, over whose signature we had written several memoranda. And Admiral Radford would say over the telephone, “Gee, fellows, I don’t exactly remember those exact memoranda—but after all it was eight years ago. But it does sound like me, and it’s certainly what I was thinking at the time.” Others (for instance Dean Rusk) reacted similarly. Accordingly, *The Washington Post* ran full accounts of the faked Pentagon Papers. Back in the office we were alarmed that the hoax hadn’t been penetrated, and so called a press conference to explain that the documents were forgeries, and to give the motive for their fabrication.¹

Buckley proved his point, but the gap widened between the executive branch and the press, particularly after Watergate. An increasing number of politically sensitive and even secret foreign policy documents were leaked to the press. Some journalists took great risks in the name of freedom of the press by giving potentially dangerous information to the opponents of libertarian freedom. In September 1975, for example, a picture of Henry Kissinger reading a document labeled “Top Secret Exclusively Eyes Only Contains Code Word” was published not only in the United States but also in Italy and the Netherlands. Franco Rossi, who covered the European Security Conference in Helsinki, had taken several pictures of President Ford and Kissinger from a balcony. When he developed the film, he discovered that he had not only a photograph of Ford and Kissinger but also a perfectly legible reproduction of a note that Ford had passed to Kissinger. And a third photo showed Kissinger reading a document that was later identified as a report on diplomatic relations between Paris and Hanoi. The report was based on information from “a CIA source with excellent access” in the French foreign ministry. Publication of the picture further strained French and American relations and provided Soviet disinformation experts with useful material in various deception games against their American opponent.

Four years after this incident, several America newspapers received an eighteen-page letter from Charles Hansen, a computer programmer who claimed that he had used information from public documents to design a feasible atomic bomb. Of course, the federal bureaucracy tried to prevent publication of this potentially explosive information, and in subsequent investigation, it discovered that approximately 5% of the documents dealing with nuclear weapons design had been wrongly declassified, among them a report

describing the development of a hydrogen bomb.⁶ In this conflict between freedom of the press and national security, the court decided in favor of the press, but the incident shows how publicly accessible information could lead to the demise of freedom of the press. In the era of international terrorism, this kind of information in the hands of political fanatics is a threat not only to the American democratic system but to people all over the world.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966 and further liberalized in 1975, is a peculiar American law that encourages maximum disclosure of data dealing with national defense, foreign policy, and law enforcement and opens the archives of the Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other government agencies to both Americans and foreigners. The Carter administration liberalized the guidelines dealing with the interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act even further in 1977:

The Government should not withhold documents unless it is important to the public interest to do so, even if there is some arguable legal basis for the withholding In order to implement this view, the Justice Department will defend Freedom of Information Act suits only when disclosure is demonstrably harmful, even if the documents technically fall within the exceptions in the act.⁷

More government information than ever before became available to the public, but the act created new conflicts between the pragmatic realities of running the government and the democratic ideal of free flowing information. By sending out a message that sources of leaks need not fear the legal consequences of their acts, the Carter administration encouraged further leaking.

In a study of the impact of the Freedom of Information Act on intelligence and national security, Allen Weinstein, director of the Twentieth Century Fund, revealed in June 1979 that the business community, imprisoned felons, people under criminal investigation, and foreign governments filed 60% of all requests for information under the act. The other requests were made by several obvious groups, including crusading congressmen, public interest advocates, scholars, and journalists. Since the FOIA standards allowed anyone in the world to request government files, documents were also processed and shipped to Communist and Third World countries.⁸ For example, the FBI and State Department files dealing with the well-known Burgess-Maclean-Philby espionage case were requested by British journalists, and, according to persistent rumors, one of the journalists passed the material to Kim Philby, who now lives in Moscow. In some cases, the requests came from Communist countries. Responding to requests from Philip Agee, a former CIA agent and defector who later participated in Soviet disinformation campaigns against the agency, cost the government \$325,000 in personnel time and \$70,000 in computer time.⁹

Liberal interpretation of the FOIA offered opportunities for Communist countries to acquire important information about their major adversary without any operational risk. For example, information received from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation gave them a blueprint of the bureau's investigative techniques, warned them of possible hazards, and opened new possibilities for international games. The fact that anybody, even foreign agents, could request and receive sensitive material from government files made America's allies more cautious in dealing with the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other federal agencies. Leaders of other nations feared that classified information shared with the United States could easily be obtained by hostile governments or published in the American press. For Soviet deception specialists, it was easy to play upon this fear and widen the gap between them and the United States. Finally, in 1981, the Reagan administration persuaded Congress to pass the Freedom of Information Improvement Act. The act supports the principle that government documents belong to the public and should remain open for inspection, but it empowers the Attorney General of the United States to withhold from foreign agents, criminals, and unscrupulous businesses any records dealing with terrorism, organized crime, and foreign intelligence.

It is impossible to determine the number of documents that have been acquired from U.S. government files by intelligence services in the Soviet bloc. And it is equally difficult to determine how much information has been leaked to the American press by these services. In any event, one can assume that many secret American documents obtained by the Soviets were "recycled" back to the United States. When any document loses its informational value for Soviet decision makers, they no doubt employ it for any disinformational purposes it may have. They may leak it to the American press (slightly changed) on the assumption that its publication might damage the administration's public image, widen the gap between the United States and its allies, or threaten American interests in some other way.

Is there a solution to this complex and sensitive problem? One would make a grave mistake in blaming only the press for the problem. The guarantee of freedom of the press under the First Amendment places the mass media in the role of watchdog. In a system dominated by two major political parties lacking substantial philosophical differences, depriving the press of its rights or reducing its scope of responsibilities would indeed jeopardize the future of American democracy. But it is disturbing that relatively few American journalists recognize the significant potential for abuse offered by current interpretations of freedom of the press to the Soviet bloc. Communist disinformation campaigns not only injure the United States, they represent violations of First Amendment rights and sometimes place American journalists in the invidious position as unwitting messengers and even victims of hostile propaganda.

THE KGB AND THE PRESS

ABC senior correspondent John Scali, who once served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has this to say about Soviet disinformation: "I think too little has been said in the past about the importance of disinforma-

tion and how it is a major intelligence weapon. The Soviets are masters at spreading rumors—I wish we were as good.”¹⁰ Intelligence officers assigned from the Soviet bloc to the United States are generally surprised by the political naiveté and credulity of many Americans. They are able to obtain from either the press or chance contacts information that would cost a high price in any other Western country. The tradition of state secrets is deeply rooted in Europe, but in America most journals will publish politically sensitive information or secret documents without regard for the negative consequences to the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or U.S. allies. In many instances, the KGB learns more about the United States from American publications than from reports by secret agents. A humorous story circulated through the Soviet-bloc espionage community best illustrates this advantage: A U.S.-based KGB officer writes a cable containing secret information that costs several thousand dollars. As he prepares to give the cable to a radio communications operator, he hesitates, returns to his desk, and adds this sentence: “For a more comprehensive and reliable report, read today’s *New York Times*.”

Every modern intelligence service uses overt intelligence (information collected from such open sources as newspapers, magazines, trade journals, and scientific and highly specialized publications) as the first stage of the process. The American press is a veritable gold mine for any espionage agent who knows the kind of information he wants. It provides much more than first signals about important developments, political changes, or scientific discoveries. In its search for colorful detail and balanced and objective information it publishes the names of individuals, their backgrounds, problems, weaknesses, and even conflicts with the law and thus serves as a handy resource guide.

Much of the Soviet information-gathering effort in Washington is open and legal. Some KGB operatives among Soviet diplomats work publicly as regular researchers and lobbyists, but they collect such a vast amount of material that it simply cannot be digested. And, since the Marxist-Leninist dogma teaches that the capitalist press is a propaganda tool of the ruling class, the Soviets tend to distrust such easily acquired information. Thus they place greater faith in information gathered through clandestine channels. Daily KGB reports are politically slanted to insure approval of party leaders in Moscow. Members of the Politburo prefer reports that reinforce their beliefs in the gradual advance of the Soviet cause and ignore inconvenient facts. An analyst in Moscow faces a serious problem when he receives shocking or controversial data from agents abroad. He can lose his job if his interpretation of events contradicts Marxist-Leninist doctrine and he can be accused of political sabotage if the interpretation is doctrinaire but misleading. The result is widespread disinformation even within the Soviet system.

Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer and TASS correspondent who defected to Great Britain in April 1980, confirms that KGB operatives, corres-

pondents, and official Soviet representatives stationed abroad transmit information tailored to reflect Kremlin perceptions of the world. "There were red faces in both TASS and the KGB when Mr. Mugabe was elected Prime Minister of a democratic Zimbabwe, an event which Moscow had insisted the British imperialists would never allow."¹¹ In other words, the self-serving tendency of the intelligence apparatus isolates Soviet leaders from reality. And messengers of good news are more likely to be promoted than messengers of unsavory or contradictory news. As a result, the Soviets often make decisions based on distorted information and overly optimistic assumptions. By spreading disinformation through their channels of domestic communication, the Soviets contaminate their own environment. In the end, the decision-making elite becomes a victim of its own game, unable to distinguish truth from disinformation. In early Soviet disinformation campaigns, KGB operatives were somewhat hesitant to use slogans and propagandistic evidence that did not *directly* support Soviet policies. They found later that they could be more effective by hiding behind any kind of political mask, including left-wing organizations or even neo-fascist movements, as long as they served Soviet interests.

Countries in the Soviet bloc finance large numbers of Western newspapers and magazines, as well as various press services and reports. In most cases these mass media show no official connection to Eastern Europe. Occasionally, the Soviets use semiofficial channels, particularly when they invest large amounts of money which they hope to get back eventually. In March 1977, for example, East Berlin incorporated in Luxembourg a company called the Society for the Development of the Press and Printing Industry. It is officially headed by Karl Raab, who is the director of finances of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the East Germany ruling party. Various articles published by the company describe its purpose as "the promotion of any transaction of a commercial or industrial nature or in the movables, for the development of the press and public operations."¹² The Soviets channeled financial support through this company to various foreign publications needing help. In August 1982 the conservative opposition in the Greek parliament displayed a document showing that the Society for the Development of the Press and Printing Industry had loaned \$2.3 million to finance new printing equipment for a publishing house belonging to the pro-Moscow Greek Communist party. In other instances financial assistance and loans to various Western publications have been kept secret.

In his testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, in July 1982, Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB officer and specialist for active measures, confirmed that the KGB gives major attention to foreign journalists by classifying them as permanent targets. When Levchenko was assigned to Japan in 1974 as a field case officer, he was first required to work a year with the Soviet magazine *New Times*, to improve his journalistic skills. At the time, the magazine employed twelve full-time

correspondents abroad, of which ten were KGB operatives. The KGB station in Japan, where Levchenko operated from 1975 until he defected in 1979, handled more than two hundred agents, including members of the Japanese parliament, prominent members of the Japanese Socialist party, scientists, and journalists. Levchenko himself handled ten agents and confidential contacts, of whom four were journalists. One of his agents was a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with a circulation of more than three million copies.

To what degree does the KGB influence the American press? As mentioned earlier, most American journalists view disinformation activities as dirty tricks played by one intelligence service against another to mislead an enemy and keep him off balance. They consider such activities a game in which the press stands aside and plays the traditional role of neutral observer. Robert U. Brown examined the problem from this perspective in the October 11, 1980, issue of *Editor and Publisher*. Brown stated that *The Spike*, a novel by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, is an enjoyable thriller but that some people unfortunately accept

this yarn as representing the true facts of life in the media Members of the press are doing themselves and their profession a disservice by assuming or suggesting that practitioners of disinformation can subvert a major segment of the press and get away with it for any length of time. . . . Let us not give the public the idea it has happened, is happening or can happen. We don't believe it can.¹³

Interviews with ten journalists, six Americans and four foreigners from India, South Africa, Belgium, and Italy, all of whom were 1981 Nieman Fellows at Harvard University, confirmed that American newsmen are more skeptical than their foreign colleagues about the ability of the Soviets to distort information and feed it to the press. Claude Van Engeland, an editor of Belgian Radio and Television, commented as follows on the scope of the efforts: "There is an important issue in Europe now concerning placement of cruise missiles, very controversial issue . . . and Soviet diplomats are making a great effort to influence journalists. They know they have a chance to change the mood of the people." The Americans reached for a simple analogy best illustrated by Anita Harris, a reporter for the Public Broadcasting Corporation: "You could call public relations men disinformation agents, and you could call publicity campaigns disinformation games." Most American journalists reject the idea that covert and deliberate distortion of information by external forces is a real danger. Even some security experts occasionally state that American journalists cannot become unwitting dupes of Soviet disinformation. For example, Harry Rositzke, who retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 after working with the agency for more than twenty years, questions the effectiveness of KGB disinformation programs in the United States. He maintains that Soviet disinformation is designed for the

Third World and will not sell in the American market:

Does the KGB work through American journalists recruited as 'agents of influence'? Even if there were such agents—and I have never seen any evidence of a single successful recruitment—what could such journalists do for their Kremlin employer? Could they pass a pro-Soviet slant through the hierarchy of news rooms and editorial boards in metropolitan newspapers? Within the narrow spectrum of respectable political thought in the American media, anti-Communist and openly or guardedly anti-Soviet, the insertion of Moscow-tailored items or attitudes would stick out like a red thumb.¹⁴

Rositzke concludes that the KGB has done an excellent job of denigrating the American image in the Third World and occasionally in Western Europe, but it has no impact on American opinion.

Rositzke commits a fundamental error when he maintains that effective disinformation depends primarily on a gullible and, to some degree, a primitive audience. But some of the most effective disinformation operations in history have succeeded in deceiving highly trained specialists. Rositzke ascribes superman qualities to American journalists, but they are human beings who can be threatened, blackmailed, recruited, or bought much the same as their counterparts in France, India, or Japan. Rositzke commits another significant mistake when he describes disinformation only as forgery and ignores a broad spectrum of KGB active measures based on other more dangerous techniques. And his perception that the Soviets are promulgating only pro-Communist views is based on Soviet practices of thirty years ago. It does not take into account a number of qualitative changes and the growing sophistication of Soviet intelligence operations over the past few decades.

The other extreme, usually set forth by ultraconservative activists and media observers, exaggerates Soviet control over American mass media and labels many leftist or anti-establishment reports, commentaries, and TV documentaries as disinformation. Ultraconservative critics of the press tend to disregard the liberal bias of many journalists and interpret dissent as disloyalty or even treason. Political dogmatists of a conservative nature are just as vulnerable to active measures by the Soviet bloc as radical left-wingers. When the Czechoslovak and East German intelligence services conducted an anti-American campaign in West Germany in the name of a radical neo-Nazi organization in the 1950s, many ultraconservatives joined the campaign without considering the possibility that it could be a Communist provocation.

Some American journalists have occasionally been misled and duped by Soviet disinformation and some have undoubtedly been recruited, but the American press as a whole remains a firm anti-Soviet bastion. Most articles critical of the U.S. government and sympathetic toward the Soviet Union or its policies are neither written nor distributed by KGB agents or members of the American Communist party. They are genuine products of American liberalism and tolerance.

KGB ANTS AND MOSQUITOS

The Soviets traditionally perceive foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow as either active or potential spies. Even correspondents who have no contacts with the enemy's intelligence system are, according to the Soviets, likely to engage in "ideological subversion" by spreading ideas and information hostile to the Soviet Union. Of some eighty to one hundred Western correspondents stationed in Moscow, the Soviets are particularly annoyed by Americans who subscribe to aggressive news reporting tactics and rely heavily on primary sources. The Soviet police systematically observe and analyze their behavior, family situation, political leanings, and their written articles in particular. Reporters who get into the most trouble specialize in subjects considered sensitive by local authorities, such as nationalism in the small Soviet republics, anti-Semitism, corruption, or crime. Both the First Main Directorate (intelligence) and the Second Main Directorate (counterintelligence) attempt to recruit agents within this group of correspondents.

The intelligence services use a variety of techniques to threaten, manipulate, and eventually recruit foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow. Some journalists have been accused of homosexual acts; some have been labeled as CIA operatives; and others have been subjected to long interrogations. In 1976 and 1977, for example, George A. Krinsky of the Associated Press, Alfred Friendly, Jr., of *Newsweek*, Peter Osnos of the *Washington Post*, and Robert C. Toth of the *Los Angeles Times* were accused of subversive activities and either directly or indirectly labeled as CIA spies. Robert C. Toth was interrogated in June 1977 after meeting Russian scientist Valeriy G. Petukhov of the Institute of Biomedical Problems on a Moscow street and receiving a paper on parapsychology. The authorities contended that the paper contained secret information. After Toth's departure from Moscow, TASS accused him of accepting assignments from unspecified American special agencies, thus implying his association with the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁵

Correspondents working for conservative newspapers and magazines receive particular attention. Robin Knight, Moscow correspondent for *U.S. News and World Report*, was attacked on numerous occasions by the Soviet press, and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called him "a boot-level journalist" for his criticism of the Soviet system. While visiting Tashkent in April 1979, he and his wife were invited to a tea room to celebrate their tourist guide's birthday. Shortly after having a drink, Knight felt very ill and out of control, staggered outside and fell unconscious or semiconscious for fifteen hours. While he was paralyzed, there were attempts to seduce his wife and she was also threatened with her husband's arrest. When the U.S. embassy protested this treatment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with a totally distorted version blaming the couple for the incident.

In the early 1960s, Communist intelligence services secretly began to buy newspapers, magazines, and small press services in developing countries for use as permanent disinformation channels, but initial successes gained from the new technique were short-lived. For example, some of the newspapers representing a substantial financial investment were permanently lost in Latin America in a series of military coups. Others required regular donations above the limited budgets of Communist intelligence services. In 1965, Major Frouz, the station chief of the Czechoslovak intelligence in Austria, sent to headquarters in Prague a proposal to purchase the Catholic weekly *Die Furche*, known at the time for its leftist orientation, but since the paper was deeply in the red, the proposal was rejected as financially risky. It soon became evident that having reliable journalists-agents of influence operating separately in a variety of popular and stable newspapers and magazines was a better way to influence the mass media.

A journalist-agent in a libertarian country is obviously a significant asset to an intelligence service because he can be investigative and professionally curious without raising suspicion. It is his responsibility to obtain important, even highly sensitive information, particularly in the United States with its aggressive, adversary press. Most Americans show a great deal of respect for the press, and, when any journalist reaches for his notebook and begins to ask questions, the typical American does not bother to request identification. Thus, Soviet agents occasionally use journalistic cover to interview people who otherwise would be unavailable. When one considers the volume and quality of domestic and foreign news collected, evaluated, and published every day in a major newspaper, this system of information gathering is often much more efficient and productive than the KGB or the CIA.

Every Soviet-bloc embassy to capitalist countries maintains two special funds for payments to reporters. One fund is administered at home by the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad by the embassy's press attaché. Local journalists willing to write an occasional favorable story about the Soviet economy or an interesting profile of a Soviet leader have been rewarded with a few hundred dollars or a free trip to the Black Sea. The second fund is used by the KGB to compromise and recruit secret agents among journalists and to plant disinformation. The process usually begins with a seemingly innocent request from a KGB operative asking a friendly journalist to write a brief story of a recent event based on open sources. The financial reward is not excessive, but it is usually high enough to convince the journalist that he should repeat the favor since he is not violating any law. The next assignment is more challenging and cannot be written without interviewing a few confidential sources. A year or two later, he is trapped when he discovers that his information has been stored and is being used to blackmail him. If he collaborates, the KGB promises that compromising material will be

destroyed but, if he refuses, it threatens to make it public and destroy his professional and private life.

Pierre Charles Pathé

Dozens of Western citizens are arrested every year and sentenced to prison terms as Soviet spies, including high-ranking government officials, members of parliaments, diplomats, police and army officers, or businessmen but very few journalists. Identification and prosecution of spies among journalists is a very difficult and unrewarding job complicated by legal norms guaranteeing freedom of the press. The first Western journalist sentenced to prison for spreading disinformation rather than collecting secret information for the KGB was Pierre Charles Pathé.*

The French press was surprised and puzzled in 1979 when French counter-intelligence arrested the seventy-year-old journalist and publisher of the small bimonthly bulletin entitled *Synthesis*. The son of a pioneer French film producer, Pathé had close contacts in government and business, and his brother-in-law, Bernard Vermier-Pallie, was president of the state-owned Renault company. Pathé belonged to an organization called Movement for the Independence of Europe, which included prominent politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals. Unlike his father, who had been a great admirer of the United States, Pierre Charles Pathé's sympathies belonged to the Soviet Union.

Pathé attracted the KGB's attention in 1959 after he published an article praising the Soviet Union. He voluntarily became a KGB agent a short time later and provided Soviet intelligence with many reports, analyses, and biographies of prominent industrialists, politicians, journalists, and members of the French intelligence service. But he was more than a source of information. He directly followed KGB orders for many years as an agent of influence, publicizing Soviet disinformation under his name.¹⁶

A journalist serving as a channel of disinformation usually publishes a few doctored stories a year. He receives a comprehensive outline from his KGB contact for each story that is then written in his own journalistic style and jargon. In the period from 1960 to 1979, Pathé directly wrote more than one hundred Soviet-inspired articles, helped to prepare several publications, and served as the editor of a newsletter published for high-ranking political and industrial officials.

Most of his stories were expected to discredit Western intelligence services and promote discord within the NATO Alliance. His arrest helped to fill some

*In September 1981, *Accuracy in Media Report* (Vol. X, 11 September 1981, No. 18) published the names of four American journalists who supposedly had been Soviet agents without mentioning details of their activities: Joseph Barnes, former foreign editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*; Winston Burdett, CBS correspondent; Sam Jaffe, former ABC correspondent; and Cedric Parker, former editor of the Madison, Wisconsin, *Capital Times*.

missing pieces in an espionage jigsaw puzzle although he maintained that his regular news-gathering sources were simply journalists from whom he gained information rather than spread disinformation. Nevertheless, on May 22, 1980, a state security court sentenced him to five years in prison, the first reported case in which an individual living in Western Europe was convicted for spreading disinformation. Many French journals denounced the verdict, and more than one hundred French journalists signed a petition complaining that the court's decision posed a "serious threat for freedom of expression and information."¹⁷ The July 11, 1980, issue of *Paris Match* commented as follows on Pathé's case:

In sending Pathé to jail for five years without consideration for his age or his state of health, the judges firmly condemn him as a spy without exactly being one. For them, Pathé is tangible proof that in France there are innumerable ants of the KGB, ants that are both insignificant and dangerous. These ants tirelessly and in little doses are vehicles of false ideas.

Le Canard Enchaîné

On October 30, 1979, the French police found the body of a man lying face down in a pond in the Rambouillet Forest. Nearby was an empty container of barbiturates. The man apparently had committed suicide. Identification of the man as Robert Boulin, the fifty-nine-year-old Minister of Labor, shocked the political community. A devoted Gaullist, Boulin held nine cabinet posts in the Fifth Republic and was the minister with longest service. He had been publicly praised by President Giscard d'Estaing, and many observers of French affairs considered him the future prime minister of France. Robert Boulin ended his life because of allegations that he had bought some land at Ramatuelle, above St. Tropez, at a remarkably low price, and got a building permit which would not have been available to anyone else. The initial charges against Boulin appeared in the right-wing tabloid *Minute*, and the story was vehemently pursued later by the leftist weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné*. The key issue was whether Boulin knew about the illegal transactions involving his property when he built his house. A week before his suicide, he told two reporters for *Le Canard Enchaîné* that he knew nothing about the illegal manipulations, but they did not believe him and the paper vehemently pursued the story until it brought Boulin's suicide.

For almost seventy years, excluding the period of World War II when it was not published, *Le Canard Enchaîné* has relied on irony, puns, and derision to attack generations of French politicians. It maintains extremely close relationships with its readers. Gabriel Macé, editor in chief of the paper, describes its political orientation in these terms:

Le Canard prints everything. We devote space to those in power because the decision makers are more interesting than others. We print everything we know about socialists and communists, but it does not occupy as much space in our

newspaper. When the Left was on the ascent, we gave the Opposition a larger share of the news. We have no ties either with the socialists or communists, although our sympathies lie with the Left.¹⁸

The paper began more investigative reporting with the Algerian War to satisfy the demand of French citizens for information.¹⁹ The eccentricities of Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou provided *Le Canard* with many entertaining and revealing stories but, in the 1970s, the paper became even more aggressive. For instance, it charged presidential candidate Jacques Chaban-Delmas with taking advantage of legal loopholes to avoid paying income tax for three years and virtually killed his political ambitions. It published the income tax dossiers of other prominent Frenchmen, including aviation tycoon Marcel Dassault. A major story published by *Le Canard* in October 1979 accused President Giscard d'Estaing of accepting fifty carats in diamonds valued at \$250,000 from Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Emperor of the Central African Republic. Bokassa was overthrown during October 1979 in a coup organized by the French. The article included a photocopy of a letter from Bokassa confirming the gift. The transaction supposedly occurred in 1973 while Giscard d'Estaing was still Minister of Finance. In a television speech on November 27, 1979, Giscard d'Estaing told a nationwide audience that he had received the gift before he became president and that he had donated all gifts received since becoming president to charities and museums. But *Le Canard Enchaîné* was not satisfied with his answer and replied that Giscard d'Estaing accepted diamonds from Bokassa as late as 1975.²⁰

Le Canard Enchaîné carefully protects its financial independence by restricting stock ownership to its staff of approximately thirty-five full-time journalists who elect the chief editor, set salaries, and decide how to invest profits.²¹ Although the paper accepts no advertising and depends entirely on revenue from circulation, it has been consistently profitable. Circulation is usually some 500,000, but it can reach 800,000 when the paper surfaces a particularly sensational story. In the eyes of many European and American journalists the "biting duck" has become one of the best investigative journals anywhere.²² French playwright Henri Jeanson, once a contributor to *Le Canard Enchaîné*, stated: "This acerbic criticism of events and individuals, this ironic and merciless striptease in which we spiritually undress and reveal, as Nature made them, the presumptuous cretins who try to control our destiny at our expense—these are not sterile exercises."²³

On Sunday, December 4, 1973, a member of *Le Canard Enchaîné* staff paid an unscheduled visit to his office and discovered several men drilling holes in walls and laying out wire. After this unsuccessful attempt by French counter-intelligence agents to implant bugging devices in its offices, *Le Canard Enchaîné* proudly proclaimed itself "the most listened-to newspaper in France." The French public had a good laugh and foreign correspondents stationed in Paris reported another victory of the press over governmental bureaucracy and stupidity.

But the story had another dimension. As the outlet of embarrassing leaks, *Le Canard Enchaîné* also served as a channel for Soviet disinformation. The Czechoslovak intelligence service recruited one of the paper's senior writers in the early 1960s, and used him as an agent of influence. The long-term smear campaign had no direct impact on the well-being or security of Czechoslovakia. The real beneficiary was the Soviet Union. A major objective of active measures by the Soviet bloc is to create favorable conditions for Soviet foreign policy maneuvering by the Soviets. Occasionally, Czech intelligence supplied *Le Canard Enchaîné* with a story damaging the reputation of a politician whom Soviet leaders disliked for one reason or another. At other times, the paper poked fun at American CIA activities in Paris or ridiculed the pomposity of NATO military commanders. Minor anti-Soviet punches did not disturb the KGB because they gave *Le Canard Enchaîné* an aura of political independence.

Wilfred Burchett

Under the headline, "Newsmen Who Doubled As Agents for the CIA," the March 1976 issue of *Quill* magazine argued against journalists who for one reason or another in the past cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The article cited Wilfred Burchett as an example of a courageous journalist who declined the CIA offer: "Meanwhile, Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, who reported the Korean war from the Communist North, told Reuters that in 1952 he was offered \$100,000 by the CIA 'to come to the other side and write a few articles.' He said he declined the offer."

Burchett, one of a few Western journalists covering the war from the Communist side, was quoted as saying that during the 1952 peace negotiations in Panmunjon, "One day, I was approached by an American journalist who told me 'There is a jeep alongside. Come with me across the line to the other side and you get \$100,000 for writing a few articles.' " Burchett stated that he met the American thirteen years later in Cambodia and asked him for the source of the offer. The American replied "Of course, from the CIA." The episode is basically true, but a few important facts are missing. Wilfred Burchett was on the payroll of several Communist governments for years and was identified as a KGB agent.

A few scoops as a foreign correspondent early in his career opened the door for him to both Communist and non-Communist publications. He was the first Westerner to see the devastation wrought by the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, and, as a correspondent covering the 1949 trial of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary for the *London Daily News*, he defended Communist justice. His later comments on the trial included this remark: "It completely knocked out the rubbish about torture, drugs, and extracted confessions and showed the Cardinal for the miserable, intriguing, ambitious man he was."²⁴

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969 and 1970, former KGB officer Yuri Krotkov* stated that he had met Burchett in Berlin in 1947. Burchett told him that he was a secret member of the Australian Communist party and wanted to explore journalistic opportunities in Moscow. Krotkov recruited him after the Korean War to work for Soviet intelligence. "Then, when he came to Vietnam," Krotkov said, "all his expenses were paid by the Vietnamese Communist Party, by Ho Chi Minh . . . who gave him a house in Hanoi and a car, a secretary."²⁵

During the Korean and Vietnam wars, many leftist and Communist newspapers, including the Soviet *New Times*, gladly printed his distorted anti-American reports. He brought a libel suit against the Australian paper *Focus* for reporting his pro-Communist activities, but the defense introduced several witnesses, former U.S. prisoners of war in North Korea, who testified about Burchett's indoctrination lectures and his participation in interrogations. Other evidence included articles originated in Moscow and signed by Burchett. The KGB used Burchett as a channel of disinformation to convince the world public that the United States was using bacteriological weapons in Korea. And, in the atmosphere of post-Vietnam guilt pervading the United States in 1977, Burchett presented himself on a lecture tour as a politically involved journalist deeply concerned with the most important issues of our time. With the exception of a few conservative publications, the press did not take the time to reveal his past activities and affiliations.

Burchett is more or less typical of journalists with Communist leanings who consider helping the Soviet intelligence a service to the proletarian revolution. Burchett once said to Krotkov:

I served our cause, the Communist cause, the Communist Party in China, giving them very valuable information when I was in Korea . . . I could understand their American thinking, their sentiments, what they want, what they think, and I could inform the Chinese side. The same thing happened in Hanoi. I am in close relation with Ho Chi Minh. We are almost friends. I can visit him any time I want. I am writing for them. I am deeply involved in this trouble against the Americans and I am doing my best.²⁶

The rift that later developed between the Soviet Union and China modified some of Burchett's political perceptions, but until his death in 1983 in Bulgaria, he was more a political activist and Communist propagandist than a journalist.

Arne Herlov Petersen

When the Danish government, in October 1981, expelled Vladimir Merku-
lov, the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen, for activities inconsistent with his diplomatic status, it appeared as a routine step against an

*Yuri Krotkov defected to the British in 1962 and now lives in the United States.

expanding Soviet espionage network. But investigation by Danish security agencies revealed the intensity of Soviet involvement in the West European peace movement and the mass media. A month after Merkulov's expulsion, Danish police arrested Arne Herlov Petersen, a journalist who worked for the KGB primarily as an agent of influence rather than a source of secret information. The Soviets asked him only for regular reports on the Danish left wing and so-called progressive journalists who were not members of the Danish Communist party. For more than ten years, the KGB used Petersen for publishing anti-NATO disinformation, designing anti-American forgeries, and conveying funds to various peace activities.

A statement issued by the Danish Ministry of Justice on April 17, 1982, indicates that the KGB used Arne Herlov Petersen mainly for manipulating Danish public opinion through various articles, pamphlets, letters to editors, and forgeries. The following list illustrates the nature of his work with the KGB:

- A pamphlet called "Cold Warriors," published by Petersen in 1979, was based on a KGB draft containing attacks on such Western politicians as West German Franz Josef Strauss, Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, and Henry Jackson and Barry Goldwater of the United States.
- Another pamphlet entitled "True Blues: The Thatcher that Couldn't Mend Her Own Roof" was written by Petersen under Soviet guidance and published in 1980. It attacked economic, defense, and foreign policies of the British government headed at the time by Margaret Thatcher. As is true of the earlier pamphlet, Petersen received the text from the Soviet embassy via Vladimir Merkulov.
- Several Soviet forgeries were distributed with Petersen's help. As a member of the Denmark-North Korea Friendship Society promoting closer cooperation and understanding between the two countries, for example, Petersen was asked by the KGB to pass a forgery supposedly reporting secret negotiations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The Soviets expected that the North Koreans would feel threatened and would eventually seek closer ties with the Soviet Union. This disinformation scheme involved Petersen in the role of a messenger who delivered the report to the North Koreans without revealing his Soviet connections.
- Petersen received an order in the summer of 1981 to collect signatures among Danish artists and journalists for a petition expressing support for the Soviet initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear free zone. The campaign, including publication of several political advertisements in Danish newspapers, was partially financed by the Soviet embassy.

Despite Petersen's involvement in Soviet disinformation operations, the Danish Ministry of Justice chose to publicize the main charges and evidence

against Petersen as a warning to others rather than open court proceedings against him.²⁷

The press in a libertarian country provides vital service that cannot be provided by other institutions. Aggressive, courageous journals similar to *Le Canard Enchaîné* are always needed, but the press cannot fulfill its constitutional responsibility when disinformants in the Soviet bloc are allowed to pursue their own political goals. Disinformation and other active measures are basic instruments of Soviet foreign policy aimed at enhancing Soviet influence around the world. The Soviets know that the mass media exercise major influence on public opinion and play a significant role in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Their covert action campaigns in the 1970s have been more sophisticated, more global, and more effectively designed and executed than campaigns conducted in the 1960s. And the trend will undoubtedly continue in the 1980s with most operations designed to weaken target countries rather than promote communism.

Although some disinformation campaigns have little noticeable impact, the Soviets have increased the number of such campaigns for two major reasons. First, they sincerely believe in the cumulative effect of active measures. Even though a single operation may not visibly change public perceptions of an issue, a series of related operations will eventually bring the desired changes. Several communication experts, including Wilbur Schramm and L. John Martin, support this assumption. "All communication, no matter how insignificant, leaves a mark on the receiver," says Schramm, who compares the effect to calcareous water dripping on a stalagmite. Occasionally, a drop leaves an especially large deposit, but, usually, it merely contributes to the imperceptible growth of the spur. "There is some empirical evidence of this lasting effect," says L. John Martin in his article entitled "Effectiveness of International Propaganda."²⁸ A second equally important reason for Soviet interest in disinformation campaigns is that such projects distract attention from Soviet wrongs and weaknesses. While the Soviets use chemical weapons in Afghanistan, for example, they vilify the United States as colonial exploiters of the Third World.

Western intelligence experts have known of the KGB's massive use of disinformation for years, but learning how to deal with these tactics is another matter. They can depend on comparative analysis to establish that a perpetrator is probably a Communist intelligence service, but the final proof necessary to justify a diplomatic protest or some other official countermeasure is usually elusive.

The press is in an even more difficult position. A number of conditions make journalists today more susceptible to games of deception and disinformation than their colleagues a quarter of a century ago. A foreign correspondent in the past had time to study the host country's history, politics, and

idiosyncrasies and develop contacts among prominent politicians, scholars, journalists, artists, and businessmen. Increased operating costs at home and abroad, decreased interest in foreign affairs among American readers in the post-Vietnam era, and communication barriers restricting the free flow of information in many developing countries have contributed to a substantial thinning in the ranks of foreign correspondents-specialists. News media must rely mainly on locally based freelance "stringers" or correspondents who travel from one crisis spot to another without taking the time to study social, political, and economic roots and contexts. The result is superficial reporting and journalists who are more easily deceived by disinformation.

In the words of Charles Collingwood, who spent more than forty years in journalism, today's foreign correspondent—especially a television reporter—is a "peripatetic figure, critics-oriented, likely to be sent anywhere at any time, dispatched by the dictates of breaking news as interpreted by producers and editors in his home office." According to Collingwood, the foreign correspondent of the 1980s is not a specialist but a generalist: "He is no longer his own master; he is an interchangeable part. It is grueling life, whose frustrations often outweigh its compensations." The "pack mentality" of the foreign press corps as its members socialize together, move in the same circles, cover the same stories, and interview the same people makes them especially susceptible to political infection and disinformation. Information published first by one prominent newspaper usually becomes the yardstick for other papers. A major weakness of mass media coverage of complicated international issues is the lack of in-depth analysis and verification. In the chaotic everyday search for news, both the reporter and the editor usually have little time to verify important details. Soviet operatives are aware of this handicap when they design individual operations and use the foreign press as a vehicle of deception.

To maintain an aura of authenticity, disinformation must first appear through a mass medium not openly identifiable as pro-Communist. A journalist-agent working for a reputable publication is usually supplied with disinformation and told how to write the story. In most cases, the initial appearance of sensational material is enough to start a chain reaction of further publicity as other media outlets become interested in the subject. Local Communist newspapers are left out of the game to act according to their own ideological bias and editorial decision. Even the reaction of *Pravda*, in many cases, does not provide the key for understanding the real purpose of the KGB strategy. Strict security regulations prohibit KGB operatives from informing second rank party officials and journalists.

When a newspaper publishes a story based on "documents made available to the paper," it identifies neither the source nor the motives of the writer, and many times, a newspaper receives highly interesting and politically explosive

information from anonymous sources. Even if doubts about motives of an anonymous source are explained in the story, publication of the story gives it considerable credibility and legitimacy. Today, most newspapers and radio or television networks are not willing to spend the time and money necessary to verify the source and background of controversial information if it promises to make headlines. As a result, the introduction of disinformation campaigns is relatively easy.

NOTES

1. *Boston Globe*, 30 November 1978, p. 2.
2. *Boston Globe*, 14 March 1979, p. 7.
3. *New York Times*, 6 April 1978, p. B 11.
4. *New York Times*, 25 December 1977, pp. 1, 12.
5. *Washington Star*, 26 April 1981, p. D 3.
6. *New York Times*, 3 October 1979, p. A 25.
7. *New York Times*, 4 May 1981, p. 1.
8. *New York Times Magazine*, 10 June 1979, p. 74.
9. *New York Times*, 25 September 1981, p. A 24.
10. *TV Guide*, 12 June 1982, p. 5.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *New York Times*, 7 October 1982, p. A 15.
13. *Editor and Publisher*, 11 October 1980, p. 48.
14. *New York Times*, 21 July 1981, p. A 15.
15. *New York Times*, 15 June 1977; *New York Times*, 13 July 1977, p. A 12.
16. *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 September 1980, p. 12.
17. *Time*, 6 October 1980, p. 60.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *World Press Review*, March 1981, p. 31.
20. *Time*, 29 October 1979.
21. *New York Times*, 5 December 1979, 6 December 1979.
22. *Time*, 29 October 1979, p. 99.
23. *New York Times*, 6 December 1979, p. 10.
24. *Le Matin*, 27-28 October 1979.
25. As quoted by Denis Warner in "Australian Lord Haw-Haw," *National Review*, 11 (April 1975), pp. 395-397, 410.
26. As quoted by Wm. F. Buckley, Jr., in "Poor Wilfred Burchett," *National Review*, 23 (June 1977), p. 668.
27. "Soviet Active Measures," *Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, 13, 14 July 1982, pp. 61-66.
28. L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," in *International and Intercultural Communication*, ed. by Heinz-Dietrich Fisher and John C. Merrill, (New York: Hastings House, 1976), p. 264.

Chapter 5

The Art of Forgery

Hardly a day passes without an attack on U.S. foreign policy. Domestic antiestablishment forces blame the United States for the world's social ills and foreign adversaries perceive U.S. foreign policy as a continuing conspiracy to undermine their social systems and national progress. Major forces in the world love to hate the United States and will purchase almost any kind of proof that reinforces this anti-American bias. Even rumors and propagandistic slogans are acceptable proofs. Such a climate offers the Soviets the opportunity to play a variety of anti-American games, including forgery.

El Salvador, a densely populated country the size of Massachusetts with some 4.5 million people torn by civil war, became another arena for Soviet and Cuban expansionism in 1979. A large number of secret documents captured by the Salvadoran Army in November 1980 and January 1981 revealed specific roles played by Cuba and other Communist countries in El Salvador. And, in a report on "Communist Support of Salvadoran Rebels" released in February 1981, the State Department outlined key stages of Communist involvement in the area:

- The direct tutelary role played by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Government in late 1979 and . . . early 1980 in bringing the diverse Salvadoran guerrilla factions into a unified front;

- The assistance and advice given the guerrillas in planning their military operations;

- The series of contacts between Salvadoran Communist leaders and key officials of several Communist states that resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents with nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment;

- The covert delivery to El Salvador of nearly 200 tons of those arms, mostly through Cuba and Nicaragua, in preparation for the guerrillas' general offensive of January 1981;

- The major Communist effort to cover their involvement by providing mostly arms of Western manufacture.'

Shipments of military equipment to El Salvador began in 1979, became more intense during the closing months of 1980, and continued to grow in early 1981 despite protests of the Reagan administration. Most of the shipments included American arms supplied by Vietnam and Ethiopia with the

help of Cubans who coordinated the final transfer with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders.² A global propaganda campaign by the Soviet bloc accompanied these shipments. The KGB was aware that the Vietnam syndrome was still very much alive in the United States and that skillfully played games could turn American public opinion against any kind of U.S. support for anti-Communist forces in El Salvador. It thus launched a series of disinformation operations, including forgeries, to discredit the Salvadoran government, as well as U.S. policies and actions, and to legitimize Cuban and Soviet involvement in the area.

On November 19, 1980, the left-oriented Pacific News Service distributed a story about a hypothetical U.S. document and accused the United States of planning military intervention in El Salvador. The document was "purportedly sent from an informal working group of current and former officials of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council." The report included a brief comment that the State Department had denied the authenticity of the document but stated that "non-governmental Latin-American specialists in Washington confirm the accuracy of the foreign policy detail and nomenclature in the report." Two days later, the British newsletter *Latin America Weekly Report*, which also has subscribers among Washington journalists and officials, reported:

Information on U.S.-backed military preparations in El Salvador and Honduras is more solid. A document leaked by dissenting State Department officials speaks of increased training for Salvadoran officers in Panama and Argentina . . . Contingency plans have been drawn up for multilateral and unilateral deployment of forces, and an estimate made of the likely costs and repercussions of U.S. military intervention in El Salvador.

More and more stories based on the dissenting document appeared in newspapers around the world.

The thirty-page document, dated November 6, 1980, was obviously mailed to many journalists, foreign policy analysts, and researchers in the United States and abroad. A memorandum introducing the report contained this statement: "Employees from other agencies active in El Salvador and Central America—but normally excluded from policy debates—also contributed to these notes." The statement implied that supporters and sympathizers of the group in various federal agencies had used conspiratorial methods to research, write, and distribute the memorandum. The document stated that the United States underestimates both "the political costs of world reaction" (to possible U.S. intervention) and

the Nicaraguan and Cuban commitment to provide military support to Salvadoran guerrillas in the event of a continued escalation of U.S. involvement A key objective of U.S. policy in Central America is to limit Cuban and Soviet-bloc influence in the region Few developments would open more opportunities for Cuba in Central America than the regionalization of armed conflict that would follow the escalation of U.S. military involvement in El Salvador

Therefore, to limit opportunities for Soviet-Cuban expansion, the U.S. should avoid regionalization of armed conflict by reversing the current trend toward escalating its own military involvement.

The document also stated that the Carter administration initiated covert intervention in El Salvador in 1980 primarily "to prevent the crises in El Salvador from climaxing prior to the elections" and that intelligence reports contradicting the need for increased U.S. military involvement in El Salvador had been suppressed within the U.S. government. The document suggested further that the United States should abandon its support for the beleaguered civilian-military junta ruling El Salvador and strive for a "nonmilitary, negotiated solution limiting Cuban and Soviet expansion and promoting the emergence of stable and pluralistic governments." The paper focused on El Salvador but it also included other Central American countries:

This training program is the largest ever sponsored by the U.S. for any Latin American country in a single year Various (U.S.) government agencies have taken preparatory steps to intervene militarily in El Salvador U.S. intelligence has been in contact with Nicaraguan exile groups in Guatemala and in Miami and it is aware of their relationship with Cuban exile terrorist groups in the U.S. No attempt has been made to restrict their mobility in and out of the U.S. or to interfere with their activities.

Was the controversial document a genuine product of frustrated U.S. officials, as it claimed, or was it the work of a foreign power playing an anti-American game? To give the memorandum the appearance of bureaucratic authority, the authors used the following markings on the cover page:

Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America
DOS 11/6/80
To: Dissent Channel
From: ESCATF /D
Re: DM - ESCA #80- 3

DOS is obviously an abbreviation for Department of State. The Department of Defense frequently uses the nomenclature DOD, but the State Department has never used DOS as an abbreviation.

When Foreign Service officers stationed overseas disagree with their superiors or with U.S. policy, they communicate with Washington directly through the so-called dissent channel, and they submit their reports by cable or by diplomatic pouch. In this case, the perpetrator posed as an insider using the dissent channel, but he did not sign the document, which arrived at the State Department in a plain envelope through the U.S. Postal Service. And the reference that the paper came from ESCATF /D apparently means El Salvador-Central America Task Force, but there is no such task force. The line DM - ESCA #80- 3 means Memo El Salvador-Central America, 1980, #3, but a spokesman with the State Department stated that there was no such series.³ The dissent paper on El Salvador and Central America was an obvious forgery.

One recipient of the forgery was Stephen Kinzer, a Latin American correspondent for the *Boston Globe*. In a front page story dealing with the controversial document on November 28, 1980, Kinzer reported the major conclusions of the paper and acknowledged that the document had not officially passed through the dissent channel of the State Department. Like other journalists reporting this incident, Kinzer attributed it to a "group of disgruntled diplomats and intelligence experts," and, to quell any doubts, he quoted an unnamed Latin American specialist conversant with American intelligence operations: "Considering some of the insights in the document, it would be very difficult for someone on the outside to write it."⁴

The story reached the respectable *New York Times* on December 1, 1980, and columnist Anthony Lewis gave it national publicity without verifying its authenticity. In an article under the headline "Another Noble Cause," Lewis referred to the controversial memorandum as a dissenting document and quoted it extensively. The *Times* repeated the mistake on March 6, 1981, when the memorandum received the attention of Flora Lewis, another columnist. She supposedly had received it from a reliable news source who presented it as an official paper. Ms. Lewis also treated it as a genuine dissent paper that circulated inside the government.

The dry, unemotional paper goes on and on, showing how many pitfalls have been overlooked in the U.S. reaction to Salvador's awesomely bloody civil war Its recommendations foreshadowed last weekend's proposal by Latin American Socialist parties to mediate, and West Germany's offer to help The Reagan Administration would do well to listen to the paper's authors before the chance for talks is lost, and then make sure Salvador's ruling junta knows that the U.S. seeks a political and not a military settlement.⁵

The following day, the *New York Times* published a story indicating that the dissent memorandum was a forgery. Under the headline "State Department Calls a Report on El Salvador Spurious," the paper quoted William J. Cyess, a State Department spokesman who stated that the memo was "not an official dissent channel document" and repeated previous State Department descriptions of it as a "spurious" document.⁶

In her next column on March 9, 1981, Ms. Lewis acknowledged her mistake: "I have just eaten a large plate of crow," she said. "I am now satisfied that the document on El Salvador discussed in my column last Friday, which I believed was an official paper, was indeed spurious, as the State Department later said. Many of the facts checked out, but it wasn't a Government paper. I'm abashed."

Few organizations around the world, intelligence services included, have the expertise, skill, and secret international communication network needed for designing, manufacturing, and distributing a forgery of this sophistication and quality. The intelligence system maintained by the Soviet bloc is one of them, but none of the daily papers and news services reporting the anonymous memorandum mentioned the possibility that it could be a Communist

forgery. The recipients were obviously deceived by such anti-Communist terms as "limiting Cuban and Soviet expansion" and "promoting the emergence of stable and pluralistic governments." Why would the KGB make these recommendations? The memo was not forged in the name of the U.S. Communist party but by supposedly disgruntled State Department officials with no obvious Marxist-Leninist loyalties. By equating El Salvador with Vietnam, the Soviet perpetrator played successfully on the Vietnam syndrome of the American public.

Knowing that the new Reagan administration was prepared to make substantial changes in U.S. foreign policy, the Soviets hoped to limit President Reagan's options by initiating a public discussion two months before the inauguration. The purpose of the disinformation campaign was to turn public opinion against any kind of U.S. involvement in El Salvador and to paralyze Reagan's foreign policy in Central America. The dissenters' document pretended to offer sober advice about reducing the danger of further Soviet and Cuban expansion in Central America. It warned that U.S. military intervention would only strengthen Cuban and Soviet involvement throughout Central America and recommended "the Zimbabwe option," submitting to the rebels in the hope that they would be friendly after coming to power. By stating that the key objective of U.S. policy in Central America was to limit Cuban and Soviet influence in the region, the forgery gained the confidence of the recipients, but it suggested measures that would lead only to strengthening Communist influence.

Intelligence analysts in the United States from 1945 to 1980 have traced the origins of 150 fakes planted to harm this country.⁷ This is an impressive figure, but it is only a fraction of the total. Many forgeries are undetected because they are not widely circulated but are slipped, instead, into the flow of global communication to deceive governments and individuals without alerting the press.

Current forgeries by the Soviet bloc frequently appear real enough to gain access to all but the most skeptical Western news media, and there is a boldness to Kremlin counterfeits never before seen. In several recent cases, Soviet forgers have directly attributed false statements to the president and vice president of the United States, something they more or less avoided a decade ago. One of the most recent phony documents—a redeveloped U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B circulated in more than twenty countries—has been cited as "proof" that the United States acts as an agent provocateur in manipulating such foreign terrorists as Italy's Red Brigades.

Even the frequency with which counterfeits appear on the world scene can be significant. For example, during the month preceding the abortive May 1960 summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union in Paris, the Soviet leadership ordered a reduction in such operations. Thus, only two fakes surfaced from March 1959 through May 1960, but production returned to normal with the collapse of the summit. A similar pattern em-

erged during the period of detente with the Russians in the early 1970s. CIA analysts positively confirmed the "authenticity" of only one anti-American fabrication between late 1971 and December 1976.⁸ The atmosphere of rapprochement had prompted the Soviet Union to scale down the most provocative cold-war style operations and use more subtle techniques of subversion. But the Russians kept a lid on anti-American fakes for another reason. Their counterfeits could not outclass the investigations of the Watergate era. The presidential scandal and probes of the U.S. intelligence establishment provided the world's news media with an enormous volume of damaging information all based on sworn testimony. A Communist counterfeit detected at that time might have caused Americans to "rally round the flag" and curtail the natural flow of self-incriminating revelations.

When the Watergate phenomenon began to fade in late 1976, deception experts in Eastern Europe returned to their forgeries. Although America remained the "main enemy," they set their sights on the Middle East and Western Europe. Their first concern, the Middle East, was the home of Anwar Sadat—a good friend of Jimmy Carter. Six anti-Egyptian ploys were identified between 1976 and early 1980.⁹ Western Europe ranked second on the list of targets because of the continuing Russian desire to generate friction within NATO. The Soviets also desired to keep Spain out of the NATO Alliance, limit Greece's participating in the treaty organization, and pressure the United States into abandoning deployment of the "neutron bomb" in Europe.

Forgeries, particularly the most recent publications, are classified in two major categories. The first category includes misleading information (disinformation) that contributes to poor policy decisions among government leaders. This type of fake usually does not require or receive widespread attention of the media. The second type, propagandistic forgery, seeks to mold public opinion in a target country. Information is leaked to the media in the selected nation, and, if journalists bite the bait and distribute the message, the KGB builds a propaganda campaign around the phony idea. Propagandistic forgeries take a number of different forms: leaflets in the name of nonexistent organizations, counterfeit pamphlets circulated to key individuals and groups, facsimiles and subtle alterations of official publications, reproduction and shading of entire issues of newspapers and magazines, fake personal letters, and phony bank statements. Even duplicate best-sellers have been offered to publishing houses.

LITERARY HOAXES ON A GRAND SCALE

The KGB, on numerous occasions, has mounted forays into the book market, usually for political purposes. One of the chief targets of these disinformation efforts has been dissident Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

After coming to the West, Solzhenitsyn revealed how the KGB tried to frame him in criminal plots by using forged letters and manuscripts that could have led to his imprisonment on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda:

In 1972, the KGB initiated a correspondence in my name with Vassili Orekhov, the director of the Russian National Association. It is a small emigré organization based in Brussels that deals with Czarist military history. The KGB devised letters in which my handwriting was forged. At first the letters contained only innocent requests for information about the First World War. Then followed a suggestion, purportedly from me, that Orekhov come to Prague or send a representative.

At first the KGB mailed these false letters from Prague, using the return address of the well-known author and psychiatrist Josef Nesvadba. Later, they supposedly were sent by a certain Ottokar Gorsky, whose home address was given as 1 Revolution Street, the location of the Czechoslovak airline and tourist offices. But Gorsky's telephone number indicated that he lived in another district—which happens to be the location both of the Soviet embassy and the Czechoslovak secret police.¹⁰

Solzhenitsyn stated that he did not know the scope of this provocation or his fate if he had not been expelled from the Soviet Union. Judging from the circumstances described by Solzhenitsyn, Mr. Orekhov, a Russian emigré invited to meet Solzhenitsyn in Prague, would have been arrested and given a long prison sentence. And disinformation mills in the Soviet bloc would have spread the lie that Solzhenitsyn was responsible for luring Orekhov to Prague and that he was a KGB agent, despite his anti-Soviet statements.

The scheme is very similar to the scheme used by the KGB a few years later when it attempted to discredit *The Gulag Archipelago*, written by Solzhenitsyn. Through the press agency Novosti, the KGB arranged a meeting between a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in Moscow and Nikolai Vitkevich, a former prisoner, who claimed that Solzhenitsyn betrayed him and three other people to get a lighter sentence. Vitkevich said that, when he was released in 1957, he was shown the record of Solzhenitsyn's interrogation, including notes in Solzhenitsyn's handwriting. But handwritten remarks by interrogated prisoners were not permitted on KGB records and the KGB would never show them to another prisoner.

When American bookstores sold the first copies of *The Gulag*, Soviet representatives quietly offered the memoirs of Natalya Reshetovskaya, Solzhenitsyn's former wife, to Western publishers. In a 270-page manuscript entitled *Arguing with Time*, she quoted extensively from letters that Solzhenitsyn had written to her during their thirty-four-year relationship, and she tried to discredit both the book and the author. In an interview for the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, she branded *The Gulag* mere "concentration camp folklore," a misrepresentation of the period under Lenin and Stalin and a figment of Solzhenitsyn's intuition rather than scientific and historical fact.¹¹

Most Soviet literary disinformation has been offered for sale in the West by a journalist and long-time KGB friend, Victor Louis. Although he denies any KGB connection, Western observers look at his luxurious life style—clay tennis courts, wine cellar, etc.—and wonder how a journalist can afford such luxuries. His official assignment is Moscow correspondent for the *London Evening News*, but Louis is a Soviet citizen. The son of a Russian Jew of French origin, Louis was a courier for New Zealand's and Brazil's embassies in Moscow in the post-World War II era. Accused of spying, he spent eight years in one of Stalin's gulags.

As early as 1964, Louis, then in his early forties, was hard at work building a network of Western news and publishing sources. He broke the story of Khrushchev's ouster by tipping off favored Western correspondents and published a report of an interview with Nobel Prize winner Solzhenitsyn, but Solzhenitsyn states that they had no interview. As an author and journalist, Louis has worked primarily as a literary agent who surfaced in the West in 1967 to market an early draft of Svetlana Alliluyeva's *Twenty Letters to a Friend*. By offering another version of the book by Stalin's daughter, the KGB obviously hoped to create legal problems that would delay publication of the authentic version until after the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The scheme failed because the American publisher rushed the book into print and it appeared on the anniversary of the Revolution.

Even an organization as powerful as the KGB cannot stop the flow of books spirited out of the Soviet Union. It has played, instead, a game of "if you can't beat them, join them, then beat them." By "smuggling" a second edition of a book out of Russia, the KGB hoped to raise questions as to which version was authentic. This strategy was also successful during the controversy over *Khrushchev Remembers*, the memoirs of the late Soviet dictator. Not only did the KGB muddy the waters as to which version arriving in the West was truly the work of Nikita S. Khrushchev, but it managed to fragment the community of Kremlin-watchers, spark trans-Atlantic rivalry, and permanently raise eyebrows about the pedigree of any book arriving from a country in the Soviet bloc.

The controversy over Khrushchev's memoirs also began with Victor Louis, who was widely credited with delivering the manuscript, or at least the notes, to Western presses. Several versions of Khrushchev's memoirs reached the West and one of them was published in 1970 by Little, Brown and Company. There was an immediate blitz of speculation about its authenticity as various factions took opposing sides. In an editorial on December 16, 1970, the *Washington Post* felt compelled to pronounce the book "Nikita Sergeyevich's own," and the *New York Times*, a month later, cited a group of thirty (U.S.-based) experts who had decided that the memoirs were authentic.¹² Just four days later, British experts expressed doubt as to the authenticity of the book. Kremlin watchers continued snipping at one another, and, at this moment,

various propaganda organs in the Soviet bloc felt free to join in the public debate. *Izvestia*, the official newspaper of the Soviet government, called the memoirs a falsification by the "imperialist strategists of ideological warfare," and Novosti, the Soviet feature agency, settled for the epithet "forgery." But, the Soviet Union's principal news agency, TASS, brought forward not only Khrushchev himself to denounce *Khrushchev Remembers* but also Nina Khrushchev, his wife. "I declare that this is a fabrication. Such lies in the venal bourgeois press have been exposed many times." TASS quoted Khrushchev as saying that he never passed the memoirs to the West or even to a Soviet publishing house.¹³

The KGB, meanwhile, netted a fringe benefit from the controversy. Soviet-watching professors and journalists were thrown into confusion over how and why the manuscript was packed off to the West. Some fingers pointed to "Soviet hard-liners" who never forgave Khrushchev for his denunciation of Stalin, and others stated that Khrushchev himself—TASS be damned—leaked the book to ensure survival of his denunciation of Stalin. The Kremlin insisted that the CIA wrote Khrushchev's memoirs, and, in Washington, CIA operatives recognized the handwriting of their colleagues in the KGB. In a sarcastic, fictitious interview published in the West German liberal weekly *Die Zeit*, Captain Spider of the CIA is asked: "What are you working on now?" "On the guaranteed authentic diaries of Liu Shao-ch'i, with sensational insights into the Cultural Revolution," Captain Spider says, "But we have to hurry—our literary agents have learned through aerial reconnaissance that the KGB is already on page 197."

The confusing discussion in the Western press about the authenticity of a book written by a Soviet celebrity stems from disinformation strategy. Hundreds of articles dealing with the controversy usually do not clarify the problem. On the contrary, readers became confused, disillusioned, and, after awhile, bored. The KGB campaign achieves its objective.

PROVING THE AMERICAN EVIL

The most important type of forgery by the Soviet bloc is the authentic-appearing "official" government document. If a politician in a West European country becomes too anti-Soviet or an African leader too pro-American, the easiest way to undermine his reputation is to label him a CIA agent and use a forgery as proof. Although the victim denies the accusation, the residuum of suspicion usually remains. Some forgeries circulate for years, even decades, and resurface again and again in different parts of the world. They frequently cause as much damage when they reemerge as they caused originally.

During the 1970s, the Soviet-bloc disinformation services produced several falsifications "showing" a direct link between the Israeli government and the

Central Intelligence Agency. In November 1970, for example, an Israeli left-wing, weekly tabloid, *Haolam Hazei*, published a photocopy of a letter dated May 27, 1959, suggesting that Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was a CIA agent.¹⁴ The author of the *Haolam Hazei* article dealing with the accusation admitted that it might be a Soviet forgery but decided to publish it to avoid a continuing quarrel with the Israeli government over the document. The letter was signed by Colonel Charles J. Denholm of Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Washington, and addressed to the U.S. Army Attaché, American Embassy in Israel:

In connection with your inquiries concerning Major General Moshe Dayan, we have consulted with CIA authorities. They informed us that Dayan was well-known to their British colleagues since he was involved in some delicate operations they conducted in the Middle East. SIS approached Dayan in 1941 while he was in a British prison and obtained his release before his sentence expired

The CIA considers that acceptable provisions for joint contact with Dayan could be worked out with SIS in accordance with previous practice. CIA will instruct its officer in Tel Aviv, Mr. W. Lockling, on the matter and he will get in touch with you. You must maintain close liaison with him as mediator.

A careful reader will notice the vague, evasive formulations used by the authors of the forgery to avoid a factual error, but, from the professional analyst's perspective, the major error lies in the way Dayan is identified. Every intelligence service uses cover names for its operatives, agents, or even candidates for recruitment to insure confidentiality. The demonstrative use of the name Dayan is obviously not a lapse by the U.S. Army but a calculated step by an author who intends to use the document for propaganda. The Dayan forgery undoubtedly originated in Prague for, in 1966, the Czechoslovak disinformation department manufactured a form entitled "Department of the Army Short Range Intelligence Needs," also bearing the signature of Colonel Charles J. Denholm. That document sought to prove that the Central Intelligence Agency attempted to recruit General Mohammed Oufkir, director general of the Moroccan National Security Organization. The forgery was leaked to the Arab press in September 1966.

Of the sixteen forgeries detected from 1976 to 1980, a relatively large number were designed to undermine U.S. relations with the Egyptian government and the friendship between President Sadat and President Carter. The fabrications suggested that American officials distrusted Sadat's leadership ability and were prepared to reject him as an ally in the Middle East. One such opus by Soviet fakers surfaced in a leftist Egyptian magazine in December 1976 as the text of a speech supposedly delivered by U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Edwin Yeo at the Detroit Economic Club on March 24, 1976. The bogus speech appeared in a forged issue of *American Economics* and was ostensibly distributed by the USIS in Athens:

The opinion of our group, however, is that the present Egyptian Administration is incapable of eliminating all difficulties blocking free enterprise and foreign investment. . . . The Egyptian Administration has very little capability, and in Egypt there are forces which could alter the administration. Even though Egyptian leaders promised us they would 'clear the way,' I don't place any hope in this. . . .

Comment (from the audience): I believe the situation in Egypt is as Mr. Undersecretary has described it. If this is true, then the only solution that I see is in a total change of the government and the government system. That, however, is not a question for industrialists and financiers, but for Henry Kissinger and George Bush [at the time Director of Central Intelligence]. Let them carry out their work in Egypt and we can go in.

Yeo: I don't have anything I could add to this. It was quite clearly worded.¹⁵

The forged copy of *American Economics* was sent with an unsigned cover letter to a number of leftist publications in the Middle East. The cover sheet stated that the magazine was being forwarded by a person who had "accidentally" obtained several copies of the incriminating document and was outraged—a typical technique used to disseminate Soviet-bloc forgeries.

Rome was the setting for another spurious signal from Moscow. In April 1977, the Egyptian embassy in Rome received an envelope bearing photocopies of notes supposedly taken by an aide to U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The notes appeared to come from a confidential report to President Carter and included disparaging observations on Middle East leaders, including Sadat:

Egypt is of the first importance. This doesn't apply to Sadat, however His concepts of what the U.S. should do in relation to Egypt are unrealistic, even absurd Sadat's future is uncertain because of Egypt's economic plight. It is necessary to see whether he continues to be a suitable partner

[Saudi Arabia's] Prince Fahd warned us not to exaggerate our trust in Sadat. He doesn't think Sadat's fall will lead to complications. (The Saudis may be doing something in this respect without telling us.)¹⁶

The notes came with a cover letter incorporating the following statement:

. . . . I had an opportunity to read the report written by Vance himself. It contains his impressions and views as well as the hints of U.S. policy and tactics in the Arab part of the world. As I consider it a plot, I have summarized the principal thoughts of the report and arranged for their large-scale dissemination. It is impossible for me to publish them in the papers. My identity would be revealed and my life endangered. Therefore, I appeal to all honest journalists to inform the whole world about this plot.

As in the case of the Yeo speech, the phony Vance notes prompted Sadat's government to make an official inquiry in Washington as to the authenticity of the material.

Attention next turned to Cairo where three forgeries appeared under the name of U.S. ambassador to Egypt Hermann P. Eilts, between March 1977 and January 1980. The forgeries made Eilts a major figure in the American

"conspiracy" against Egypt. The first counterfeit was a letter bearing Eilts's signature and dated June 14, 1976, to his Saudi counterpart in Cairo. It was designed to embarrass Sadat and isolate him in the Arab world:

As the strongest Western nation, the United States has primary responsibility for maintaining stability and peace in the Middle East. In this respect, any disturbance of the balance of forces in the area would be considered dangerous by the United States. From the United States' point of view, President Sadat's intention to use the situation of instability in the Sudan to obtain prevalent influence there might have unpredictable aftereffects.

As I have already had the honor to inform you, the interests of our two countries in the Sudan could well be secured by establishing a really democratic government composed of influential personalities enjoying our confidence.¹⁷

A photocopy of the forgery was sent with no cover letter to the Sudanese embassy in Beirut in March 1977.

The second forgery was an "operations memorandum" dated March 28, 1977 and addressed to Eilts's superiors in the State Department. In this effort, Eilts supposedly "attacked" Sadat for his lack of leadership and foresight:

I discussed the problem at length, several times, with Mr. Fees [The CIA's Chief of Station in Cairo] who was of the same opinion. The defects in President Sadat's style of leadership were described very well in a character study prepared by a friend of Mr. Fees'. After reading the characterization I am even more convinced that Mr. Sadat may not be the most suitable person to put across our plan for Egypt and the Middle East.¹⁸

The false document came to light in June 1977 when photocopies with a cover letter were mailed to a dozen Egyptian newspapers and magazines. The Egyptian press did not respond with the enthusiasm anticipated by the perpetrators, and Cairo again queried Washington on the authenticity of the document.

The third misuse of Eilts' signature showed up in the Syrian newspaper *Al-Ba'ath* in October 1979. What appears as a report by Eilts to Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, is actually a distorted and chaotic version of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East:

The personality of Sadat is still constituting a big problem and is a source of worry. Sadat is a man of dual personality. One is emotional and is always ready to provide aid and assistance and the other is represented in despondence, quietness, moodiness and too much thinking. The question now is: What is the extent to which he can continue to support our policy and push it forward? If he cannot achieve this in the future and if he cannot recruit new force to these ends and if his personality becomes a stumbling block in front of the gaze of other Arab leaders for achieving our objectives and purposes, then we must shunt him off: Get rid of him without any hesitation. If this happens, we must replace him as soon as possible by one who can agree to our opinions and serve our interests.

The anonymous letter accompanying the bogus report was written in the name of an "American friend" in the CIA, who stated that he had "never

accepted the dirty tricks carried out in the name of liberty, humanity and Western civilization."¹⁹

Sadat is described first as an incompetent meddler, then as a nuisance, and, finally, as a manic depressive schizophrenic. Since prior efforts failed, the Kremlin disinformation operatives escalated their attacks in August 1977, when the Egyptian embassy in Belgrade received a photocopy of a counterfeit dispatch in the mail. It appeared to come from the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Iran, and included a note stating that Iran (still under the Shah), Saudi Arabia, and the United States were conspiring to overthrow Sadat.

To give the story more credibility, compromise the Middle East peace talks under way at the time, and introduce new rifts in American-Israeli relations, Soviet intelligence manufactured an interview that a certain Karl Douglass supposedly conducted with Vice President Walter F. Mondale. Photostats of a forged press release of the interview were mailed to a number of French newspapers, news services, and foreign correspondents in July 1978. The release quotes these words by Mondale:

I do not consider either [Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin or Sadat suitable for the lasting peace between their countries especially because, as everyone knows, Begin has a terminal illness and all Sadat's energy is pinned down by his domestic worries, and he probably won't be able to stand up long in the face of his internal opposition. So there is good reason to expect shifts in personalities in the two countries involved. Should changes of this nature occur, we would welcome at the head of both countries, experienced and unbiased politicians able to pursue a realistic policy and with a will to mutually and peacefully settle their differences.²⁰

The blatantly undiplomatic and primitive language of Mondale's message aroused the suspicions of the recipients, and the forgery was not printed in the Western media.

The forgers took another turn at derailing the Camp David initiative in January 1979 when a "confidential report" was mailed to the Egyptian *Al Dawa*, a magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood. Prepared by a visiting American scholar, addressed to the Secret Service Chief, U.S., CIA, and mailed anonymously from Jordan, the "report" outlined ways that members of Islamic organizations opposing the Camp David Agreement could be pitted against each other. The Muslim Brotherhood was listed among the groups considered targets for the campaign of bribery and neutralization. Despite a protest from the American embassy in Cairo and Richard B. Mitchell, the American professor who supposedly prepared the report, it was published in the February 1979 issue of *Al Dawa*.²¹ The message was reprinted during the following months in several Muslim publications, but the Soviet-controlled media generally abstained from mentioning the anti-Sadat forgeries. Instead, they engaged in a general campaign denouncing Sadat as an accomplice of imperialism, a traitor to the interests of Egypt and other Arab nations.

ANTI-AMERICAN FAKES IN THE NATO COUNTRIES

On June 18, 1970, Riccardo Lombardi, a socialist, stood before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and presented a document written on NATO stationery, recommending the transfer of American troops from West Germany to northern Italy because of Communist strength in that area. Lombardi stated that the document was an official release distributed to him at the end of a meeting of NATO foreign ministers on May 25, 1970. The document read in part: "The Allies, realizing the weakness of democracy in Italy and the lack of political stability in that country suggest reinforcement of NATO troops on Italian soil." It proposed establishing a military unit whose "task would be to protect NATO air bases and missile sites in Northern Italy where local administrations are dominated by Communist elements."²² Both the Italian Foreign Ministry and officials at NATO Headquarters in Brussels declared the press release a fake. But the Italian Communist party organ, *L'Unità*, serving Italy's second-largest political party, devoted half of its front page on June 19 to an article under the headline, "Most Grave NATO Intervention in Italian Domestic Affairs."

Undermining U.S. influence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a continuing Soviet goal. A series of anti-NATO fakes from 1976 to 1980 began with a forgery of U.S. State Department Airgram A-8950, dated December 3, 1974. The genuine A-8950 was simply a statement of financial and commercial requirements for the fiscal year 1975, but the fabricated version asked recipients to collect information on bribing European officials and to develop other covert means of damaging America's competitors in foreign trade markets. The perpetrator was undoubtedly inspired by a congressional investigation of foreign bribery practices involving U.S. businesses. The forgery was mailed to several West European newspapers, together with a French cover letter signed by a Robert Pont. On November 7, 1976, the London *Sunday Times* published a story dealing with the document, but identified it as a forgery. TASS replayed the story by the *Times* but conveniently omitted any mention of the fraudulent nature of the airgram.

Three of the counterfeits targeted on NATO attempted to compromise the American defense posture by magnifying difficulties in the United States-Greece-Turkey triangle. One of the forgeries raised Kremlin intelligence strategy to a new level of daring when it cast President Carter as a player in the scheme. The president supposedly gave a speech in September 1977 that contained demeaning references to the Greek government. Although the phony speech came from anonymous sources and contained numerous errors in style and language, it was published by two Greek newspapers, the leftist *To Vima* and the Communist *Rizaspahhtais*.²³ The two other examples of pseudo-documents involved genuine U.S. government cables that had been tailored to conform with Soviet objectives. One of them was an altered U.S. State Department cable on Greek-Turkish relations that implied the United States

avored Ankara at Athens' expense. The other was a phony set of intelligence-gathering requirements of the U.S. Defense Department instructing operatives to spy on various Greek political parties and organizations.

In mid-1978, the Soviets disseminated a bogus letter on official NATO stationery bearing the signature of NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. The letter "informed" the U.S. ambassador to NATO that the Belgian Defense Ministry had compiled a list of journalists opposed to deployment in Europe of the enhanced radiation weapon, popularly known as the neutron bomb. Timed to coincide with a massive Soviet propaganda campaign against the new weapon, the letter implied that these journalists would somehow be penalized for their "negative" reporting.

Although detonation of the neutron bomb releases a stunning force, its principal purpose is to produce large amounts of deadly radiation. It has become known as the weapon that "kills people and leaves buildings standing," but it has another equally important purpose. It is designed to stalemate the massive Soviet tank force poised on the borders of Eastern Europe. The most sophisticated and damaging forgery of the 1970s was probably a carefully constructed bogus U.S. Army field manual known as "FM 30-31B," an operations guide designed to help U.S. military officers influence the internal affairs of friendly countries. Forwarded under the signature of army chief of staff General William Westmoreland, "FM 30-31B" encouraged the "use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard the interests of the United States in friendly nations where Communists appeared close to entering the government." The obvious suggestion was that the United States should inspire various terrorist organizations around the world. In contrast to previous forgeries by the Soviet bloc, "FM 30-31B" reflected a new level of sophistication in the sense that it contained minimum errors in style, format, and phraseology, and the authors cleverly used appropriate typewriters and military jargon. Only its "Top Secret" designation gave it away since field manuals are not usually classified that high.

The existence of "FM 30-31B" was first mentioned in an article in the Turkish newspaper *Baris* in March 1975.²⁴ Although the U.S. government was quick to denounce the manual, it appeared two years later in Spain and subsequently in Western Europe. On September 18, 1978, *El Paris*, an independent leftist Spanish newspaper, published a story based on the forgery and, five days later, accusations raised against America by the field manual appeared in the Spanish weekly *El Triunfo*.²⁵ The author of that article raised questions that implied American support for Western Europe's terrorist organizations, including Italy's Red Brigades.

The Red Brigades perhaps gained their greatest notoriety in March 1978 when they kidnapped and subsequently murdered former Italian Premier Aldo Moro. In a chain reaction of accusations the press in France, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Portugal repeated the charge that the United States was the inspiration for Moro's murder and played down American protesta-

tion of innocence. Almost simultaneously with West European reports, the accusation that the United States instigated the Moro kidnap-murder surfaced in the East European mass media. The disinformation-based charge of American complicity in Moro's death was so widespread that East European journalists did not depend on their usual waiting period before orchestrating a propaganda campaign of their own. *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, an official organ of the international Communist movement, included this comment in its December 1978 edition:

Let us note that another Italian journal suggested: There arises the suspicion that the Red Brigades (or those who manipulate them in Italy) are pro-fascist organizations skillfully camouflaged as 'reds' . . . The abduction and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro could, in the logic of things, have been the result of the CIA's realization that the policy pursued by that statement was dangerous. A few months later this was confirmed by a secret document which appeared in an October issue of the journal *L'Europeo*. It bore the signature of U.S. General William Westmoreland and it said that U.S. Special Services should use leftist outfits in friendly countries to promote the interests of the United States.²⁶

The creation of "FM 30-31B" and the subsequent campaign marked a significant victory for the Kremlin. Many West European newspapers and magazines of different political slants repeated the anti-American allegations and thus gave them notoriety and a measure of credibility.

Several new anti-American forgeries surfaced in Western Europe during 1981, among them a forged letter supposedly sent by President Reagan to King Juan Carlos of Spain on October 23, 1981. In the forgery, Reagan urged the king to speed Spain's entrance into NATO, made a few unflattering references to some groups in Spain, and suggested ways for the king to suppress domestic opposition. A copy of Reagan's letter was mailed to many Spanish journalists. A short time later, in November 1981, the letter was sent to delegates to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid, but it failed to achieve the desired effect. Several Spanish newspapers ran stories exposing the Reagan letter as a Soviet forgery.²⁷

Another fake, a letter allegedly written by former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to Joseph Luns, suggested ways to neutralize the antinuclear movement in Europe. The forgery was skillfully designed, but the perpetrator addressed Luns as "Dear Joseph" instead of "Joe," as Secretary of State Haig would have addressed him.²⁸

Although the use of an anonymous source is often a warning of something amiss, spotting a suspicious document can be difficult, since there is usually no direct evidence that a document originates in Eastern Europe. Analysts must rely on such circumstantial evidence as format, content, style, and the usual methods employed by the secret services in the Soviet bloc. To produce forgeries with the "core of reality" typical of the late 1970s requires highly skilled and experienced agents. A fabricator must have firsthand examples of classified documents and stationery of the U.S. government and must follow

foolproof handling procedures. (Photostats are often used to improve chances that a forgery will pass as genuine because the typeface is more difficult to analyze). Most important, the pseudodocument must at least appear to reflect American foreign policy. Few organizations in the world possess the necessary knowledge, materials, experience, and infrastructure for covert action to conduct sophisticated forgery operations. The only organizations with obvious malice toward the United States are based in Eastern Europe. There is no reliable evidence that the Soviets have any significant competition in the use of forged documents as vehicles of disinformation or black propaganda. The People's Republic of China refrains from the tactic, and various leftist organizations, such as the Red Brigades or the Palestine Liberation Organization, simply do not have the resources to produce and disseminate quality forgeries.

NOTES

1. *New York Times*, 27 February 1981, p. A 8.
2. *New York Times*, 20 February 1981, p. 1.
3. *AIM Report*, Vol. X., 1 January 1981, No. 1.
4. *Boston Globe*, 28 November 1980, p. 1.
5. *New York Times*, 6 March 1981, p. A 27.
6. *New York Times*, 7 March 1981; *New York Times*, 9 March 1981.
7. "Soviet Covert Action, The Forgery Offensive," *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, February 1980, p. 63.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
10. *Time*, 27 May 1974, p. 51.
11. *Time*, 18 February 1974, p. 46.
12. *New York Times*, 21 January 1971, p. 2.
13. As quoted by *Washington Post*, 25 November 1970, p. A 10; *Washington Post*, 17 November 1970, p. A 1.
14. *Atlas*, January 1971, p. 42.
15. "Soviet Covert Action, The Forgery Offensive," *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 6, 19 February 1980, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 138-144.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-153.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 145-146.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-157.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-171.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-165.
21. *Al Dawa*, February 1979, No. 406.
22. *New York Times*, 21 June 1970, p. 50.
23. "Soviet Covert Action, The Forgery Offensive," pp. 117-121.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 86-101.
25. *El Triunfo*, 23 September 1978.
26. *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, December 1978.
27. *Enterprise*, 9 July 1982, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*

Chapter 6

The Iranian Hostage Crisis: The Soviet Connection

Most Soviet successes in covert action are based on mistakes and insensitivities of American foreign policy. Iran was no exception. When Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh was forced to resign in 1953, the shah spoke in these terms to CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt: "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army and to you."¹ With U.S. support, the shah built a huge military force and secret service apparatus that served as a major anti-Communist deterrent in the Persian Gulf. While maintaining the political structure of a feudal society, he felt that he could change Iran into a modern industrial society within a few decades. But rapid urbanization and industrialization threw Iranian society into chaos as entire villages were uprooted and people became confused about their own traditions. Systematic torture of Iranian citizens by SAVAK, a secret police organization established in 1957, ultimately led to intense hatred of the shah.

Many American journalists warned in the late 1970s that the shah's system of power was rapidly deteriorating, but as late as June 1978, the shah maintained that nobody could overthrow him. "I have the support of 700,000 troops, all the workers and most of the people . . . I have the power."² Most American foreign policy experts, including CIA analysts, agreed with him.

Analysis of internal developments in Iran during the last decade reveals not only an increasingly active role by intelligence services of the Soviet bloc but also gradual deterioration of American intelligence services. A CIA report on Iran in August 1978 concluded that Iran was "not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation," and, a month later, the Defense Intelligence Agency supported this misleading perception in a report predicting that the shah would "remain actively in power over the next 10 years."³ With no reliable sources of information on Iranian society, U.S. intelligence depended almost entirely on SAVAK reports and thus failed to recognize numerous signals about the potentially explosive situation. In a study of American intelligence on Iran prior to November 1978, the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Evaluation, concluded that "policymakers were not served as well as they needed to be . . . Long-standing U.S. attitudes toward the shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetite for analysis of the shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available intelligence." In short, both the intelligence community and the users of intelligence contributed to the failure.⁴

What about the mass media? In the summer of 1979, the McGraw-Hill Company published *Countercoup: The Struggle for Control in Iran*, a book written by former CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt recounting his adventures in the Middle East in the 1950s, particularly his supervisory role in the Iranian coup of 1953. Publication of the book was poorly timed in light of the growing unrest and anti-American movement in the country. And numerous factual mistakes made the book a political fiasco. A few days after the first hundred copies went on sale in October 1979, the company recalled the entire first edition of 7,500 copies to correct multiple inaccuracies. For example, a photograph showing Iranian demonstrators in the 1950s carried the caption, "Crowds fill the streets in support of the shah", but a close look at the placards carried by the demonstrators revealed not a picture of the shah but a picture of Joseph Stalin and slogans demanding removal of the shah.⁵

Two weeks before Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Teheran, the *Wall Street Journal* published a story glorifying the role of the American master spy, Howard Rocky Stone, in the 1953 pro-American coup, without thinking about the irritation it would cause in Iran.

He recalls buttoning the uniform of Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi on the day the general was to announce over Radio Teheran that the shah had designated him the new prime minister. Gen. Zahedi, the CIA key ally in Iran, was too nervous to dress himself . . . And he [Stone] remembers a victory party at the CIA station that night in 1953, after the coup had succeeded. Gen. Zahedi, the new prime minister, and his son approached Mr. Stone and said: "We are in . . . We are in . . . What do we do now?"⁶

The ostentatious disregard for Iranian nationalism and expression of superiority offended many Iranians and contributed to the anti-American mood.

PUSHING THE UGLY AMERICAN

Long-term Soviet goals in the Middle East are to erode the U.S. position in the Islamic world and destabilize the area to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Iranian-American hostage crisis of 1979-1981 underlined the advantages enjoyed by the Russians in dealing with Third World countries.

While American influence and economic prosperity provoked resentment and humiliation in Iran, the Russians kept a low profile. "The Soviets engage in subversion, espionage and propaganda against Iranian Government inter-

ests," said Sadegh Ghotbzadeh shortly before stepping down as Iranian foreign minister, "but they never insult the Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini]. As I have often mentioned, the Soviets are no less satanic than the Americans. But they know how to avoid hurting the people's sensibilities."⁷ Before the shah's fall in 1979, the Kremlin pursued a two-track policy toward Iran. On the official level, it maintained respectable noninvolved relations but, under the surface, it worked systematically to undermine the monarchy. And it pursued a similar tactic during Khomeini's tenure. While praising the anti-imperialist orientation of his movement and expressing tolerance for his religious fanaticism, Soviet leaders and the KGB secretly attempted to push the Iranian Revolution toward Communist ends.

Vladimir Sakharov, a Soviet diplomat and KGB agent who operated in the Middle East and later defected to the United States, confirms that the Kremlin is moving forward with a long-term, sophisticated, and multifaceted campaign to lure nations of the Middle East, one by one, into the Soviet camp. As a student at Moscow's Institute of International Relations in the early 1960s, Sakharov was a member of its first graduating class of Arabists. "They number more than 2,000 now," he said in 1980, "all fluent in local languages, conversant with Islamic laws, history, customs, and sensibilities and regional economics and politics, and trained in military tactics, intelligence gathering, propaganda techniques and recruitment." The institute gave the Middle East top priority, as a key to breaking the back of Western imperialism. The objective of bringing the Middle East under Soviet domination will be accomplished through well-coordinated political, ideological, economic, and military operations, overt and covert.⁸

Sakharov states that the Soviets assiduously recruit agents, allies, and friends in every important military, government, student, and religious organization in the Middle East.

I was given intensive training in this art, and, once I was stationed in the Middle East, one of my major duties was to spot potential recruits. Many young, ambitious, and idealistic students end up in Moscow or at Soviet guerrilla training centers. The Soviets go to great lengths to recruit local government officials, military and political officers, religious leaders, teachers, union leaders, and businessmen—anyone with influence. The means include ideological salesmanship; taking advantage of local rivalries; secret help with one's career; providing liquor, women, and compromising favors . . . Soviet women are even recruited by the KGB to marry Arabs and become Mata Haris.

In his testimony, Sakharov also stated that the Soviet government pursues friendly relations with governments while it secretly backs revolutionary groups against them. He stressed that these revolutionaries need not be Marxist. "They can be Islamic or nationalist so long as they are strongly anti-American and above all, show promise of being winners."⁹

The KGB was able to penetrate the highest echelons of the Iranian government during the 1960s and 1970s, including the military. In 1977, the Iranian counterintelligence service arrested KGB officer Boris Kabanov, who operated in Iran as a consul of the Soviet Embassy, and his agent, Major General Ahmed Mogharebi, a logistics expert in the Iranian army. Mogharebi used high technology communication hardware to provide the KGB with valuable logistical data dealing mainly with U.S. military equipment in Iran, the availability of ammunition, and the status of the Iranian Army. Kabanov was protected by diplomatic immunity and expelled, but Major General Mogharebi was sentenced to death and executed in January 1978. Shortly after taking Mogharebi into custody, the Iranians arrested Ali-Naghi Rabbani, another high-ranking Soviet spy who served as an official in Iran's Ministry of Education.* Prior to his arrest, Rabbani received his instructions directly from the Soviet Union via satellite on a small pocket-size receiver. Both Mogharebi and Rabbani were once members of Tudeh, the clandestine Iranian Communist party, and were later recruited for the KGB.¹⁰

The KGB built a vast intelligence network among all strata of Iranian society, including the Islamic clergy, radical students, Tudeh members who were ordered to dissociate themselves from the party immediately after they were recruited, and members of several ethnic groups fighting for national independence, particularly the Kurds and the Baluchis.

The core of the Kurdish revolt is the Komileh, a political party established shortly after World War II under the ideological and financial influence of the Soviets. A major objective of the Komileh is to create a Kurdish republic consisting of Kurds living in northern Iran, Iraq, and eastern Turkey. The Baluchis, another ethnic group perceived by the Soviets as an asset in the secret war for the Middle East, inhabit a large area from Pakistan through Afghanistan to eastern Iran, and are known for their military skills. Several hundred agents, most of whom had been recruited from Moslem republics of Soviet Central Asia, were sent into the area in 1979 and 1980 to foment the spirit of national liberation among the Baluchis.¹¹

Countries in the Soviet bloc have conducted a massive public campaign in Arabic countries and in Iran since the early 1960s to convince the Moslem world that scientific socialism is consistent with Islamic social doctrines and ethics. Officers in the Soviet embassy have been very active among members of the Islamic clergy and have presented them with expensive copies of the Koran imported from the Soviet Union and literature depicting the life of Moslems in the Soviet Union. They also expressed sympathy for Ayatollah

*Other journalistic sources identify Ali-Naghi Rabbani as a high-ranking officer of SAVAK and claim that approximately eighteen other high officials of SAVAK and other government agencies were working for the KGB.

Khomeini, who was in exile at the time for anti-government activity. Soviet bloc intelligence services in these countries have engaged in disinformation and propaganda campaigns to show that Americans have no respect for the Iranian people and consider them backward and degenerate.

In late November 1964, several hundred individuals in Iran, including some newspaper editors, received a photocopy of a memorandum purportedly written by Cleo Shook, director of the U.S. Peace Corps in Iran and addressed to members of his organization. The memorandum described the Iranian people, their customs and religion in highly derogatory terms and portrayed them as ignorant, morally degenerate religious fanatics. The forgery was obviously designed to antagonize the Moslem clergy against Americans with the inclusion of phrases describing Islam as "reactionary" and Moslem religious customs as "savage" and "wildly fanatic." The memorandum advised Peace Corps volunteers to prevent young Iranians "from going to the Mullahs to learn Islam, which bars the country from modern life." It also called attention to a sense of superiority that forces Americans to intervene in foreign countries and change their governments so that they resemble the corrupt American model. The Iranian press was not allowed to publish the forgery, but Czechoslovak intelligence—the perpetrator—collected numerous signals about the outrage caused by the memorandum among Moslem clergymen.

A number of Iranian newspapers, government officials, and religious leaders anonymously received copies of another Soviet-bloc forgery in February 1965. Stamped "Confidential," the document was written in the name of Stuart W. Rockwell, a member of the U.S. embassy in Teheran and was addressed to "James." The document suggested that both the writer and the recipient were American intelligence officers and referred to the shah and all Iranians in disrespectful terms. It included a remark about American success in having the "mischievous old man" exiled—a reference to Ayatollah Khomeini, who strongly opposed the shah's regime. The letter also indicated that Rockwell was involved in illegal purchases and transactions. Like other anti-American forgeries in the Middle East, the Rockwell letter was circulated to confirm U.S. interference in Iranian domestic affairs, its lack of respect for Iranian religious and political leaders, and its interest in material possessions and black market dealings.

The production line of the Soviet bloc forgeries was interrupted in the early 1970s by the Watergate scandal and congressional investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The steady flow of self-incriminating reports and documents from Washington provided Eastern European propagandists with so much material that forgeries were no longer necessary. But, when the Watergate era subsided, the Soviets reopened their forgery campaign and Americans in Iran again became a favorite topic. For example, the following forged dispatch dated April 6, 1977, and labeled "Top Secret," was sent anonymously from the U.S. embassy in Teheran to a number of recipients:

During the talks, General Massiri, referring to recent information, broached launching the project elaborated for President Sadat's removal. In their opinion, Mr. Sadat's time is up, he has to step down either by way of a coup or something else. They see this as the only alternative considering common interests in the area and, he says, Prince Fahd completely agrees. Their final decision was underscored by Mr. Marwan's March report on the Egyptian situation and the President's attitude.

In accordance with the guidelines and in view of the sensitivity of the question, I did my best to be noncommittal. General Massiri asks us to brief Mr. Fees: Mr. Razmara in Cairo has already received his instructions.

An anonymous letter mailed with a photocopy of the forgery to the Egyptian embassy in Belgrade read as follows:

Dear Sir,

Begin's cabinet doesn't act on behalf of the interests of the Israeli people and in collusion with the Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Carter administration wants to raise pro-Likud governments to power in the combat-countries. President Sadat will be the first who has to leave. Please, warn him of it.

Sincerely,

J.H.

The pseudodocument suggested that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States were plotting to overthrow Egyptian President Sadat. But the ploy failed. Instead of accepting the disinformation, the Egyptian government made an official inquiry in Washington and received evidence proving the fraudulent nature of the document and the perpetrator's motives.

Another important Soviet instrument of disinformation and propaganda has been the clandestine National Voice of Iran (NVOI), a Persian (Farsi) language radio station that broadcasts from Baku in the southern part of the Soviet Union. Posing as an underground operation in Iran, the station is managed by senior KGB officers, most of whom spent several years as operatives in Iran, and by Iranian Communist refugees and exiles. Although the station has focused primarily on anti-American propaganda since it first began to broadcast in 1959, its political tone was relatively mild until massive demonstrations against the shah began to sweep Iran in late 1978. From that time on it strongly supported Ayatollah Khomeini's program to force the United States out of Iran. In December 1978, it stepped up its propaganda attacks against the United States with instructions on how to organize demonstrations,¹² and, after the shah's departure from Iran in January 1979, it expanded its broadcast time and further sharpened the anti-American tone.

When Ayatollah Khomeini became the dominant religious and political figure in Iran, conspiracy, paranoia, plots, and counterplots became the rule rather than the exception. Long-term American interference in the affairs of Iran made the Iranians xenophobic and susceptible to the Ayatollah Khomeini's argument that the U.S., particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, was responsible for all of their problems. In the explosion of nationalistic and religious fervor, the Iranian public believed Khomeini when he stated that

Americans and Israelis sponsored the attack of Muslim fanatics on Mecca's Sacred Mosque. Conspiracy theories blamed the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency, and international Zionism for almost every difficulty, from assassinations in revolutionary Iran to drug addiction. Some Iranians even considered the escalating oil prices that helped to push the United States into an economic recession a CIA plot.¹³ Obsession with American conspiracies went far beyond the bounds of logical probability. Many well-educated Iranians believed early in the revolution that Ayatollah Khomeini was actually an American agent, and others claimed that Khomeini was working for the U.S. oil companies when he decided to keep Iran's oil in the ground while prices rose.

THE TAKEOVER OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHERAN

Iranian militants calling themselves Moslem Students Following the Imam's Line took control of the U.S. embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979. All available evidence indicates that the initial decision to take over the embassy was the spontaneous reaction of a group of students who were disappointed with the slow zigzagging course taken by the Iranian Revolution. They were suspicious that the Iranian government, including the Revolutionary Council, would enter into a secret compromise.

The radical clergy and Marxist extremists, in particular, believed that Prime Minister Bazargan committed a major error in attempting to restore relations with the West. The takeover of the U.S. embassy was aimed both at overthrowing Mehdi Bazargan's moderate government and at protesting the admission of the deposed shah to an American hospital. "We defeated the attempt by the liberals to take control of the machinery of the state We forced Mr. Bazargan's government to resign. The tree of the revolution has grown and gained in strength," Hogatolislam Ashgar Mosavi Khomeini, the radical students' mentor said.¹⁴

The idea of storming the embassy was the brainchild of engineering students from Teheran's Polytechnic Institute, Teheran University, the National University, and the Sharif Technological University. The initial plan to seize the compound for a brief period, embarrass the United States, and force the resignation of the moderate government was conceived in October 1979. The students recruited a number of supporters among their fellow students, systematically cased the U.S. embassy, and developed maps showing the location of various offices and weak points in the embassy walls. When they climbed the embassy walls, they envisioned an occupation lasting only a few days, but the worldwide reaction and Khomeini's subsequent blessing encouraged them to continue the operation.

In the months that followed they became, in effect, arbiters of the revolution. Mosavi Khomeini admitted that the students had asked him to inform Khomeini of their plan, but he refused on the basis that "it was politically

unwise to let the Imam have any prior knowledge of the occupation of the embassy."¹⁵ The militants told a number of journalists, clergymen, and scholars that their movement had no leader and that their actions were based on the Imam's ideological guidelines.

Three radical leftist organizations comprising the Moslem Students Following the Imam's Line have used the Ayatollah Khomeini's name in various ways as a defensive shield: the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen, the Marxist Guerrilla Fedayeen, and the pro-Soviet Iranian Communist (Tudeh) party. Since its establishment in 1965, the Mujahedeen Khalk (People's Crusaders), an armed guerrilla organization, has consisted primarily of young people who call themselves Islamic progressives. Their ideology is a mixture of nationalism, socialism, and Islam, but they categorically deny any links to the Soviet Union or the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) party. Their goal is a socialist Iran that would tolerate nonexploitative private property. With some 100,000 guerrillas under arms, the Mujahedeen was the best organized opposition force in Iran during the shah's tenure. Shortly after the establishment of the new Khomeini regime, the Mujahedeen gained legal status and opened offices in major Iranian towns, but when Khomeini denounced them as counterrevolutionaries in the summer of 1979, they again went underground.¹⁶ The split between the Mujahedeen and the Khomeini regime became final after President Bani-Sadr's dismissal from the presidency and his eventual escape to France in July 1981. The second major guerrilla organization, known as the Fedayeen Khalk (People's Sacrificers), is also composed largely of students who staged many attacks against the central and local Iranian governments during the shah's tenure. The Fedayeen have not shown signs of pro-Soviet inclinations, but Marxist principles dominate their ideology. One section of the Fedayeen has followed the strategy of the Tudeh party and proclaimed support for Khomeini, but the remainder of the organization has maintained an anticlerical stance. The portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini in the Teheran office of Nouredin Kianouri, secretary general of the Tudeh party, symbolized the tactics of Iranian Communists. The party officially supported Khomeini and was involved in what Kianouri characterized as the struggle for the reorganization of social life, especially the oppressed strata of society, but the 35,000 card-carrying members worked secretly for a Communist takeover in Iran. Although the Tudeh party was frequently attacked by the clerics during the hostage crisis, it made a successful tactical maneuver in proclaiming support of the religious fundamentalists and instructed its members to move into government structures.

Almost all members of the Moslem Students Following the Imam's Line were trained in using small arms. Although Khomeini frequently made anti-Communist statements, the student militants never accused the Soviet Union of interfering in Iranian domestic affairs. "We shall never allow the United States to provoke us into a confrontation with the Soviet Union or to convince us that the Soviet Union is our enemy."¹⁷ But the reputation of the militants as

orthodox Moslems totally devoted to Ayatollah Khomeini's philosophy gradually eroded even among prominent Iranian leaders. President Bani-Sadr, for example, initially praised them as true patriots but later criticized them as self-centered children who behaved like a government within a government. "They unfortunately sometimes let themselves be influenced by certain political groups favorable to the Soviet Union, such as the Communist Tudeh party, which wants to isolate Iran on the international scene."¹⁸

SOVIET TACTICS

On November 6, 1979, two days after the takeover of the U.S. embassy, a Radio Moscow commentary included these remarks: "Iran knows through bitter experience about the disgusting behavior of U.S. imperialists In this respect, the anger of the Iranian nation and its youth is totally understandable and logical."¹⁹ The clandestine National Voice of Iran stationed in the Soviet Union went much further and incited Iranian mobs to further violence in a broadcast on November 7, 1979:

In conditions where the U.S. conspires against the Iranian revolution, against Iran's independence and freedom, against the leaders of the revolution, particularly against Imam Khomeini, a number of the government's official sources, including the prime minister, consorted with the envoys of the brutal imperialism of the U.S. persons such as Brzezinski, this mad dog of imperialism and Zionism Let us remember that the security advisors of the Presidents of the United States had the greatest share in the massacre and slaughter of the Third World At the same time that the delegation of the provisional government was holding talks with the conspirator Brzezinski, demonstrations by the Iranian people during the feast of the sacrifice against the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism against the Iranian revolution were in process We believe that the only decisive and necessary response to U.S. imperialism is the united struggle for the eradication of imperialism led by U.S. imperialism from our dear Iran. Our struggle along with the aware and heroic people of Iran in achieving this holy aim continues²⁰

The station maintained this highly emotional and aggressive anti-American tone throughout the hostage crisis. Although no data are available about the impact of the station on Iranian audiences, the content of the broadcasts suggests that the Soviets focused primarily on the young politically active generation.

Throughout the Iranian crisis, the Soviet Union officially played the role of Iran's friend who was appalled by irresponsible American behavior and indicated that it was prepared to support Iran against any American pressures. A week after the takeover of the U.S. embassy, American diplomats in Moscow were told that the Soviet Union was trying to be helpful in behind-the-scenes efforts to obtain the release of the hostages. While condemning takeover of the embassy as illegal, Moscow used the opportunity to manipulate the Iranian government and public opinion against the United States. On December

5, 1979, the Soviets, in their first official statement dealing with the hostage crisis, made it clear that they backed Iran. *Pravda*, the Communist party daily, accused the United States of using "crude military and political pressure against Iran" and stated that seizure of the embassy and detention of American diplomats could not be used as a pretext for "military blackmail of another sovereign state." Slightly more than one month later, on January 13, 1980, the Soviet Union vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on economic sanctions against Iran because it would be "a blow to the Iranian revolution."

The Soviet press vehemently supported Teheran's demands, continuously repeated the charge that many hostages were spies, and justified anti-American actions by the Iranian government.

It is enough for a country to win freedom and independence, to break away from the sphere of imperialist domination or influence, for the U.S. ruling quarters to act as if they had lost one of their own states . . . to this day they have not been able to reconcile themselves to the loss of the three Indo-China countries, of Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. And the loss of the United States' once well-established strong point in Iran and the prospect of obtaining another forepost in Afghanistan on the southern frontiers of the USSR gives Washington no rest. . . . Its paranoid reaction to all this is the real reason for the present chill in the international atmosphere. It seems that Washington is increasingly incapable of distinguishing between what belongs to the U.S. and what belongs to others.²¹

The tactics to draw Ayatollah Khomeini's regime into a closer relationship with Russia were succeeding until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Several weeks after the invasion, Iranian leaders, preoccupied with domestic unrest, were unable to formulate a coherent policy toward the Soviet aggression. Iran formally condemned the invasion as "a hostile act against the Iranian nation," but it was not perceived as an immediate threat. The first strong denunciation came on January 17, 1980, when Bani-Sadr, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Soviets "want us to be divided rather than united so that they can capture the divided parts, as they did in Afghanistan, and reach the waters of the Indian Ocean."²²

The Soviets ignored the warning. To take advantage of the anti-American sentiment and help the Iranians survive Western economic sanctions, Moscow offered transportation routes across Soviet territory, and, in April 1980, Iran signed new trading agreements with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Rumania. The Iranian government also reached an agreement with the Soviets that, in the event the United States closed Iran's southern waterways, the Iranians would be allowed to transport goods to Iran via the Soviet Union. Almost every day, East European technological experts in Teheran called at the National Petro-Chemical Company in an effort to gain control of projects abandoned by American or other Western concerns.

The outbreak of the military conflict between Iraq and Iran in September 1980 presented an unexpected complication for the Soviets. They rejected Iran's request for the Soviet Union to condemn Iraq and chose to play a

neutral role. By maintaining a low diplomatic profile, sending ammunition and other military equipment to both Iran and Iraq, blaming the United States for the trouble, and waiting for the outcome of the war, they hoped to be a sure winner on all fronts. In a statement of Soviet policy, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev stated that both combatants were "friendly with the Soviet Union." And *Izvestia* echoed the official Soviet line in these remarks: "Every new day of armed clashes undermines both countries' opposition to imperialist schemes. Moreover, the Iraq-Iran military conflict impedes the consideration of the nonalignment movement and objectively weakens the developing countries' front."²³

Before the Iraq-Iran war, the Russians supplied approximately two-thirds of Iraq's military equipment, including Tupolev 22 bombers, and after the outbreak of the war, they continued sending spare parts and ammunition to Iraq through Jordan's port of Aqaba. But Iran was undoubtedly a bigger prize in the East-West conflict than Iraq. Thus, in attempts to gain Iran's sympathy, Moscow made several friendly gestures, such as supplies of arms for Iran from Soviet Allies (notably Libya, Syria, and North Korea), an agreement for transit of Iranian freight, and even direct military aid.

When the negotiations to release the hostages entered the final stage in January 1981, the Soviets launched a propaganda campaign aimed at disrupting the arrangements. In a radio broadcast to Iran, Moscow warned that the negotiations were only a smokescreen for American plans to launch a military attack on Iran. And, two days before the release of the hostages, Soviet television noted that the United States and its NATO Allies were planning "armed aggression" against Iran. "U.S. imperialism has decided to show its teeth," said the television commentator. And *Pravda* accused the United States of playing a "dishonorable game" on the hostage issue by using negotiations as cover for "a new intimidating operation."²⁴

After the hostages were released and transported to Germany, stories of mental and physical torture during their captivity appeared in the Western press. The Soviet press agency TASS asserted that CIA agents were brainwashing the hostages into believing that they had been tortured. "The American authorities obviously fear that the former hostages could declare for all to hear that they do not have hostile feelings for the Iranian people," TASS said.²⁵

SEEDS OF CONFUSION

The heated atmosphere of conspiracy, anti-Americanism, and internal confusion made the Iranians easy victims of Soviet forgeries, false rumors, and other deceptive activities. For example, on December 12, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini's office made a surprising announcement that it had received a letter from Senator Edward Kennedy requesting a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini. The request was denied because of "the demand of the nation to

return the shah." Immediately after the announcement, the Iranian mass media published a letter supposedly containing these remarks by Senator Kennedy:

We are 100 per cent supporters of the Islamic Republic. What you have achieved during 11 months in Iran has shocked the world. You and the 35 million population of Iran stood in front of the United States and its 225 million population . . .

My greetings to you. I will give my blood for you. My remarks about the engagement of the U.S. Government with the deposed shah endangers my future political career. I think the same as you and in your way for the support and aid of the oppressed and workers We have decided to proclaim our support for you since we understand your teachings and beliefs.

The *New York Times* observed that the language attributed to the senator appeared extremely unidiomatic.²⁶ Kennedy categorically denied his authorship with the statement that the letter was a "total fabrication" and a State Department official called it a "bald, crude, amusing fake."

Iranians were hardly amused, however. Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh maintained that Mr. Kennedy had indeed sent a message to Ayatollah Khomeini, but a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry later confirmed that it was a fake and that "there had been a misunderstanding somewhere."²⁷ The Ayatollah Khomeini's son, Ahmad Khomeini, stated that the letter was legitimate and added that it was not the first time the senator had tried to contact Iranian leaders. Shortly after the letter was identified as a forgery, students holding American hostages labeled Senator Kennedy an "imperialist and a sympathizer of Carter."

Although the pseudodocument bore political fingerprints of Soviet disinformation, neither the press nor officials in Washington or Teheran suspected its Soviet origin. In a comprehensive report on the forgery and Teheran's reaction, the *New York Times* concluded that "there was no reliable information as to who the author of the purported letter may have been."²⁸ Why would the KGB or another communist intelligence service produce a document of such dubious quality? A forgery of this type is a simple trick known among Communist specialists in deception as the "immediate denial technique." The technique is based on the assumption that the victim (the Iranian government) will publicly announce reception of a document sympathetic to its political cause and the alleged author (Kennedy) will deny the authenticity of the document. The victim (Iran) considers the document another dirty trick by the enemy (the United States) and blames both the enemy and the alleged author. Hostility between the victim (Iran) and the enemy (the United States) leads to mutual suspicion. The perpetrator (the Soviet bloc) is officially a neutral observer out of focus with the issues and neither the victim nor the enemy suspects his involvement.

Shortly after seizing the U.S. embassy, the militants announced discovery of many documents that presumably revealed American espionage activities in Iran. Three weeks later, they provided Western journalists their first opportu-

nity to observe the evidence. In a courtyard decorated with portraits of Khomeini, the militants publicly interrogated a group of hostages about embassy correspondence with Shahpur Bakhtiar. From his exile in France, Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister, reportedly asked for material support and intelligence on events in Iran. Although it denied his request, the U.S. embassy expressed a wish to maintain the dialogue. The so-called evidence appeared as normal diplomatic correspondence, but the interrogators implied that the United States was helping Bakhtiar lead separatist movements. The hostages were also questioned about millions of dollars in counterfeit American, West German, and Iranian banknotes that had been found in the embassy. The students argued that the embassy had attempted to undermine the Iranian economy. "Oh heavens, we were not involved!" exclaimed one of the hostages.²⁹ The banknotes had been brought to the embassy by an Iranian and U.S. officials were trying to track down the counterfeiters.

In mid-December 1979, the militants released a copy of a cable from the U.S. embassy in Iran to the State Department, indicating that William Daugherty was an operative with the Central Intelligence Agency, and, in the following months, several other hostages were accused as American spies. Impressed by the militants' claims, Bani-Sadr and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh developed plans for an international tribunal to review crimes by the United States and the deposed shah against Iran. For the "Iranian Watergate," as Ghotbzadeh called it, the Iranians wanted to use materials found in the U.S. embassy, evidence accumulated in Iranian ministries, royal residences, and banks, and documents that had been made public in the U.S. Senate investigation of the CIA. The idea of a monster trial against American imperialism presented a new and welcome opportunity for Soviet-bloc disinformation operatives. When the KGB learned about the project, it promised to supply Iranians with other documents and materials that would make the charges more persuasive.³⁰

But Bani-Sadr's and Ghotbzadeh's confidence in the documents rapidly deteriorated in the next few months. On January 5, 1980, Iranian guards arrested Minister of National Guidance Nasser Minachi on charges by militant students that he had connections with the Central Intelligence Agency. A student spokesman charged in radio and television broadcasts that the documents confirmed Minachi's close links with the Central Intelligence Agency, but Bani-Sadr doubted the evidence and angrily denounced the militants as "dictators who have created a government within a government." Following his release by the Revolutionary Council, Minachi commented during a news conference that "the documents were not authentic and were the work of spies." President Bani-Sadr suggested in March 1980 that the U.S. Congress should investigate American interference in Iranian domestic affairs since 1953 and that the governments of both the United States and Iran should provide documents reflecting the interference. Surprisingly, he announced that

he would exclude documents seized at the U.S. embassy, but Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh was even more explicit in deriding some of the "revealing documents" as "garbage."³¹

The growing mistrust of prominent Iranian politicians in the validity of the documents did not prevent the militants from using them for a large-scale witch hunt, and all of their victims were known for strong anti-Soviet sentiments. The revolutionary prosecutor for the military arrested Admiral Mahmoud Alavi, Iran's Harvard-educated navy commander, in the early part of February 1980 for close links and friendly relations with the accused U.S. spies held in the U.S. embassy. And the Iranian newspaper *Islamic Republic* charged on February 26, 1980, that some of the documents on Alavi "showed that he had been in contact with agents of the old regime and helped many of them escape." Also in February 1980, the militants submitted documents linking Simon Farzami, an Iranian Jew and editor of the English-language daily *Teheran Journal*, to U.S. press attaché Barry Rosen. Ten months after his arrest, Farzami was sentenced to death and executed but details of the trial were not published.³²

On July 14, 1980, the Teheran newspaper *Azadegan* published an excerpt from the interrogation of Thomas Ahern, another hostage who had supposedly admitted that he was a CIA operative. The protocol identified three of Ahern's secret contacts: Khosroh Qashqai, a member of the Iranian parliament, who was not allowed to take his seat because he refused to testify at a hearing into charges that he had been a SAVAK agent; Abbas Amir Entezam, Iranian ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, who had been summoned home and arrested; and Admiral Ahmad Madani, who had objected to the holding of the hostages from the beginning. A former commander of the Iranian navy and close ally of President Bani-Sadr, Admiral Madani was Bani-Sadr's first choice as prime minister in May 1980, but he rejected the offer because he could get no assurances that the clerics would not meddle in his government. Several weeks later, he was expelled from parliament for supposedly cooperating with the Americans and the shah, but, rather than face a trial, he went into exile.³³

Former Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir Entezam, also an official spokesman in the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, resigned in November 1979 and was appointed ambassador to the Scandinavian countries. He was one of the moderates who favored resolution of the Iranian-American controversy through negotiation rather than violence. He maintained official contacts with the U.S. embassies in Teheran as well as Stockholm and, on his return to Iran on December 19, 1979, he was arrested and put on trial as an American spy in the spring of 1981. He categorically denied the charges and claimed that forged evidence was used against him. The most "compromising" document used in the trial was a specially encrypted cable dated August 7, 1979, and signed by Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance. According to the document, Entezam was introduced in Teheran to former CIA agent George Cave to discuss plans for intelligence briefings to the Iranian government. The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency offered him this service in exchange for his information on Iran, but, for the militants, the offer was proof of his treason and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.³⁴

Like the documents used against Nasser Minachi, some of the other documents were rejected by the Iranian courts because they lacked authenticity. For example, the militants were forced to apologize publicly for attempting to link Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's Islamic Liberation Movement to the United States through the embassy files. In a few instances, Iranian officials openly admitted that some documents accusing Westerners or Iranians as spies were forgeries. Ayatollah Behesti, chief justice of the Supreme Court, stated in February 1981 that four Britons held in Iran since August 1980 on suspicion of espionage were arrested on the basis of forged documents.³⁵ The documents were presented to the authorities to prove that the British had cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The perpetrator even forged the signature of former U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan on a letter to show that the British were hiding many weapons. The forgery also indicated that the four emissaries had been given \$500 and 250 kilograms of TNT for a terrorist campaign.³⁶

Another series of forgeries surfaced in Teheran in April 1981, this time in the form of bank slips purportedly proving that some Iranians had deposited millions of dollars in private accounts in Western Europe. Among the compromised individuals were Ayatollah Behesti, who supposedly had invested \$2.6 million in the Zürcher Kantonal bank of Zürich, and Fakhreddin Hejazi, a member of parliament accused of transferring \$6.3 million to the account of former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar in Paris.³⁷

Although the perpetrator in all these cases has not been publicly identified and the evidence is only circumstantial, it points to Soviet intelligence. The explosion of anti-American hysteria and the seizure of numerous American documents during the Iranian Revolution presented an ideal situation for their massive use.* The Soviets were potential beneficiaries in all detected cases.

Before the seizure of the U.S. embassy, the Soviets possessed a large volume of information about Americans in Iran, including data on their contacts, partners, private lives, etc. It was easy to manufacture "hard evidence" against some individuals by changing only names and dates on genuine documents or using slightly doctored papers received elsewhere and leaking them

*In the spring of 1981, the Iranian militants published a set of thirteen paperback books containing some of the documents found in the U.S. embassy covering the period from 1966 to 1979. Their authenticity has not been seriously challenged, except by the former Iranian President Bani-Sadr who said that some of the documents were "deliberately mistranslated." (See *Time* magazine, February 15, 1982, p. 18).

to the Iranians. With at least one reliable secret agent among the militants, the KGB could secretly supply them with numerous forged and genuine documents for use in the campaign against the United States.

Many Iranians visited the United States during the shah's tenure or maintained contacts with American institutions and individuals. Any Iranians who had any contacts with the U.S. embassy in earlier years or used its services to communicate with partners in the United States became potential targets for KGB blackmail, for the KGB or any satellite intelligence service could claim possession of incriminating documents and blackmail them. In such an atmosphere, a U.S. embassy letter mentioning the individual's name even in the most innocent and trivial connection could have tragic consequences.

RUMORS

The presidential election campaign in Iran attracted 106 candidates, including eccentrics of various political colors. Khomeini's staff members stated that the packed field was a CIA intrigue to confuse the Iranian public opinion. Widely circulated rumors in May 1980 claimed that President Carter had tried to mail a poisonous snake to kill the American hostages so that he could use their deaths as a pretext for military invasion.³⁸ Khomeini believed that the Central Intelligence Agency and its agents were responsible for all chaos, struggle, and sabotage in Iran and nobody could convince him that American capabilities for covert action in Iran ended long before the takeover of the U.S. embassy.

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was a frequent target of rumors during the hostage crisis. In the early stages of the revolution, several Western correspondents suggested that Ghotbzadeh was a secret Soviet agent, and the allegation was publicly repeated in the U.S. presidential campaign by Republican candidate John B. Connally. The French weekly *L'Express* reported that, during his stay in France, Ghotbzadeh had "long served . . . as liaison between the French Communist Party and the Iranian Communist Party."³⁹ The allegations also held that Ghotbzadeh spent several years during the 1960s studying at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and, as a dissident student, he was supposedly twice expelled from the United States. It is true that, as an exile living in France, Ghotbzadeh was closely associated with radical Arab liberation fronts, but, during the last few years of his exile, he developed very close relationships with Ayatollah Khomeini and served as his security chief.

After Khomeini's takeover, Ghotbzadeh became the chief spokesman and flamboyant propagandist of the new Iranian regime in his position as director of Iranian television and radio. And, in the dramatic developments following the seizure of the U.S. embassy, Ghotbzadeh, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a moderating element who warned both the fundamentalist religious forces around the Islamic Republican party and radical students of the

increasing Soviet threat. At the Moslem foreign ministers' conference in Islamabad in May 1980, Ghotbzadeh vehemently denounced the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Even more annoying for the Soviets were his public statements accusing the Kremlin of secretly manipulating the radical elements in Iran and "driving the young generation to political sabotage. The Tudeh [Communist] Party has more than fifty years of experience in serving the Soviet Union as a trusted fifth column. And it is doing an excellent job today," he said.⁴⁰

The rumors about Ghotbzadeh's clandestine connections with the Soviets gradually subsided, but new accusations that he was an American secret agent proved fatal. As part of a disinformation campaign in September 1980 to undermine his reputation and political future, *Moscow News*, an English-language weekly, openly repeated rumors spread through Soviet channels in Iran and described him as a virtual agent of the United States.⁴¹ The Kremlin was obviously relieved when the new government of Prime Minister Rajai took over and Ghotbzadeh disappeared from its ranks. Two months later he was arrested when he criticized state television and radio for such programming that citizens were tuning in foreign broadcasts. He was released only at the order of Ayatollah Khomeini.

On November 4, 1980, the Islamic Guards arrested Rajai Samghabadi, former managing editor of an English-language daily in Teheran. He was then asked to sign a document indicating that he had served as a link between former Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh and the Central Intelligence Agency, and, when he refused, his captors subjected him to a mock execution. They released him several days later and he secretly left the country.⁴²

Azadegan, a fundamentalist newspaper, reflected further Soviet disinformation when it published additional quasi-evidence of Ghotbzadeh's American connection. The December 20, 1980, edition of the paper included a photocopy of a check for one million dollars that Ghotbzadeh allegedly received from Americans. The check was designated specifically "for the release of hostages."⁴³ The article accompanying the reproduction stated: "This is the payment to Mr. Ghotbzadeh from his American masters to secure the release of the hostages." Ghotbzadeh categorically denied the charge, but the forgery continued to circulate in Teheran. He continued to warn of the threat posed by the Soviet Union: "The Soviets are going to inordinate lengths to make sure Iran sinks deeper and deeper into international isolation The Kremlin, through its agents and propaganda, has also gone all out to create trouble between us and Pakistan, Turkey and the Persian Gulf nations. It wants us cornered and helpless so that in desperation, we will turn north. Their policy is clear: to bludgeon Iran to its knees and then impose on it whatever conditions they want."⁴⁴

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was arrested again on April 8, 1982, and convicted of masterminding a plot to overthrow the Islamic Republic and

assassinate Khomeini. He was executed by firing squad after a short trial on September 16, 1982. More than seventy officials, mainly his supporters, were executed a month earlier. Ghotbzadeh confessed during his trial that he wanted to seize power with the support of Khomeini's religious rival, Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, but he vehemently denied plotting Khomeini's assassination. Shortly before his execution, Ghotbzadeh stated that he had signed his own death sentence when, as foreign minister, he ordered the closing of three Soviet consulates in Iran and asked the Soviets to reduce their diplomatic corps to the same size as the Iranian diplomatic corps in the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ACHIEVEMENTS

The KGB penetrated numerous Iranian institutions and movements, including radical student and religious organizations, before and during the revolution, but it was unable to control the hectic pace of events. The seizure of the U.S. embassy and detention of fifty-two hostages, the bloody struggle within the Iranian elite, and numerous assassinations were spontaneous developments reflecting internal conflicts and tension caused by the revolution. After the takeover of the U.S. embassy, which evoked great enthusiasm from the Iranian public, the militants became victims of their own popularity. Soviet covert action in the form of forged evidence, rumors, and manipulation of leftist organizations contributed directly to the general confusion and anti-American hysteria. The Soviets can claim a major victory over the United States in the sense that Iran is no longer an American ally in the Persian Gulf, but their effort to gain greater influence in Iran brought only limited success. The Khomeini regime was ideologically hostile to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the beginning of the revolution, the Soviets counted on the Mujahedeen as a potential political ally, but, as the rift deepened between the Mujahedeen and Khomeini, they officially supported the fundamentalist right-wing clergymen and even began to label Mujahedeen as "CIA backed leftists."⁴⁵ In a campaign of terror against the Khomeini regime in 1981, the Mujahedeen assassinated a number of religious and government officials, including Ayatollah Behesti, the nation's chief justice; four cabinet members, six deputy ministers, and twenty-seven members of parliament. And, on August 30, 1981, an explosion killed Prime Minister Javad Bahonar and President Mohammed Ali Rajai. Soviet propaganda accused the Central Intelligence Agency of financing the assassinations.⁴⁶

Soviet strategy was based on gradual expansion of political and economic influence in Iran, and, for a short period, the strategy was successful. For example, Soviet-Iranian trade in 1981 reached 1.1 billion, and several KGB advisors arrived in mid-October to help Iranians organize an efficient security

force, including an intelligence service. Most of the advisors were members of Central Asian minorities who spoke fluent Farsi, and they were ostentatiously sympathetic to the Khomeini revolution. A few weeks later, the Soviets expanded their influence even further by sending a team of economic experts to assist in rebuilding Iran's troubled economy. By the end of 1981, the number of Soviet diplomatic personnel in Teheran reached 200, almost four times the number in the days of the shah.⁴⁷

Rivalry between the regular army and the Islamic Guards, the clergy's military team, offered the Soviets an opportunity to exert more influence among the Iranian armed forces. The regular army remained a stronghold of Western-educated officers, but the Soviets helped Khomeini improve the strength of the Islamic Guards. The first weapons imported from the Soviet Union in 1981 were allocated to the Islamic Guards.⁴⁸

As mentioned earlier, Soviet successes were only temporary. The war between Iraq and Iran and Soviet indecision concerning which side to support raised questions among Iranian leaders, and retarded the Soviet political offensive in Iran. The KGB suffered a major setback in June 1982 when Vladimir A. Kuzichkin, a KGB officer who operated as vice consul in Iran, defected to Great Britain and provided the West with valuable information about Soviet penetration of Iran. Kuzichkin's main role in the Soviet embassy was his contacts with the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) party.⁴⁹ A short time later, Khomeini began to tighten the screws on the Communists. Twenty-five leading Communists were arrested in November 1982, and, in April of the following year, several Tudeh leaders were shown on television and forced to confess spying for the Soviet Union. The first secretary of the Tudeh party, Nureddin Kianuri, admitted that the Tudeh party had been an "instrument of espionage and treason" since 1941 and that he had spied for Moscow since 1945.⁵⁰ By May 1982, more than one thousand members of the Tudeh party had been arrested, eighteen Soviet diplomats had been expelled, and the Tudeh party had been banned on charges of spying for the Soviet Union.

A Marxist Iran remains the long-range goal, of course. Such an accomplishment would open the door to the Persian Gulf for the Russians and prevent the Muslim revolution from infecting the southern parts of the Soviet Union with some forty-three million Moslems who are characterized as a potential demographic bomb.* The Khomeini regime abrogated a treaty of 1921 giving the Soviets the right to intervene in Iran if events threaten their interests, but Kremlin leaders may eventually use the treaty as a pretext for a military invasion.

*A Soviet census published in February 1980 showed 1979 population figures indicating that the Moslems of Soviet Central Asia are the most rapidly growing community. From 35 million in 1970, their number grew to 43 million in 1979 (see the *New York Times*, February 23, 1980, p. A 9).

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA

The Iranian crisis, probably one of the toughest stories ever covered by the American mass media, illuminated both the strengths and weaknesses of American journalism. In the absence of direct contact between the Iranian and American governments, news organizations essentially replaced the State Department as the principal source of information and occasionally served even as diplomatic intermediaries. Several times during the crisis, Iranian leaders asked U.S. journalists to transmit messages to Americans, and Washington even used them as communication channels in the opposite direction.

For almost a year after the departure of the shah, American journalists working in Iran encountered little if any personal hostility. Iranian leaders believed that Americans would support them if they could tell their side of the story. When a member of the militant group approached CBS, ABC, and NBC representatives in Teheran and offered them an interview with Marine Corporal William Gallegos, only NBC accepted conditions that included permission for a student spokesman to make unedited opening and closing statements. The controversial broadcast reopened the discussion about the role of the press as an unedited platform for terrorists to set forth their views.

Several months after the embassy takeover, the Iranians realized that their propagandistic efforts had not produced the expected results. They charged Western journalists with biased reporting and insults to the Islamic revolution, and Ayatollah Behesti accused them of "repeatedly filing untrue, distorted reports."⁵¹ On January 14, 1980, the ruling Revolutionary Council announced expulsion of all journalists working for American news organizations. The Iranians modified their restrictions on the press a few times in the following months, but they refused to change their critical, suspicious attitudes. And the assassination of Iranian leaders in the summer of 1981 gave new impetus to their campaign against Western journalists. The Iranian government charged that three Reuters correspondents—Barry May, Phil Davison, and Alan Philis—were spies and ordered them to leave the country within forty-eight hours.⁵²

The American mass media showed commendable restraints when the lives of American hostages were at stake.* A number of news organizations, including CBS, NBC, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and the *New York Times*, knew that six Americans had escaped from the U.S. embassy during the takeover and were hiding in Teheran. They withheld the news until they learned that the Americans had left the country with false Canadian passports. A major weakness in

*The two-hour documentary, "Iran: Inside the Islamic Republic," aired on PBS in June 1980 was a clear exception. The documentary was filmed in Iran between December 1978 and May 1979 and was outdated at the time of the broadcast. Fundamentally unfair and unquestionably supportive of Iran, the film was a showcase of propaganda rather than journalism. The fate of the American hostages was not mentioned at all (see the *Boston Globe*, June 7, 1980, p. 21).

the mass media coverage of the crisis was the lack of competent analysis. Barry Rubin, a staff associate at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, comments on the problem as follows:

Much of the difficulty lies in the nature of the American press. Reporters covering Iran lacked language ability, a continuing presence in Teheran, and the contacts that develop from such specialization In contrast to European practices, there were hardly any American journalists familiar with Iran, and relatively few who were knowledgeable about Islam and Muslim societies, and Iranian history and political culture.⁵³

American journalists reported numerous signals about the intense Soviet involvement in Iran, but the evidence was somewhat fragmented and interpretation of the signals lacked any depth of meaning. One year after the hostages were released the *Boston Globe* published a series of analytical articles on U.S. documents that had been captured and published in Iran. It critically evaluated American policies, motives, reactions, and mistakes, but it gave little attention to the role played by the Soviets in this highly publicized game. The attitude was more or less typical of the reaction by the American press throughout the crisis.

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Chapter 7

Playing with War

The United States and the Soviet Union play a sophisticated game of hide-and-seek with complex and delicate electronic instruments, satellites, hundreds of ships and aircraft, underwater microphones, radar and other equipment, and numerous agents and double agents. The purpose of mutual surveillance is to determine whether opponents play according to the ground rules of bluffing without launching a major attack. Every successful military operation involves an element of deception and surprise, and effective defense against strategic deception requires a reliable intelligence warning system. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., underlines the importance of such a system in these words:

Strategic warning is the answer to strategic surprise, which may be accompanied by strategic deception. Alternatively, the purpose of strategic surprise, which is likely to take place in conjunction with strategic deception, is to deprive an adversary of strategic warning. . . . The prospects for deception are enhanced if the object of the deception is dependent on only one or just a few channels of information, or if the real thing can be hidden among the spurious.¹

The Central Intelligence Agency and other American intelligence agencies have, since World War II, satisfied Washington's need for reliable intelligence and analysis. For more than two decades, the Soviets have built up their military arsenal in all categories, conventional and nuclear, and the effort has been out of all proportion to the legitimate needs of self-defense. As of 1980, Moscow had a numerical lead in several categories of strategic weaponry: in comparison with the United States, the Soviet Union was ahead 1,398 to 1,054 in launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles, 950 to 656 in submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and approximately 7,836 to 3,253 in megatonnage, an important indicator of the destructive force in a nuclear arsenal. But the United States also had an advantage in some fields of nuclear weaponry. American submarine-launched ballistic missiles were much more accurate, and the submarines that carry the missiles track faster, deeper, and quieter, particularly the Trident submarine.²

A CIA research study covering the period from 1971 to 1980 indicates that the Soviet Union spent 40% more than the United States on defense activities. In 1980, Soviet costs for these activities were 50% higher than U.S. outlays. Soviet defense spending was estimated as approximately \$175 billion, and the U.S. figure was \$115 billion.* Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was even more pessimistic. In an annual report to Congress on the nation's defense in January 1981, Brown stated that the Soviet Union had spent \$270 billion more on the military since 1968 than the United States had spent and that the Soviets were currently spending 80% more on military power than this country.³

The Soviets have made impressive progress in developing highly technological strategic and tactical weapons. In such areas as antiship missile technology and chemical warfare, the Soviet Union has a clear lead over the United States. A group of fifty-three U.S. engineers and physicists estimated in 1979 that the Soviets were five to seven years ahead of the United States in the area of particle beam weapons.⁴ And they have done considerable work toward the development of lasers as futuristic death ray weapons. Although the Pentagon has worked on a similar project, William Perry, Undersecretary of Defense for Research, states that the Russians are outspending the United States by three or four times in this area.⁵

Both the United States and the Soviet Union use a variety of techniques, including submarines, planes, ships, and satellites, in the international race to gauge military capabilities. Electronic equipment aboard satellites, for example, is powerful enough to detect a basketball from a distance of 2,000 miles.⁶ Although Soviet satellites are not as sophisticated as their American counterparts, they are capable of performing a variety of important intelligence-gathering services, such as intercepting foreign communications, acquiring foreign radar transmissions, or photographing foreign military objects. When a serious international crisis arises, the Soviets usually send several satellites into orbit. During the Egyptian-Israeli War in 1973, for example, they launched satellites at the rate of approximately one a day.⁷ American satellites have a life span of several months or even years, but most Soviet reconnaissance satellites remain in orbit for some two weeks. Intercepting and decoding

*According to Robert Huftstutler, director of the Office of Strategic Research, the CIA relies on two principal methods to estimate Soviet expenditures. The first derives implicit defense costs from published Soviet economic statistics. The second is the building-block approach, in which CIA analysts identify and enumerate physical elements of the Soviet defense effort over time and apply direct cost factors to them. While each of the two methods is uncertain, the CIA considers the building-block approach more reliable and practical and uses the analysis of available Soviet statistics to make rough checks on the other estimates. The Soviets, are, of course, familiar with the CIA evaluation procedures and take all necessary countermeasures to distort the final results.

the enemy's communications is an increasingly important element in Soviet-American competition. Knowledge of the enemy's thoughts and actions simplifies the task of developing realistic countermeasures.

Americans were truly surprised in May 1972 when they intercepted, with the help of their satellite, conversations between Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet missile designers in a limousine on their way to a Moscow conference. Brezhnev talked about a "main missile"—the SS-19—that had never before been mentioned in SALT negotiations. Not until some years later (in 1978) did American intelligence analysts conclude that their estimates of Soviet military strength had been shockingly inaccurate.** Soviet managers of military deception had obviously done their job. Military deception is an integral part of every nation's military strategy, but the Soviets have mastered it to a degree unparalleled in modern history.

In response to the growing number and accuracy of Soviet missiles that could give the Soviets the critical advantage in a nuclear war, the U.S. Air Force developed a plan to build an MX system, a mobile ICBM system designed to deceive the Soviets. Each of 200 missiles used in the system would be shuttled among 4,600 shelters in Utah and Nevada, supposedly making it impossible or at least extremely difficult for the Soviets to detect the exact location of the missiles at any given moment. Many experts and scholars doubted the feasibility of the system. In addressing a symposium at Massachusetts Institute of Technology on April 11, 1981, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., president of the Arms Control Association and a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had this to say about the MX concept:

I (too) do not like the idea of depending on deception and fooling the Russians as a basis for having a survivable land-based missile force. I think that's the wrong game to be playing with the Soviet Union. I think they're better at deception than we are, and we will never know, and that's the most important aspect about playing this deception game: We will never know whether we have deceived the Russians or not⁹

Some deceptions, for example, active measures involving Soviet front organizations, are designed to manipulate American and West European public opinion against U.S. military policies. Other campaigns are designed to mislead American evaluations of Soviet military objectives, targets, strategies, weapons, and military equipment. Unlike propagandistic games, these campaigns require professional military expertise and are usually unknown to the

**Business Week* reported on February 28, 1977, that there was total disarray among intelligence analysts in estimating Soviet military spending. An analyst from the Central Intelligence Agency and one from the Defense Intelligence Agency were given permission to go into the field in a long-shot attempt to get classified Soviet assessments of their own defense costs. They came up with irrefutable evidence that the CIA's overall figure for the early 1970s had been approximately half as high as it should have been.

public. Competition of one military elite against the other might eventually give the perpetrators the decisive strategic advantage. In military disinformation campaigns, the KGB plays only a secondary role, primarily as transmitter of deceptive messages to opponents. The objectives, strategy, and content of individual disinformation messages are formulated by experts in the Soviet army, air force, and navy.

Technology has assumed an increasingly important role in information gathering, and in deception. Satellites send pictures that would be impossible for individual photographers. Computerized interpretation of radar signals collected by reconnaissance aircraft and radio interceptions is another source of valuable data. But, ultimately, an *agent* provides information on the intentions of the other side, and intentions are most important.

Intelligence officers from the Soviet bloc systematically infiltrate NATO forces for both defensive and offensive purposes. Numerous agents at various levels of the NATO hierarchy supply vital information about Western plans, strategy, weapon storage, movement of troops, internal frictions, conflicts, and weak spots. Such information gives the Soviets an important advantage in developing their military strategy. Soviet-bloc agents occupying important positions within the military hierarchy of NATO countries occasionally function as agents of influence, pushing certain concepts and obstructing others.

Some experts attempt to explain the enormous Soviet military buildup during the period of détente as a phenomenon stemming from complexes dating back to the 1920s. The explanation might have had some validity a few years after World War II, but it lacks substance in the 1980s. Max Kampelman, the chief U.S. delegate to the European Security Conference in Madrid, observed: "The Soviet military buildup during the period of détente has long exceeded anything remotely necessary for defensive purposes. It is an offensive capacity. It is a capability for surprise attack."¹⁰

Disintegration of the NATO Alliance remains one of the major objectives of the Soviet overt and covert maneuvering. The Soviets came very close to achieving this objective in 1982 when the NATO Alliance was seriously threatened by internal problems and disputes over military and economic tactics. The International Institute for Strategic Studies stated in its annual strategic survey of May 1983 that NATO passed through one of its most difficult years in 1982. "Stresses among NATO members are accumulating that need to be relieved, and the longer term outlook is worrisome." The major problem that disturbed relations inside the alliance was the dispute over the Siberian gas pipeline. When the Polish government, under Soviet pressure, declared martial law in 1981, President Reagan imposed an embargo on exports of American technology, including equipment made in Europe for the pipeline to carry Soviet natural gas to Western Europe. Most West European countries rejected the embargo and labeled the American policy as reversion to cold war and economic warfare.¹¹

Obviously, the Kremlin's long-range aspiration is to expand the socialist camp and defend its conquests. Massive military superiority—a goal to be achieved by the turn of the century—will make the task much easier.

HIDE AND SEEK

Soviet military experts know that Western, particularly American, sovietologists try to integrate large volumes of data into a coherent picture revealing the war-making capabilities of the Soviet Union. To distort American assessments as much as possible, they systematically leak falsified information based on long-term disinformation plans formulated by the general staff of the Soviet army and approved by the Politburo.

There is a misconception that U.S. intelligence satellites flying over Soviet-bloc territory and taking pictures of military installations are the final answer to the requirement for reliable intelligence.* Satellites can obviously collect a great volume of information electronically, including pictures of military installations, weapons, and movements of troops. But, just as military operations and installations can be camouflaged from human eyes, they can be camouflaged to distort the information collected by satellites.

The Warsaw Pact countries, under Soviet supervision, developed a long-term military disinformation plan in the mid-1960s to deceive NATO strategists. For example, the general staff of the Czechoslovak army, in cooperation with Czechoslovak counterintelligence and intelligence, systematically leaked distorted information on the strength of the Czechoslovak military, location of major units, technological advances, and the availability of certain kinds of weapons to Western intelligence services. Numerous double agents working on Czechoslovak territory for both Czechoslovak counterintelligence and one of the Western intelligence services were systematically supplied with disinformation. The operation even included construction of deceptive missile ramps, seemingly chaotic transfer of certain specialized units, and maneuvers with deceptive messages. Other members of the Warsaw Pact used similar techniques.

The strategy of deception paid off many times for the Soviets. For example, during the first round of strategic arms discussions (SALT I) involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (heavy ICBMs) in May 1972, the Russians were already producing a heavy ICBM, the SS-19. When the United States proposed that both parties should agree not to convert the launchers of older missiles into launchers suitable for heavy ICBMs, the Russians disagreed.

*The most productive agency in dealing with this type of intelligence is the National Reconnaissance Office. It collects the so-called electromagnetic intelligence, beginning with monitoring radio and telephone communications of a military character and ending with determining the location and operational capabilities of the adversary's antimissile defenses and radar installations.

They were in the process of deploying the SS-19 and refused to accept any definition of a heavy ICBM. Their refusal left a major loophole in the provision for imposing SALT I constraints on Soviet heavy ICBMs.*

In negotiating with the United States for a ceiling on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the Soviets demanded larger quotas than the United States because they lacked forward submarine bases comparable to U.S. bases in Great Britain, Spain, and Guam. After American negotiators accepted the demands, Dr. Kissinger told a congressional committee that because of differences in geography the Soviet Union required three nuclear missile submarines for every two American submarines so that it could maintain a proportionate number in battle-ready positions. But even before they made their demands the Soviets had already developed a long-range SS-N-8 submarine-launched missile that could be fired at most U.S. targets without leaving its home ports.¹²

When President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev completed negotiations to ban mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, they verbally agreed that their countries would not build land-based mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, but Mr. Brezhnev refused to sign the agreement. According to Mr. Sullivan, the Russians have camouflaged and concealed all SS-16 missile production from American intelligence and have covertly stockpiled approximately one hundred mobile SS-16s. The intermediate range mobile SS-16 can easily be upgraded to an intercontinental missile. Covert stockpiling gives the Russians the equivalent of a proposed American multiple-aim-point system of mobile missiles *before* production and deployment of such missiles has even been planned.¹³

U.S. intelligence collected information on Soviet-bloc military and strategic developments through a variety of sources during the 1970s, but the most important source was the surveillance satellite KH-11. The lenses of this satellite can distinguish between civilians and military personnel from an altitude of 200 miles. Its multispectral and infrared sensing devices can even locate such objects as tanks, launchers, or missiles at night and distinguish camouflaged and artificial vegetation from real trees and plants.** As long as this technological superspy remained secret, the United States could be reasonably certain that the Soviets could not launch a major surprise attack against the West. But the advantage provided by the KH-11 watchdog did not

*The deception strategy used by the Soviets during these negotiations was revealed by David S. Sullivan, a former analyst for the CIA, in the 1979 winter issue of *Strategic Review*, the organ of the U.S. Strategic Institute

**Unlike other spy-satellite systems that record information on high-resolution films and periodically drop them to earth in capsules (a highly complicated and risky procedure), the information from the KH-11 satellite is transmitted instantly to earthbound stations in a digital computer code.

last long. In March 1978, William Kampiles, a low-echelon, twenty-three-year-old officer in CIA headquarters, passed the KH-11 manual to the KGB in Athens, Greece, for \$3,000. From then on, the Russians knew enough about the infrared and multispectral photographic equipment on board the KH-11 to take effective countermeasures and feed the system with disinformation. Among the first signals tipping U.S. security experts that the Russians probably knew about KH-11 capabilities came shortly after sellout of the manual when the satellite reported Russian ground movements that were deliberately staged to confuse American analysts.

Christopher John Boyce, an employee of the TRW Systems Group in California, and his companion, Andrew Daulton Lee, were convicted in 1977 of attempting to sell documents concerning a CIA satellite system known as Pyramider to Soviet agents in Mexico City. The system was never built. Investigation in 1979 disclosed that the two men had sold the Soviets data about two existing and functioning surveillance satellites (Rhyolite and Argus) that had been used to intercept telemetry signals transmitted by Soviet missiles during test launchings. CIA analysts used the information supplied by Rhyolite and Argus to trace the evolution of Soviet ballistic missiles and their improved atmospheric reentry systems.

Approximately six months after the arrest of Boyce and Lee, American military experts were puzzled when the Soviet Union began encoding telemetry signals from its test missiles. The new measure was a part of a disinformation game based on material supplied by the two Americans. The Soviets learned enough about the American reconnaissance satellites to develop a disinformation system capable of degrading the value of the satellites. Detailed knowledge of technical specifications made it possible to design countermeasures, including physical camouflage of relevant defense sites or transmission of disinformation to deceive the satellites.¹⁴

In November 1969, President Nixon again renounced first use of chemical weapons by the United States in the event of war and later curbed chemical weapons in the American arsenal. His decision was influenced by a Soviet disinformation campaign designed to persuade Washington that, if the United States continued its buildup of chemical and biological weapons, especially nerve gas, the Soviet Union would initiate a crash program to match American capabilities. But the Soviets already possessed these weapons in large quantities.

The Soviet Union and 118 other nations signed a Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of lethal germs or toxins, except in small laboratory quantities for medical research. After the convention became effective in 1975, U.S. intelligence produced evidence (mainly pictures from spy satellites) indicating that the Soviets might be building or expanding plants for manufacturing biological weapons at Zagorsk and Sverdlovsk. Both the Ford and the Carter admin-

istrations decided against an official inquiry since the Soviets could have interpreted such action as an attack on détente.¹⁵

Sverdlovsk, a city of two million people, is a major Soviet industrial area some 875 miles east of Moscow and is normally off limits to foreigners, presumably because of its military industries. In April 1979, several hundred individuals died from a mysterious disease believed to be a form of highly infectious pulmonary anthrax. Many immigrants from the Soviet Union to the United States reported the incident amid rumors that it was caused by exposure of large numbers of people to a lethal biological agent. They stated that the Soviet military had stockpiled germ warfare materials near Sverdlovsk and had conducted experiments in biological warfare for a number of years.¹⁶ Mark Popovsky, an emigré from the Soviet Union and author of a number of books on biomedical sciences in the Soviet Union, testified before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 29, 1980, that he had learned, while living in the Soviet Union, that secret military compounds had worked on bacteriological weapons in Kirov and Sverdlovsk.

Plague, tularemia, tetanus, anthrax and yellow fever were some of the infectious diseases worked on by Soviet experts at these secret compounds In February [1980] I received a letter through the underground sent to me from Moscow in January, in which a friend informed me that last spring an infectious strain had spread throughout Sverdlovsk following an explosion in a secret bacteriological compound The nature of the disease was not known, but it was thought to be a very virulent form of anthrax.¹⁷

In the face of mounting evidence that the epidemic disease was caused by biological warfare germs, the State Department finally instructed U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., to conduct an official inquiry into the matter. Although the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs denounced Western reports and the inquiry as impudent slander and the latest invention of American propaganda, an official Soviet note to the U.S. embassy in Moscow on March 20, 1980, admitted an outbreak of anthrax disease but stated that it had been caused by improper handling of meat products in one of the local factories. After investigating all signals, U.S. intelligence provided the House Select Committee on Intelligence with evidence in June 1980 that the epidemic of anthrax in Sverdlovsk was caused by an accident at biological warfare facility identified as Military Compound 19, which released anthrax spores into the atmosphere.¹⁸

Subsequent to the Sverdlovsk incident, a series of events in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan confirmed that the Soviet Union had produced and used chemical and bacteriological weapons on a massive scale, despite its signature on the 1972 convention outlawing the manufacture or transfer of lethal biological agents or toxins for use as weapons. American journalist Calen Geer, who was in Afghanistan on an assignment for *Soldier of Fortune* in the spring

of 1980, returned to the United States with several items of Russian military hardware, including a nerve gas filter, a hand-held missile launcher, and sticks of an incendiary material similar to napalm.¹⁹ Hundreds of Afghan refugees, defectors, doctors who treated victims of chemical attacks, and journalists who had visited Afghanistan between the summer of 1979 and the summer of 1981 testified about numerous incidents of chemical attacks. The State Department reported in March 1982 that, during the same period, at least forty-seven chemical attacks resulted in 3,042 documented deaths.²⁰ A State Department report to Congress on the Soviet use of chemical warfare in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan concluded that "the toxins and other chemical warfare agents were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Laotians and Vietnamese either directly or through the transfer of know-how, and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea."²¹

The Soviet Government and press reacted in a predictable manner. *Sovetskaya Rossia*, on March 29, 1980, labeled the evidence slanderous propaganda:

In the present propaganda campaign in line with attempts to heat up the atmosphere and make it easier to obtain new funds for chemical weapons, slander is being spread in the U.S. about alleged Soviet use of such means of warfare in Afghanistan. What it means, is that the US is forcing a race in chemical warfare weapons as part of its new rearmament program.²²

DRUG INFECTION

Almost 1,600 American soldiers stationed in West Germany during 1973 were treated every month for drug addiction. Five years later, a special congressional committee estimated that more than 16,000 of the 225,000 U.S. soldiers in West Germany were no longer combat-ready because of drug abuse. Even more alarming was the drug addiction of personnel assigned to nuclear weapons programs. At a meeting of NATO ministers in November 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance mentioned the alarming number of drug-related deaths among American soldiers stationed in West Germany and expressed concern that heavy drug use could affect military readiness.²³

For years Communist military strategists observed with a great deal of pleasure the drug addiction of American GIs and other NATO troops because they knew that it could undermine the readiness of the entire Western military alliance. And various Communist countries occasionally tried to intensify the problem.

The People's Republic of China became involved in international drug trafficking in the 1950s with two major objectives: to obtain foreign currency and to weaken the West by poisoning its younger generation. The second objective was actually political justification for the whole operation. Chinese leaders did not really believe, at the time, that smuggling drugs to the West would

significantly change the existing balance of power, and they stopped the operation by the mid-1960s. The Burmese Communist party, with an armed force of some twelve thousand men controlling large areas in Burma's Shan plateau, adopted similar tactics in 1981. The area is a major center of opium poppy cultivation in Southeast Asia, and the Burmese Communists used it to acquire foreign currency and not to accomplish political objectives.

The Soviet approach was different. Specialists in covert actions frequently discussed the idea of systematically supplying American GIs with large quantities of drugs, but they could not decide on the most practical means. They decided in the early 1970s to permit the movement of drug traffic from the Middle East to Western Europe through Eastern Europe. Most opium harvested in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is refined into heroin and then transported to Western Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. American narcotics agents discovered that a large volume of illegal narcotics enter and pass through Bulgaria on the journey to Western Europe. Bulgarian state police seize some heroin, but, rather than destroy it, they sell it to other traffickers who are guaranteed safe passage.²⁴

Another important intersection on the road between the Middle East and West Germany is East Berlin. A congressional task force on drug abuse characterized East Germany as a silent partner in heroin trafficking aimed at U.S. military personnel in West Berlin and West Germany. The chairman of a congressional task force on drug abuse, Glenn English, made this startling revelation in 1978: "Virtually all of the heroin being used by American military personnel in West Berlin and more than 65% of the heroin used by servicemen in West Germany was delivered with the passive cooperation of the East German government."²⁵ The latest signal on the involvement of Communist countries in drug trafficking came in March 1982 when Senate investigators uncovered evidence that Cuba was involved in smuggling marijuana and cocaine from Colombia to the United States. The objectives of the operation involving Cuban intelligence operatives with the approval of high Cuban officials were not clearly identified, but the operation might have been perceived as the easiest source of desperately needed Western currency.²⁶

Despite this very recent signal of Communist involvement, the KGB, in recent years, has lost some of its original enthusiasm for using drugs as a secret weapons against NATO forces. Soviet officials probably recognize the danger that growing drug addiction in Western Europe would eventually contaminate even their own environment.* More important, a drug addict among American military personnel assigned to duty with nuclear weapons could easily start a major nuclear conflict even without Washington's knowledge.

*Recent immigrants from the Soviet Union reported growing use of such drugs as Anasha (a form of hashish) and Chefir (a stimulant made by boiling tea leaves) among Soviet youth (see the *New York Times*, June 8, 1982, p. A27).

NATIONAL WARS OF LIBERATION

The most effective military active measures undertaken by the Soviet intelligence are probably activities in support of "national wars of liberation" in developing countries. The collapse of old colonial systems after World War II offered the Soviets a unique opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the departure of colonial powers. Some of the former British, French, and Portuguese colonies, such as Vietnam and Angola, either directly joined the Soviet camp as Marxist-Leninist states or, like Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, or Egypt (for almost fifteen years), became closely associated with it. In the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets registered major success in Cuba, but the victory was followed by more than a decade of no further Soviet expansion.

Insurgency usually begins in a climate of political oppression and economic injustice. Soviet success in manipulating national wars of liberation and skillfully exploiting the aspirations of developing nations for economic progress, freedom, and justice has stemmed largely from American mistakes and insensitivities. When the poorest and the oppressed become impregnated with revolutionary ideals and determination to defeat the ruling elite, the official American diagnosis usually suggests more American ammunition and military advisors to fight the rebellion. The idea that the radical left can be easily defeated by massive support for the radical right is fundamentally wrong because it offends large majorities of people who believe that profound change is necessary in developing countries and pushes the disillusioned into the arms of the Soviets.

Providing overt or clandestine aid to leftist guerrilla groups gives the Soviets the magic key to future manipulation of the country when the war is over. The grateful winner usually opens the door to multifaceted Soviet-bloc influence and finally becomes both the target and victim of Soviet imperialism. To make its influence politically more acceptable and less visible, Moscow may choose one of the satellites—Cuba, East Germany, or Czechoslovakia—to entangle the victim in a web of political intrigue and military dependence on Eastern Europe and gradually make him more responsive to Soviet wishes.

Soviet-bloc involvement in wars of national liberation takes several forms, the first of which is military training and political indoctrination of guerrillas, particularly individuals with the potential of becoming leaders or commanders. In addition to the KGB, the Cuban, East German, and Czechoslovak intelligence services play particularly important roles in spotting talented individuals with charisma and leadership potential. They are approached and eventually sent to one of the East European countries for further training and political education. To prevent any damage to the political futures of these individuals, the trip may be organized secretly, with the help of false travel documents via clandestine routes. A Salvadoran guerrilla traveling to Czechoslovakia, for example, might fly to Austria where he meets a Czechoslovak intelligence officer who exchanges his passport for a Czechoslovak travel

document with falsified personal data. Only then does the individual cross the border of the Communist country. After several weeks or months, he leaves the country via the same secret route and his official record remains spotless. Guerrilla training is not a standardized, one-for-all program but is designed to reflect the special needs of the revolutionary group. Participants become familiar with firearms and explosives, and they learn basic security measures against enemy intelligence and policy infiltration and techniques of clandestine communication. Political indoctrination is considered part of the training, but the Soviets have lately shown considerable flexibility in tolerating various highly nationalistic doctrines and religious beliefs.

Supplying arms, communication, and other material and advisors to the guerrilla group is another form of Soviet influence. East German or Cuban advisors, theoretically outside experts not involved in endless dispute among local political factions, command great political power. Their military advice may have far-reaching implications, even on the lives of many rank-and-file guerrillas and commanders who may be manipulated into military catastrophic operations if they show "politically dangerous" tendencies. The advisors are also sources of valuable intelligence. The 5,000 Soviet military advisors stationed in Afghanistan before the December 1979 invasion, for example, provided the Russian invasion command with information about morale in the Afghan armed forces, locations of Afghani troops, loyalty of individual officers, and so on.

According to U.S. government estimates, some 1,000 Soviet advisors were operating in Angola in 1981.²⁷ Until then, the Soviets had categorically denied any military presence in Angola, even in an advisory role. But, during a raid into Angola in 1981, the South African army captured Sergeant Major Nikolai Fedorovich Petretsov, a Soviet advisor who participated in the guerrilla war against the regime in Namibia, a former mandate administered by South Africa. For weeks, the Soviets responded only with silence, but they finally agreed in 1982 to exchange several West European agents arrested in Soviet-bloc countries for Petretsov.

If potential results are promising and the venture does not seem militarily too risky, the Soviets may even deploy their own combat troops. According to data assembled by *U.S. News and World Report* in 1981,²⁸ the Soviet bloc countries maintained military forces (200 or more troops or military advisors) in the following countries: Nicaragua (1,000 Cubans); Afghanistan (85,000 Russians); Cambodia (200,000 Vietnamese and 200 Russians); Iraq (1,065 Russians); Laos (50,000 Vietnamese and 2,000 Russians); South Yemen (1,100 Russians, 200 Cubans and 100 East Germans); Syria (2,480 Russians); Algeria (1,015 Russians and 250 East Germans); Angola (15,000 - 19,000 Cubans, 1,000 Russians and 1,000 East Germans); Congo (400-800 Cubans and 20 East Germans); Ethiopia (11,000 - 13,000 Cubans, 1,000 Russians and 300 East Germans); Libya (1,820 Russians, 400 East Germans); Mozambique (600 East Germans and 525 Russians).

Until the mid-1970s, the Soviets focused their efforts on such nations as Angola and Ethiopia, defined by the United States as areas outside its national interests. Since 1978, however, they have intensified their covert efforts to stimulate armed violence and destabilize several governments in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Cuba has played a key role not only in arranging supplies of weapons to Nicaraguan and Salvadoran rebels but also in helping the rebels launch an extensive public relations campaign to win sympathy both in the United States and in other countries.

When NBC correspondent Arthur A. Lord landed in Nicaragua in 1978, he was overwhelmed by the attention he received from the Somoza regime as well as the Sandinista rebels:

Thirty-five minutes after I had checked into the hotel, the phone in my room rang. "Mr. Lord, my name is Lacayo," said the lightly accented voice on the line. "I represent the Students' Committee for a Democratic Nicaragua. Tomorrow morning there will be an anti-government demonstration by 100 women at the UN building downtown. At the Free University, students will erect barricades; and in Matagalpa, protestors will try to seize the national guard headquarters. Which will you cover?" My head swam. How did this character even know I was there?²⁹

The "character" became a very useful source of information, and, as the civil war intensified, so did efforts to manipulate the media. While Somoza hired an American public relations consultant to handle his contacts with the press, the Sandinista guerrillas conducted several operations that served propagandistic rather than military purposes. For example, they attacked the National Palace in Managua in August 1978, seized 1,500 hostages, and released them only after Somoza paid them \$500,000, released fifty-nine political prisoners, and guaranteed them safe conduct from the country. The drama stimulated great interest among foreign correspondents, including the American press and helped the Sandinistas to gain considerable sympathy.

After the victory of the Marxist-led revolutionaries in Nicaragua during 1979, the Soviets focused their attention on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. When the domestic conflict in El Salvador escalated into civil war, the new Reagan administration became alarmed and, on February 23, 1981, issued the so-called White Paper on El Salvador. Based on captured guerrilla documents and U.S. intelligence, the White Paper presented evidence that many weapons used by El Salvador's guerrillas were supplied by Communist countries through Nicaragua, and secret documents captured from the guerrillas revealed that the Soviet Union and Cuba agreed in 1980 to deliver a large volume of weapons to the rebels. A senior Salvadoran guerrilla leader identified in the paper as Shafik Handal, secretary general of the Salvadoran Communist party, had visited several East European capitals, Vietnam, and Ethiopia in 1980, and, after his return, reported that the Communist countries agreed to

provide arms, uniforms, and other military equipment for as many as ten thousand guerrillas.³⁰ Some of the arms were American made and serial numbers of captured American M-16 rifles revealed that these weapons were lost to the enemy in Vietnam in 1974. Although physical evidence that Cuba and Nicaragua cooperated in delivering arms to the guerrillas in November and December 1980 was overwhelming and almost self-evident, the Soviet-bloc press, El Salvador's left-wing guerrillas, and, eventually even the U.S. press strongly criticized the document. The central issue of the controversy was the role of the Soviet Union and the extent to which it directly participated in the delivery of arms. The critics stated that the documents appended to the paper did not fully support the conclusion about the Soviet role because only 1/10 of the publicized Soviet arms deliveries were discussed in the appendices. Former CIA agent-turned-KGB-propagandist, Philip Agee, even charged that the documents were forgeries,³¹ and his accusation received wide publicity.

Two major daily papers, the *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal*, subsequently criticized the White Paper for inadequately documenting allegations of Communist arms shipments and political consultations between El Salvador's guerrillas and Soviet-bloc officials. The *Washington Post* stated that it could find "no concrete evidence to support the State Department's contention that nearly 200 tons of weapons had been delivered to El Salvador."

While the press continued to discuss the validity of the conclusions presented in the paper, the physical evidence of arms entering El Salvador mounted. When Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic party of West Germany, visited Cuba in April 1981 and discussed the issue of Communist arms shipments to El Salvador with Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader did not deny the shipments of weapons, but he insisted that the Soviet Union had not been involved.³² The controversy over the White Paper illustrates the advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the propaganda battle against the United States. Cuban involvement in El Salvador was clearly proved and evident, but skeptics refused to believe that this automatically implicates the Soviet Union.

PROPAGANDA WITH WAR AND PEACE: "BETTER RED THAN DEAD"

When Arnaud de Borchgrave, a former *Newsweek* correspondent and co-author of a political novel, *The Spike*, testified before the new Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on April 24, 1981, he called attention to irrefutable proof that the Soviet Union was playing "a covert role in promoting the antinuclear lobby," and he named an organization known as Mobilization for Survival as a Soviet front organization. Serving as an umbrella for

some 140 antinuclear power groups and antiwar organizations, Mobilization for Survival has coordinated a number of demonstrations against nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.

De Borchgrave's statement provoked a charge by liberal and leftist organizations, including Americans for Democratic Action, that the Senate hearings were inappropriate. Mobilization for Survival stated that Mr. de Borchgrave's testimony was "reminiscent of the repression and intimidation of the McCarthy era" and asked Senator Denton, the subcommittee's chairman, to "disallow any further unsubstantiated and damaging charges to be entered into the record of his committee."³³ Is it true that the KGB is secretly promoting the antinuclear lobby and antimilitary organizations, or is Mr. de Borchgrave's statement the unsubstantiated accusation of a political dogmatist?

It would be a mistake to label every antimilitary demonstration or statement as part of a well-orchestrated Communist propaganda campaign. Fear of nuclear war is a genuine, spontaneous concern affecting millions of people whose political preferences are far from Communistic. To label these people simply as Communist dupes is a political mistake with potentially dangerous political overtones. But it is just as dangerous to push aside all evidence proving Soviet involvement and naively hope that supporters of peace in the East and West will unite under the flag of humanity and march happily together ever after.

The Soviet Union recognized a significant opportunity for using peace as a vehicle to influence public opinion in the West long before the latest round in the antiwar struggle. With the help of such front organizations as the World Peace Council, Soviet propaganda has skillfully played upon fear of war and has driven a wedge between the United States and its European Allies. With 100 full-time staff members and some 120 branches around the world, the World Peace Council of Helsinki is a propaganda instrument of the Soviet peace initiative against Western governments.

Although it claims to be politically independent, the World Peace Council is financed from Eastern Europe. Millions of dollars are secretly poured into the antiwar movement every year through semiofficial and secret channels, mainly by the KGB. In October 1981, for example, Denmark expelled a Soviet diplomat, Vladimir Merkulov, after he tried to persuade some 150 Danish artists to sign an appeal calling for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. He even supplied money to publish the appeal as an ad in several newspapers.³⁴

The peace movement has been a one-sided action against Western defense policies, ignoring the huge Soviet military machine. The Soviets use both their official and secret communication channels to promote the international peace movement and use it as a front group to undermine the Western military alliance, but they do not tolerate pacifist movements at home. Any Soviet citizen who promotes reduction of Soviet military force is perceived as an enemy of the Soviet system. For example, the KGB moved in on November 1,

1982, when a group of Soviet pacifists arranged a news conference in the apartment of one of its members. Sergei Batourin, the leader of the group, and his wife were prevented by the operatives from leaving their home, and the few members who did arrive were not allowed to enter the apartment. Several foreign correspondents who entered the apartment earlier were ordered to leave.³⁵ Pacifist movements inside the Soviet Union have irritated Soviet authorities more than other dissident organizations. When a large group of Scandinavian pacifists went to the Soviet Union in July 1982 and staged a peace march through Soviet cities, several Soviet pacifists were detained for fifteen days and others were held under house arrest.

Mobilizing public opinion against Western military defense is an old Soviet game. Beginning in 1950 with the first major antinuclear campaign, known as the Stockholm Peace Petitions, the Soviets have, on numerous occasions, manipulated public opinion to their advantage by skillfully playing upon fear of war among nations and disassociating themselves from any terms or acts perceived as militaristic. The Soviet military buildup is always interpreted as defensive, and any similar action by the United States as aggressive.

Unlike American government officials, the Soviets have the ability to translate even complicated technical language into simplistic, popular, and catchy slogans. Soviet military invasion is labeled "fraternal assistance," and American support of a friendly government under siege by guerrillas is "intervention." The Soviet Union is entitled to support members of "national liberation movements," but the United States helps "mercenaries." In the campaign against the neutron bomb, for example, the Soviets called it "the ultimate capitalist weapon, one which kills people but leaves property intact." Major General Arsenii F. Milovidov, Dean of Philosophy at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, remarked in October 1980 (*Voprosy Filosofii*) that nuclear missiles are "fearsome weapons of war" in imperialist hands but a "shield for peace" in the Soviet armory. Different themes are played for different audiences. Some topics are treated in a highly sophisticated manner, particularly when the Soviets directly address American audiences. After the invasion of Afghanistan, their broadcasts for North America emphasized humanitarian and economic help rendered by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan and avoided any reference to the ugly face of war.

Most campaigns are a carefully designed mixture of facts, half-truths, exaggerations, and deliberate lies. Several West German companies established OTRAG (Orbital Launch and Rocket Corporation) in 1975 with the objective of placing satellites in space for commercial purposes. One year later, a contract signed with representatives of Zaire enabled OTRAG to build a launch ramp and conduct testing in the Shaba province of Zaire. Moscow disapproved of the project and in the fall of 1977, initiated a campaign labeling it a West German rearmament scheme to produce cruise missiles. The United States, specifically the Central Intelligence Agency and the Depart-

ment of Defense, was identified as a sponsor of this conspiracy to help West Germany become a major nuclear missile power. TASS first began sending articles reflecting this story, and then press agencies in the Soviet bloc picked up the disinformation, giving it respectable treatment and wider publicity. By using secret channels in the West European press, the KGB pushed for dissemination of the story and, by early 1978, the complex of fabrications reached a level where it was spread automatically by legitimate journalists in the West and Third World countries. Eventually, the West German company decided to abandon the project.

Other campaigns are based on pure fantasy and the use of harsh rhetoric. For example, TASS disseminated a story (originally published in the Afghan newspaper *Hagigate Enquelabe Sowr*) accusing CBS news correspondent Dan Rather of participating in the murder of three villagers while he was visiting in Afghanistan in March 1980. According to TASS, two members of a gang called Tor Padsha, which was fighting government troops in southern Afghanistan, surrendered to Soviet-backed Afghan authorities. They stated that a group of people wearing national Afghan clothes and carrying photographic equipment arrived from Pakistan toward the end of March to join their gang. These people were American newsmen interested in making a film. The TASS story stated in part:

Precisely at that time, the thugs from the Tor Padsha gang attacked the village of Fatehabad, seizing three workers cleaning an irrigation canal. The workers were taken to the village square and here one of the U.S. newsmen took charge, ordering the bandits first to stone the captives and then to cut off their heads. The whole of the bloody sequence was photographed and filmed by the Americans.

TASS repeated the conclusion of the Afghan newspaper, *Hagigate Enquelabe Sowr*, that "Rather, the CBS-TV commentator, participated in the bloody murder of three Afghan workers."³⁶ In New York, Mr. Rather stated that the story was "fantasy from first to last, sheer unadulterated nonsense."

In July 1977, the Soviets initiated a worldwide campaign of coordinated overt propaganda, covert political action, and diplomatic moves against modernization of NATO's military arsenal. It was one of the most costly but successful propaganda actions in Soviet history. The CIA estimated that the campaign cost the Soviets the equivalent of some \$100 million.³⁷

For the first stage of the campaign, the Soviets chose the American neutron bomb. Through their own media, front organizations, and secret journalistic channels in the West, they presented the neutron bomb as a particularly dreadful addition to the American nuclear arsenal and used it as a symbol of American imperialism. Their objective was to undermine the Western military alliance and to justify, in the eyes of the world, public development of new Soviet weapons and increased military spending. Western Europe was the major arena for the campaign, but it had a worldwide impact.

They opened the campaign with a series of radio broadcasts for domestic and international audiences, and between July 4 and August 14, the neutron

bomb consumed as much as 13% of the total news time. No other topic received so much attention. Following a broad statement by TASS on July 30, 1977, and vociferous support by the mass media in the Soviet bloc, the bomb received close attention from several front organizations in Western Europe and the Third World.

The World Peace Council declared the second week in August 1977 an international week of action against the neutron bomb, and the declaration was followed by hundreds of protest meetings, usually accompanied by protest letters to local U.S. embassies, in Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The press for the Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Italian, and Greek Communist parties enthusiastically spread the anti-American message, and in the early fall of 1977 the non-Communist press picked up the story.

In most disinformation campaigns directed from Eastern Europe, the perpetrators are hidden in anonymity or behind masks, and members of the Western Communist parties and their presses are not consciously included. Since the antineutron bomb campaign was designed as a broad public issue involving both Communist and non-Communist nations, the Soviet initiative was not a secret operation. On the contrary, many high Soviet officials became publicly involved, including President Leonid Brezhnev. In January 1978, President Brezhnev sent a letter to Western governments warning that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb presented a serious threat to détente, and members of Western parliaments and trade union representatives received letters from their Soviet counterparts with similar messages.

The campaign gained further momentum. By using the horrors of the neutron bomb as a unifying ground, the Soviets succeeded in attracting non-Communist organizations, journalists, and politicians and transforming the initiative into a worldwide campaign outside the boundaries of ideology or territory. U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced in September 1977 that President Carter would not approve production of the neutron bomb until the NATO Allies agreed to deploy the weapon on their territory. But the Soviet campaign went on. When the American press on April 4, 1978, reported President Carter's decision to delay production and deployment of the neutron bomb, the Soviet press labeled it a deceptive maneuver and demanded an even stronger protest movement. Several Soviet officials, including the Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands, were subsequently decorated for their contributions to the campaign. Janos Berecz, chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist party, stated in September 1979 that "the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and most successful since World War II."³⁸

Members of the NATO Alliance made a decision in December 1979 to proceed with the production and deployment of modernized long-range theater nuclear forces. For the Soviets, it was an impulse to give the antineutron bomb campaign a new objective: to prevent or at least delay NATO from modernizing its long-range theater nuclear forces. As in the previous case,

Moscow used a variety of propaganda and disinformational techniques, beginning with authoritative pronouncements by Soviet leaders and ending with covert placement of sympathetic articles in the Western mass media. West European audiences were bombarded with messages that the proposed theater nuclear forces could serve as "vulgar political blackmail," impose a major nuclear threat to Europe, and have a potentially irreparable impact on East-West relations. To gain support from the older generation with direct experience of the Nazi brutalities of World War II, Moscow asserted that West Germany could play a dominant role in nuclear strategic planning and function as NATO's nuclear trigger. Statements by West German leaders denying these allegations were simply ignored.

The International Department and the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the two bodies coordinating the campaign, replayed the major themes through diplomatic channels, front organizations, and domestic and foreign mass media and gave it new impetus in the summer of 1980. At that time, the United States was considering a new strategy of nuclear defense described in the document known as Presidential Directive 59. The basic idea was to develop highly accurate intercontinental missile systems capable of surviving a surprise Soviet attack and to dispel Moscow's notion that it could win a nuclear war. The new U.S. policy did not propound the concept of preemptive strikes against the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to broaden an American president's options in a crisis, enabling him to make selective strikes against Soviet military and economic targets instead of forcing him, in the event of a Soviet attack, to destroy Soviet population centers.

Soviet propaganda maintained that the new U.S. policy openly embraced a doctrine of preemptive strike and wrongly assumed that, in a nuclear conflict between East and West, Soviet retaliation would be limited to Western Europe.

Those in the West who up to now had blindly believed in the slogans of NATO about supplementing and modernizing their armaments should ponder the question: Will this mean that American weapons will appear in their countries for the purpose of carrying out pre-emptive strikes mentioned in the [59] directive?³⁹

Victims who accepted the Soviet argument that the Presidential Directive 59 was "madness" and "nuclear blackmail" were not told that Soviet military doctrine is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union can win a nuclear war.

Several KGB operatives stationed in the United States during the early 1980s intensified their efforts to penetrate and influence the U.S. peace movement. Their purpose was to acquire information on plans for various conferences and demonstrations and analyze relations between European and American antiwar groups. While in Western Europe the Soviet campaign playing upon the fear of atomic war was quite successful, in the United States,

according to an official statement issued by the FBI in March 1983, the Soviets failed to achieve a dominant role in the peace and nuclear freeze movements.⁴⁰ A number of KGB operatives stationed in the United States worked hard to influence the American peace movement and to establish closer contact between West European and American antiwar groups but their initiative failed.

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Chapter 8

The Nation of Immigrants

Thin, nondescript, middle-aged Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel lived in the United States for nine years under the facade of a somewhat mediocre photographer and painter interested in Bach and Van Gogh. He skillfully concealed his double identity until he was arrested in June 1957. The only charge he admitted during the trial was that he had illegally entered the United States. The principal charge included conspiracy to transmit atomic and military information to the Soviet Union. The court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment, but he served only four years. The Russians eventually suggested exchanging him for Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of an American U2 spy plane brought down in Russia in 1960, and he returned to the Soviet Union in 1962. In the language of Soviet espionage, he was an "illegal."¹

The first generation of Communist illegals sent abroad after World War II were not university graduates. Most candidates for the dangerous and unrewarding job came primarily from the ranks of the state security apparatus, including the counterintelligence service. They were usually experienced operatives in their late twenties or early thirties, carefully selected for their political reliability and emotional stability. After landing in target countries with their new identities, they were occasionally used for minor, routine intelligence operations to exercise their skills and maintain their alertness, but they were really agents of the future. They would be activated at the time of a military confrontation between East and West when normal diplomatic relations would be broken and officers under diplomatic cover would be forced to leave. They were expected to take over managerial responsibilities for existing espionage networks and conduct paramilitary and sabotage operations in the enemy's backyard. The service broadened the scope of its operations in later years and used illegals in many instances as case officers in charge of major espionage agents, but their primary role remains unchanged: they are agents of the future.

The United States has admitted more than a million refugees from Communist countries in the last quarter of the century, and many of them were not bona fide refugees.² Aliens who come to the United States can easily conceal

themselves from federal authorities in a big city. Even if they are apprehended, they can delay their expulsion from the country for years.

American press reports on Soviet subversion in the United States usually deal with specific KGB operations and ignore the fact that America is the major target for all Warsaw Pact countries and the international Communist movement. But common goals, targets, and strategy are established in Moscow. Both Soviet and satellite intelligence services consider East European ethnic communities and exile organizations in the United States targets for active measures and vehicles for in-depth penetration of the government.

John Darnton of the *New York Times* observed in a report on Polish traditions and national pride:

People [in Poland] are inordinately proud when someone of Polish descent makes it in the outside world. Menachem Begin may be Prime Minister of Israel, but he never forgets his roots in Poland. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's advisor on national security, may be the hardline anti-Communist in Washington, but it must be conceded that he can still speak the mother tongue.

The high watermark of Polish pride, of course, came when Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Cracow became Pope John Paul II. Even officials in the Communist government brag about him. One official of Interpress, the Polish government press and feature agency, made this poignant comment in 1980:

Now there is a new feather in the Polish cap, an offspring of the Marciszewski family from Bialystok. He is Edmund S. Muskie, the new Secretary of State. It is all part of our secret plan . . . We've got the Middle East and the Vatican. We've got the National Security Council and the State Department. Now we are working on the final stage to complete the encirclement. It's a bit harder. We are going to put someone in Peking!⁵

All of this may appear as nothing more than a good joke, but it reflects the basic strategy of Communist intelligence. Correspondence from immigrants and refugees to relatives and friends in their native countries is systematically examined by intelligence operatives in search of clues that may be used for blackmail and eventual recruitment. Torn between loyalty to their adopted country and the well-being of their families in Communist countries, immigrants may succumb to the pressure of blackmail.

American intelligence experts admit that Soviet methods are now infinitely more sophisticated than the cloak-and-dagger methods of the past. Relaxed Soviet-American relationships in the 1970s made it easier to sneak scores of undetected illegals—intelligence operatives with false identities—into the United States. Stories of illegals captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or West European security agencies share a number of similarities. These individuals were usually recruited in Eastern Europe while they were serving as junior officers in the army or state security. Next they spent one to three years in studying new techniques of secret communication, collecting information

from open as well as secret sources, and learning the language and customs of the target country. Although very few are able to speak the new language without an accent, this is not a major handicap in the United States.

Before reaching the target country, illegals proceed through several transition countries and sometimes even change their names on route to cover their footprints. In March 1980, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation introduced the press to KGB Colonel Rudolph Albert Herrmann, who was granted political asylum with his wife and adult son, also a spy. A long-time Communist operative and for the last several years a double agent for the United States, Herrmann followed a route typical of many Communist illegals sent to the United States. Although he was a KGB colonel, Rudolph Albert Herrmann is actually a Czech named Luděk Zemenek, who was recruited by the KGB while he was serving in the Czechoslovak army.

After receiving his initial professional training in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, he was ordered, in 1957, to move as a phony refugee to West Germany and later as an emigrant to Canada. Finally, in 1968, he entered the United States and settled down in Long Island, New York, posing as a freelance photographer. Judging from their reports, journalists covering the press conference with Herrmann after his defection were disappointed. Herrmann's missions in the United States seemed rather unheroic. He occasionally travelled across the country as a courier delivering orders or picking up materials from other agents. And he sent a few reports to Moscow about American domestic political or economic situations.

One of the first missions was a disinformation operation aimed at stopping the early Apollo manned space program. The Russians sent him a coded radio broadcast containing the text of a letter that he would mail to American space officials. Presumably based on the most up-to-date Soviet knowledge of U.S. space technology, the letter alleged that the space vehicle for the Apollo 8 voyage to the moon was sabotaged. Herrmann typed the letter and mailed it from Atlanta to give the impression that he was connected with the Manned Spacecraft Center in Huntsville, Alabama, but the operation failed. The letter was placed in a file of "crank letters," and on December 21, 1968, the Apollo 8 mission proceeded as planned.

A few years later, Herrmann tried to develop a close acquaintance with unspecified candidates in presidential elections so that he would have "a foot in the door" if they were elected. FBI officials had to stop the double game in the fall of 1979 when the KGB ordered Herrmann's twenty-one-year-old son to return to Moscow for specialized training. At the time, the KGB probably suspected that Herrmann had transferred his loyalties to American intelligence.

In attempting to understand the motivation and logic of a man who will spend fifteen or twenty years of his life under constant threat of exposure and arrest, reporters often search for superhuman qualities and they are disap-

pointed when they find a normal human being. Major Karel Petr, the most successful Czechoslovak "illegal" of the 1950s operated in West Germany and France and, like Herrmann, received directives from the KGB. Petr accepted the KGB mission for one simple, unheroic reason—to escape his dogmatic, talkative, and dominating wife.

THE REAL DEFECTORS AND REFUGEES

The real political refugees from Communist countries are permanent targets for retaliation by their former governments. Active measures involve the whole spectrum of operations, beginning with rumors and forgeries and ending with kidnappings and assassinations. The hunting season is open all year, and it is not restricted by the political climate or fear of hard reprisals.

Arkady N. Shevchenko, Undersecretary General for the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the highest ranking Soviet citizen at the United Nations Secretariat, refused to return home in April 1978. Such a decision by the most important Soviet diplomat to defect to the West caused consternation and intense alarm in Moscow. He was a protégé of Foreign Minister Gromyko and was privy to many Soviet foreign policy secrets. The standard technique on intelligence services in the Soviet bloc is to demand officially, through diplomatic channels, access to the defector. They bring carefully forged letters from the defector's family and use threats and hints to intimidate him into silence. The major objective, of course, is his return to the Soviet Union. When Shevchenko refused to return even after meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin, the Soviet press claimed that the United States was holding Shevchenko "under duress," and the Soviet mission in the United States issued a statement that he was a victim of "premeditated provocation and of a detestable frame up" by American intelligence agents.⁴

If it is convinced that personal contact and blackmail will not succeed, the KGB takes more drastic active measures. A three-time world champion canoeist, Vladas Cesiunas, arrived in West Germany in mid-August 1979, asked for political asylum, and mentioned his plans to write a book exposing the true face of Soviet sports. The potentially embarrassing disclosures before the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow forced the KGB to act quickly. On October 16, 1979, TASS issued a statement that Vladas Cesiunas "who had been induced to stay in West Germany against his will managed after some incidents to get to the Soviet embassy in Bonn and to return home with the assistance of Soviet officials." The canoeist supposedly told Soviet reporters that, after his arrival in Duisburg to compete for canoeing championships, something in his drink paralyzed his will and dulled his thoughts and wishes.⁵ Actually, he was abducted by Soviet intelligence and forced to leave West Germany against his will. Cesiunas' kidnapping and the public statement by TASS were also intended to warn other potential defectors.

Political diversity and disagreements within exile communities is a fertile environment for various behind-the-scenes games, and the generation of refugees who grew up in a Communist society are particularly vulnerable because totalitarian socialism deprives them of self-confidence and responsibility for their lives. Every important decision, such as entering college or choosing employment or a place to live, is directly controlled by the state and Communist party apparatus. It kills human initiative and breeds the feeling of helplessness vis-à-vis almighty authority.

A refugee suffers both cultural and political shock during his first years in an open society because he must adjust to a new environment, gain self-confidence, accept new rules of life in a highly competitive society, and care for himself. Most of them succeed but some fail, and Communist intelligence services find their easiest victims in the second category. Their tactics against political exiles are very simple: divide and govern. Disinformation games systematically disrupt the unity of the exile community and create rifts between rank-and-file members and their leaders. They picture exiles as gangs of outlaws interested only in their financial well-being in an attempt to deprive them of sympathy and support by their adopted governments and the public.

The anti-emigration center of Czechoslovak intelligence has launched hundreds of disinformation campaigns since the early 1950s. For example, a chain letter in the name of a fictitious organization called HEPND (Movement of Exiles for Return Home) mailed to a few thousand individuals in Western Europe and overseas in the mid-1950s convinced a few hundred individuals to return to Czechoslovakia, including the editor of the newspaper *Československé Listy*, published in London. And the Czech and Slovak exile communities have been flooded with forgeries of official documents, personal letters, newspapers, magazines, and announcements of various kinds. In July 1958, the center distributed abroad a few thousand copies of *Ceské Slovo*, a monthly newspaper published in West Germany by members of the former Czechoslovak Socialist party. The front page of the paper included the following article:

Goodbye—From the Editorial Staff

The headline should not surprise you. Neither we nor a few individuals among the exiles are to blame. We have never thought that one day we would have to write this necrologue. There are several reasons for it and we would like to explain at least some of them Our original intention was to make this newspaper of the political party into a publication of the whole exile community. But we didn't find enough understanding and support We had hopes like many others. We were fighting against pessimism of people who lost their hope that one day they would be able to return to Czechoslovakia. We believed that it was only a matter of time and methods. We trusted President Eisenhower who said that one of the basic goals of American foreign policy was the liberation of the enslaved nations in Central and Eastern Europe. We believed that the American promises were so significant that they could not be ignored later The Soviet Union did not give up in Geneva—but Eisenhower went silent. The Soviets didn't surrender in Hungary, but the West did. That's the reality . . .

The article attacked a few prominent exile leaders and ended with a pessimistic outlook for the future. It caused only minor confusion among the refugees but a few were frightened that the hands of Prague could reach so far.

The disinformation department launched a new series of games after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The major target has been Communist exiles now considered more dangerous than the generation of refugees who fled after the 1948 coup. The idea of democratic socialism defended by Communist refugees has supporters among members of West European Communist parties, and the Soviets consider it a contagious disease that must be eradicated. A few months after the invasion, a pamphlet entitled *Metamorphosis of Josef Smrkovský* was circulated in Czechoslovakia and Western Europe. Its purpose was to smear Josef Smrkovský—one of the leaders of the political spring of 1968—as a ruthless politician dominated by a desire for power. Identifying themselves only as “Prague Communists,” the authors stated that Smrkovský, a two-faced man with an urge to become president, practiced statesman-like gestures in front of a mirror. According to the pamphlet, Smrkovský tried shortly after World War II to foment anti-Soviet hysteria, changed his mind, and later became a witness in a trial against Rudolf Slanský, Secretary General of the Communist party. A few years after Slanský was sentenced to death and executed in 1952, Smrkovský supposedly switched sides and defended Slanský as a victim of the Stalinist era.

When the personal security of a secret agent operating in the West is seriously threatened, the intelligence service expends considerable effort to smuggle him back to Eastern Europe where he is used in various disinformation and propaganda campaigns. In January 1976, Czechoslovak intelligence introduced Pavel Minařík to journalists at a press conference in Prague, Minařík had spent almost seven years in West Germany as a Radio Free Europe broadcaster and worked secretly for Czech intelligence. The operatives used Minařík as the central figure in a disinformation campaign to smear Radio Free Europe and representatives of the 1968 democratization process in Czechoslovakia, including Alexander Dubček, Jiří Hájek, and Zdeněk Mlynář.

The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty are the only connections between millions of people in Eastern Europe and the outside world. Since these stations employ hundreds of emigrants and defectors, penetration by Eastern European intelligence services is relatively easy. Among the thousands of newcomers to the United States from Eastern Europe is a small but very important group of former intelligence and military officers. These defectors bring with them some of the most sensitive information, including the names and histories of Communist agents operating in the West. Since a defector can be used as a messenger in this highly sophisticated game of hide-and-seek, his reliability must be carefully evaluated and the process may require months and even years.

Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who came to the United States shortly after the Kennedy assassination, was suspected as a "plant" by American intelligence. For several years he was kept in complete isolation and his case was an issue that divided the CIA elite. On one side, James Angleton, a chief of CIA counterintelligence until 1974, and Richard Helms mistrusted Nosenko, and on the other side, William Colby and Stansfield Turner believed that Nosenko's message was genuine. Numerous reports on the Nosenko case by the American press during the past ten years have been filled with speculation as well as surprisingly authentic detail indicating that both sides of the dispute leaked confidential or even secret information for their own political purposes. Rather than resolve the Nosenko mystery, public discussion only sharpened the differences between the two opposing groups. The press cannot provide a clear, definitive answer to the problem; only a team of professional investigators with access to all public and secret information can resolve it. The investigators should thoroughly examine both the extent of Soviet disinformational involvement as well as pollution of the issue by CIA operatives if they expect to determine Nosenko's legitimacy. Assigning a KGB officer to the United States as a phony defector with a disinformational message is a highly risky operation that would be considered only under extremely serious international circumstances. An example would be a crisis leading to a military resolution or a serious crisis within the Communist system. The reason is very simple: the KGB must pay a very high price to generate believable disinformation.

The KGB knows that the defector will be subjected to numerous tests of his reliability. Even if he passes a lie detector test, the debriefing is a long and thorough process of extracting detailed information concerning the defector's personal life and professional experience, including names and histories of Communist agents operating in the West, information about former friends and colleagues in the service, operations in which he has served, etc. To be considered trustworthy, more than 95% of his information must be factually true. The result is very serious damage to the KGB's secret networks and plans.

Upon completion of debriefing and acceptance by the intelligence community, the defector faces new and perhaps even more difficult challenges in his effort to find a place in the new society. He cannot join an ethnic organization or a social group in the United States because revelation of his past would make him a social outcast. And he must answer numerous questions about his personal background and means of livelihood from inquisitive neighbors and still protect his new identity. His specialty is intelligence and a directly related area such as diplomacy, the military, international business, travel, or journalism, but he cannot hope to find permanent employment in these areas because of the distrust he encounters as a former devotee of Communism. Furthermore, his accent and the risk that he will be kidnapped when he travels abroad

make this type of employment impractical. Some defectors adapt to the norms of the capitalist system and establish themselves as entrepreneurs, and others acquire additional education and enter professions far removed from their original jobs. The rest attempt to survive as advisors and researchers on the periphery of Washington's governmental machinery, but they work in a risky environment.

Like Nikolai Artamonov-Shadrin, a Soviet defector who disappeared in December 1975, some defectors eventually become victims of the continuing secret war between the East and the West. Nikolai Artamonov, a captain in the Soviet navy, defected to Sweden in 1959. A few years later, he landed in Washington, changed his name to Shadrin, and worked as a consultant on Soviet naval affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency. The KGB approached him in 1966 and tried to recruit him. After consulting the Central Intelligence Agency, Shadrin pretended to cooperate and acted as a double agent feeding doctored intelligence to the KGB. He was last seen in Vienna, Austria, on December 20, 1975, where he was sent by the Central Intelligence Agency to meet two KGB officers. All signals indicate that Moscow suspected him of playing a double game and kidnapped him.

The weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* contended that the Central Intelligence Agency murdered Shadrin when it learned that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. The author, Genrikh Borovik, stated that he acquired his information from Igor A. Orlov, a KGB operative who met Shadrin first in Washington and later in Vienna on December 18, 1975, two days before his disappearance. He quoted Orlov as follows:

Possibly Shadrin made some tragic slip after December 18 and the CIA, having learned of his forthcoming return to the motherland realized the game was lost, that this was a scandalous failure and hastened to eliminate Shadrin and, to cover up its tracks, blamed the other side. I wouldn't like to think of the worst but, knowing the CIA's methods, I find it hard to suggest that he is being held in detention . . . Thanks to Shadrin we received important data on many people working with American intelligence, especially in those branches that deal with defectors from the Soviet Union.⁶

The KGB would never publicly admit that it had kidnapped Shadrin. Orlov's statement was part of a Soviet disinformation maneuver publicly denying any Soviet responsibility for Shadrin's disappearance. But the maneuver had a clear message for all defectors: "If you play a double game with us, you will end like Shadrin." The hard-line policy toward defectors, including kidnappings and assassinations, implemented at the time by all intelligence services in the Soviet bloc, frightened East European refugees and exiles, particularly when they learned in October 1978 that Georgi Markov, a prominent Bulgarian defector, had been assassinated in London.

A TRUSTWORTHY MESSAGE?

Anytime a Communist regime in the post-World War II period allowed large numbers of its citizens to emigrate to other countries, its intelligence service used the event for its own purposes. The West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was surprised in 1965 by what it perceived as a massive offensive by Czechoslovak intelligence. Hundreds of German emigrants from Czechoslovakia confessed that they had been recruited, and their number grew with every transport that crossed the borders.

Shortly after World War II, the Allied Powers consented to the deportation of three million Germans from Czechoslovakia. Approximately two million were resettled in West Germany and the rest in the Soviet zone. Some 170,000 to 200,000 Germans who could prove their anti-Nazi sentiments were allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia, but they became second class citizens with limited constitutional rights. In 1965, the Czechoslovak government decided to rid the country of unreliable elements and allowed the emigration of all Germans who requested the privilege in Operation Transfer. Some 70,000 applications to the Ministry of the Interior inspired Czechoslovak intelligence to undertake a game that kept West German counterintelligence busy for several years. It was indeed an offensive, but its main purpose was disinformation.

Prague was reasonably sure that the emigrants would be carefully screened by the West German government. Several hundred pseudo-agents recruited among the Germans were expected to inform West German police of their recruitment for espionage immediately after they crossed West German borders. The primary objective of the plan was to engage West German counterintelligence in maximum unproductive screening of the alleged Czechoslovak agents. The instructions and missions given to the pseudo-agents were designed to appear credible to the West Germans, and thus draw attention from the real targets and objectives of Czechoslovak intelligence. The second major objective of Operation Transfer was to intersperse several highly capable, tested, and reliable agents who would escape detection by West German counterintelligence. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution had to give close attention to all individuals claiming that they had been recruited as Czechoslovak agents because their testimony could have been sincere or merely simulated. In fact, the West Germans felt compelled to conduct in-depth investigations of all other immigrants. Thus, thousands of German migrants were millstones necessitating protracted, complicated, and unproductive investigation. Eventually, in 1968, the Bonn government reformed the law and provided immunity to foreign agents who voluntarily admitted working for foreign intelligence, and in 1970, Interior Minister Genscher made another public appeal for spies to surrender. Operation Transfer confused

West German security forces and kept them busy with unproductive investigations that paralyzed their effectiveness. The West Germans were forced to submit to procedures imposed by Czechoslovak intelligence and left them with options that only victimized them.⁷

One night in March 1962, Israeli security arrested a man known in Israel as Israel Beer, a spy for the Soviet Union. The ultimate decision to arrest him came from Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion himself. Born in Austria, Beer emigrated to Palestine in 1938, rose to prominence as the youngest lieutenant colonel in the Israeli army, and served as a military historian and advisor to the senior levels of Israel's military establishment. Beer was tried and found guilty of passing secret information to the Soviet Union and died in an Israeli prison in 1968. But his true identity is questionable.

Israeli agents found that Beer had never attended an Austrian military academy as he claimed, and he had not fought in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. There were no records of him. Beer never revealed his true identity, and he never admitted working for the KGB. He was purportedly activated in 1956, after eighteen years of building a cover, but not until he had been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned did Mossad—the Israeli intelligence service—discover that there had, in fact, been an Austrian named Israel Beer. “He was a poor Jewish student who bore a vague resemblance to the man who became Ben-Gurion’s trusted friend. But the real Israel Beer disappeared in 1938, the year that the agent emigrated to Palestine.”⁸

Israel Beer was one of many agents sent by the Soviets to Israel to manipulate the situation in the Middle East to their advantage. When Stalin recognized modern Israel in 1948, he hoped to organize an Israeli fifth column to collaborate with the Red Army in an armored invasion over the mountains of Anatolia, across Syria and Israel, to the banks of the Suez Canal.⁹ When he realized that the concept was impractical, he switched his support to the Arab side. Stalin’s anti-Semitic campaign in the Soviet Union climaxed in August 1952 with the massacre of Russia’s leading Jewish writers. The 1953 “Doctors’ Plot” led to more anti-Semitic persecution, particularly against Jewish physicians and scientists, and it was halted only by Stalin’s death. Until the Six-Day War of 1967, the Soviets pursued a policy of controlled tension in the Middle East, but since the war they have sought total destruction of Israel.

The large-scale Jewish exodus—a term as appropriate as ever—began in 1971.¹⁰ A preliminary trickle just after the 1967 Six-Day War presaged the later rush for the gates to the Soviet Union. Since the exodus is used as one of the cards in the East-West game, there have been dramatic ups and downs in the number of Jews allowed to leave. Emigration plummeted from 34,933 in 1973 to 20,695 in 1974 and declined even further in 1975 to 13,459. Soviet authorities allowed some 30,000 Jews to leave in 1978, and the number increased to the highest level—51,320—in 1979. According to figures issued by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the number fell off again to 21,471

by the end of 1980.¹¹ The cutback was undoubtedly a reprisal against the United States for reducing the volume of trade with the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan. By February 1981, the number of individuals granted permission to leave rose dramatically to 3,000 a month. Benevolent handling of the applications began shortly before a meeting of the Congress of the Communist party as a propagandistic maneuver "reflecting the party's humaneness."

Soviet authorities avoid the term "emigration" and speak instead about "reunification of families," a reference to families separated by World War II and its aftermath. Any Jew who applies for an exit visa must submit an invitation from a relative in Israel. Although the closeness of the relationship was not important until 1980, Soviet officials have recently begun to issue visas primarily to people with invitations from first degree relatives and have more or less ignored invitations from distant relatives.¹² Officially, all Jewish emigrants from Russia are headed for Israel, but in 1980, 65% of them went to other Western countries, primarily the United States. Early emigrés were motivated either by strong religious sentiments, or desire to be reunited with loved ones separated during the Holocaust, but in recent years, the underlying reason for the Jewish exodus has been growing persecution and a spiritual vacuum enforced by Kremlin leaders.

Adjustment to newly gained freedom can be difficult. Thousands of Russian Jews who emigrated to Israel or to the United States after years of hardships and even imprisonment did not realize that decades of heavy Marxist-Leninist indoctrination left deep social and ideological imprints on them and that introduction to the Israeli or American social environment can be a traumatic experience. Many new arrivals are shocked when they suddenly confront a competitive society. Others are disturbed by freedom of the press and fear of Western policemen whom they perceive as parallels of the KGB. A typical immigrant usually requires several years to develop inner security and the feeling that he is at home. Some never adapt to their environment and seek to return to the Soviet Union.* A few are readmitted and used by the KGB as key elements in propaganda campaigns designed to show people at home and abroad that life in a Communist country is far better than life in the West.

Readers of Soviet newspapers throughout the 1970s were exposed to letters from returnees under such headlines as "We were deceived, allow us to return," or "We have returned from Israel to our socialist homeland." And the Soviet mass media launched hysterical campaigns against Israel. Hundreds of articles, editorials, pamphlets, letters to the editor, caricatures, and publications depicted Judaism as the ideological progenitor of Zionism and Zionism

*The number desiring to return to the Soviet Union was computed at hundreds by a Soviet spokesman in 1972, and one source claims it is as high as 1,500. Jewish and Israeli sources mention a far smaller figure between 100 and 200.

as the updated equivalent of Nazism. Many Jews were pressed into service in a campaign to brand any desire to leave for Israel a betrayal of socialism. The campaign against Israel included publication of 1969 and 1970 editions of the book, *Beware Zionism*, with the flavor of *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In *Beware Zionism*, Yuri Ivanov calls attention to a worldwide Jewish conspiracy and asserts that even the Vatican is manipulated and dominated by Zionists.¹³ *Pravda* published a letter on April 10, 1971, from seventy veteran Bolsheviks of Jewish extraction who joined the Communist party between 1903 and 1907. They remembered their struggle against tsar, the civil war, and the struggle against the Nazis, and the presumed benefits enjoyed by all nationalities under Soviet rule. They admonished Israeli Zionists to stop their "dirty solicitations" and reminded them that the Soviet Union "has granted all nationalities, including Jews, every right and opportunity."¹⁴

The continuing departure of Russian Jews led the Soviet mass media to picture Jews as cynical, aggressive, criminal, exploitative, and conspiratorial, usurping not only corporate arms production in the United States but also the press.

The Zionists have enmeshed in their web nearly a thousand papers out of the 1,811 that are published in the U.S.A., including papers like the *New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune* and others. The Zionists put pressure on such influential magazines as *Fortune*, *Time*, *Newsweek* and *U.S. News and World Report*.¹⁵

A large number of "theoretical" articles in the Soviet press called Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination. The Zionists themselves, according to the articles, favor the incitement of anti-Semitism to create a ghetto mood in the Jewish milieu that is escaping their control. Why do the Soviets allow the Jewish exodus while they officially discourage it and attack Zionism as a branch of racism and Israel as an arm of imperialism? American journalists explain the paradox largely in terms of the political climate between the United States and the Soviet Union. Major factors in the Soviet concessions are public opinion in the West and the possibility that the United States will grant the Soviet Union more favorable tariffs and terms of credit. But there are other reasons. A more liberal emigration policy serves as a safety valve for relieving the pulsating tension inside the Soviet Union. By permitting or forcing the most outspoken critics of the system to leave the country, the KGB drains the democratization movement of its leaders and members. Last, but not least, the KGB has used the exodus as a vehicle for further penetration of Israel, the United States, and other Western countries.

As Soviet Jews continued to leave Russia in 1971, the KGB established a special department at its headquarters in Moscow and subordinate sections in some of the larger KGB field offices throughout the country. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union specifically instructed the KGB to infiltrate Jewish groups, discourage emigration of educated Jews, and silence Jewish protests.¹⁶ In numerous cases, the KGB used psychological and other forms of pressure to force applicants to become

KGB agents. Some Jews gave their written consent to work for the KGB hoping to gain more favorable consideration of their requests, and they failed to recognize the danger that their written contracts could be used for future blackmail.

A small but potentially dangerous group among the emigrants includes KGB operatives—illegals—posing as Jews sent abroad under a new identity. Since they are usually well-educated and professionally trained, the KGB expects that, in a few years, they may occupy positions within American economic, scientific, or academic institutions with unrestricted access to valuable information. No statistics are available on the numbers of Jews recruited as KGB agents. Neither Israeli counterintelligence nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made any official reports available on this subject, but unofficially, they admit that they have, indeed, discovered KGB agents among Jewish immigrants. The stories of Israel Beer, Alfred Frenzel, and Günther Guillaume are warnings that must be taken seriously.

GIFT HORSE FROM CASTRO

Fidel Castro stated at the First Communist Party Congress in Havana in December 1975 that the Cuban Ministry of the Interior has infiltrated virtually every counterrevolutionary outfit in the United States, and in many cases its men have held some of the highest posts in the leadership.¹⁷ Since the early 1970s, the Cuban intelligence service (DGI) has visibly intensified its activities against the Cuban exile communities in Florida, New York, and New Jersey. And many Cuban agents have penetrated various Cuban exile organizations and business groups, as well as leftist research organizations and think tanks.

One organization established to identify potential agents and lure them to Cuba was Havanatur, a Panamanian company in Miami with a monopoly on the flights of Cuban exiles from the United States to Cuba. Headed by Carlos Alfonso, who was named by the State Department as a DGI operative, Havanatur conducted the first operational screening of large numbers of individuals travelling to Cuba and alerted Havana to individuals deserving further attention. The United States government finally stepped in and, on December 31, 1979, expelled Havanatur from U.S. territory.¹⁸

Under the direct command of Fidel Castro, in 1980 the DGI conducted an anti-U.S. operation that deserves special attention for its boldness. When more than 10,000 Cubans seeking political asylum broke into the compound of the Peruvian embassy in Havana on April 21, 1980, Castro ordered temporary removal of Cuban guards from the embassy and announced that he would grant exit visas to the dissidents. Several Latin American countries and the United States agreed to admit 10,000 exiles, and Costa Rica organized twice daily flights from Havana to San José where the refugees could be screened and sent to other countries. But Castro suspended the flights after three days of operation and demanded that all refugees would go directly to

the countries where they planned to settle. Thousands of boats, mostly pleasure boats from Miami, made the trip to Mariel Harbor in Cuba to bring the exiles to the American coast. They were surprised by the well-organized procedure. Far offshore, American boats were met by Cuban gunboats and escorted into the harbor. When American crewmen handed Cuban authorities lists of relatives and friends who would be returned to the United States, they were told that, for every non-embassy refugee, each boat had to accept four refugees selected by Castro's men.¹⁹

Shortly after the first Cuban refugees landed in Florida, President Carter commented that the United States would receive them with "an open heart and open arms,"²⁰ but the euphoria among Washington officials and the press was short-lived. What first appeared as a victory for the United States became a serious problem. More and more captains returning from Cuba stated that they could not locate the relatives and that they could not depart from Cuba without a load of *gusanos*. The refugees were admitted to the United States on the condition that they would request political asylum within sixty days but the procedure collapsed, giving Castro the advantage of forcing his solution to the problem. From April 21, 1980, to September 26, 1980, when Cuba closed Port Mariel for the refugees, some 124,000 refugees reached Key West, Florida. None of them possessed documents legally entitling them to enter the United States; their average age was 31; and 70% of them were men. One-fifth of them had spent some time in prison, and one-fifth were dark-skinned Cubans who would be classified as black by most Americans.²¹ Castro was releasing common criminals from jail and patients from mental institutions and ordering them on the boats.

The sudden influx forced the U.S. authorities to take special measures. Florida Governor Bob Graham declared a state of emergency, and the Federal Government opened several camps where the refugees were given medical examinations, x-rays, and laboratory tests. Every refugee was closely screened by representatives of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Individuals with criminal backgrounds were sent to the federal prison at Talladega, Alabama, to await deportation proceedings. By mid-May, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had arrested three individuals who had been sought on charges of air piracy and kidnapping.

A crowd of more than 300 Cubans broke out of the refugee relocation center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, on June 1, 1980, and rushed through the streets, shouting "freedom" and setting fires. When military troops searched the camp, they confiscated numerous knives and homemade weapons. It was one of many confrontations between law enforcement officials and refugees protesting delay in resettlement. An even more violent confrontation occurred at the refugee camp at Eglin Air Force Base in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, where two hundred Cubans jumped the fence and threw bricks and rocks at

military police. The police isolated sixty-eight suspected instigators after the *melée* and put them in a more secure compound.²² Although the White House announced that the instigators and hundreds of suspected criminals would not be allowed to remain in the United States, officials privately admitted that Castro probably would not allow them to return to their homeland.

More than one million Cubans have left the island since Castro came to power in 1959, and most of them settled in the United States. First came the elite, next the professional class, and finally, in 1980, the penniless blue collar workers whom the revolution was supposed to help. Confidential reports from Cuba reveal that the Cuban government discussed the exodus long before 10,000 Cubans occupied the compound of the Peruvian embassy. In a report to the House Intelligence Subcommittee in late January 1980, the CIA warned that the Castro regime "may again resort to large-scale emigration to reduce discontent caused by Cuba's deteriorating economic situation."²³ The agency repeated the warning several times between January and March of 1980, but the Carter administration ignored it because the State Department "didn't think the exodus was imminent."

Even if the CIA had not provided the warnings, there were numerous other signals about Cuba's domestic problems. Like the exodus of some 270,000 individuals in October 1965, the 1980 exodus brought Castro slight relief from demands for food, other consumer goods, and badly needed housing. Much of Cuba's sugar crop in 1979 was destroyed by rust and the tobacco crop was almost totally destroyed by blue mold. The deteriorating economy and a lapse in revolutionary fervor inspired Castro to open the door and rid the country of many political dissidents, real or potential troublemakers, and criminals. Thus, the flight from Cuba was a blessing in disguise. Instead of allowing the refugees to settle in several countries, Castro maneuvered the U.S. government into a position where it had no alternative but to accept all refugees, including criminals, mental patients, and retired people with little hope of supporting themselves. Many of them had no immediate family contacts in the Cuban community, and they became burdens for the U.S. government. Of course, Castro knew that the unemployment rate among blacks living in the Miami area was 9 percent in 1979, and their bitterness intensified when they learned that Cubans were taking jobs that traditionally belonged to them.

Under the new Refugee Act passed just five weeks prior to the influx, refugees were required to show that they had "a well-founded fear of persecution" if they were forced to return to their homeland. Although the decisions were made strictly for individual cases, the procedure was impractical for handling 124,000 different cases. Identification was extremely difficult since the refugees arrived in the United States without visas or any other travel documents, and unlike earlier waves of refugees from Cuba, 20,000 males were separated from their wives because most of the refugees from Mariel were not allowed to bring their families. A report by the Federal Office of Refugee Reset-

tlement in 1982 stated that 24,000 Cuban refugees admitted that they had spent more than fifteen days in Cuban prisons but private estimates ranged as high as 40,000.²⁴

Many individuals who had served time in Cuba for common crimes were rounded up by local police and threatened with imprisonment if they did not leave the country. After processing at their local police stations, they were transported to El Mosquito Beach at Mariel. Another group included offenders who were actually serving time in various prisons. They were processed in prison, transported to Mariel, and kept separated from other refugees until their departure. Cultural shock and feelings of isolation after their arrival in the United States contributed to confusion and a high incidence of crime among the refugees. Between July and September 1980, for example, a commercial airliner was hijacked to Cuba almost every week by homesick refugees desiring to return home. Castro's reaction was an announcement on September 18, 1980, that he would return all Cuban hijackers to the United States.

Of the 124,000 refugees who landed in Florida, 1,700 have been detained since their arrival for suspected involvement in serious crimes, but sorting out criminals in a population without records is an extremely difficult task.* With no solid evidence of their criminal past, the government released most hardened criminals with other refugees and brought a plague of murder, rape, and robbery to cities where they settled. As America's new banditos, they became known for high-caliber weapons, amazing bravado, and viciousness. During the period of eleven months after their arrival, sixty-six Marielitos were arrested in Miami for homicide and seventy-two for murder. Actually, the rate of homicides among the refugees has been five times higher than the rate among the general population.²⁵

Records of the New York City Police Department for 1981 show an estimated 1,000 arrests of Cubans who came to the city in the 1980 flotilla. One refugee, thirty-two-year old Guillermo Valdez, compiled an arrest record of half a dozen armed stickups between August and December 1980. Much the same is true of other areas with large populations of Cuban refugees. By September 1981, hardly a community anywhere in the United States was willing to accept the final group of 720 refugees. By then, the Federal Government had spent more than \$600 million on resettlement, food stamps, and Medicaid for the refugees.²⁶ Since an estimated \$25,000 a year is required to maintain an individual in a prison, additional millions of dollars will be necessary in the future to insure the continued separation of hard-core Cuban criminals from the rest of American society.

*Some of the Cuban refugees carry their criminal past with them in the form of tattoos with which they were marked in a Cuban prison. The most common place for a tattoo mark is the area between the thumb and forefinger.

Mounting evidence, including the testimony of refugees and statements by FBI operatives, shows another small but very important group of individuals who had been recruited as secret agents by Castro's DGI. Some of them were picked up with the expectation that immediately after reaching the United States, they would inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation about their missions. Their instructions, including the names of potential contacts in the United States, were to disorient the bureau.

Still another group included reliable DGI agents and operatives expecting to begin operation immediately after passing the U.S. security check. Among them was Mario Esteves Gonzales, who was arrested in November 1981 on charges of drug trafficking. In his testimony before Federal District Court in Miami, Esteves admitted that he was one of approximately 3,000 secret agents sent to this country in the 1980 exodus. When the Coast Guard arrested him, he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a boat off the Florida coast. He told Federal officials that his first assignment from the Cuban intelligence was to join Alpha 66, a radical anti-Castro exile group operating in the United States, and that he later received orders to get involved in drug trafficking. Until his arrest, he travelled frequently to Cuba, mainly on speedboats, and delivered between \$2 million and \$3 million derived from drug trafficking to Cuban officials. Funds collected by the Cuban government were used mainly to obtain badly needed hard currency for the Cuban economy and to finance leftist movements in Latin America. Not all of the estimated 3,000 secret agents are involved in drug trafficking, of course. Some are expected to disrupt Cuban exile groups and others to conduct economic or scientific espionage. But another small group of reliable, dedicated agents will be very difficult to identify. They plan to begin their operation only after they build up their reputations as respectable and loyal Americans.

What originally appeared as a major blunder for the Castro regime became an American headache. By allowing the most disappointed and bitter citizens to leave the country, Castro at least temporarily alleviated some of the internal tension facing his government, relieved Cuba of several thousand criminals, made them a burden for American cities and taxpayers, and seriously undermined the image of the Cuban exile community in the United States. And, by interjecting a number of secret agents into the mainstream of disenchanting refugees, he created a problem for U.S. security agencies that will require many years and a great deal of energy to resolve.

NOTES

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Chapter 9

Love Affair with Terror

Around noon on February 27, 1980, several young men and women were kicking a soccer ball outside the gates of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, Colombia. Inside the building, diplomats were toasting Dominican Independence Day. Later, after representatives of five Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, departed in their limousines, the soccer players pulled automatic weapons from their bags and took control of the embassy. The terrorists seized fifty-six diplomats, including American Ambassador Diego C. Ascencio, and threatened to kill them unless the Colombian government satisfied their demands for the release of 311 guerrillas jailed in Colombia, a ransom of \$50 million, and publication of a manifesto dealing with the torture of political prisoners in Colombia.

Wearing bright warm-up suits and hoods, the guerrillas addressed each other by numbers rather than names, and their leader, Comandante Uno, was an impressive man in his early thirties. The group was called M-19 or the April 19 Movement, one of two major terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. Organized in 1974 to operate primarily in urban areas, it is a Marxist group that advocates establishment of a socialist republic. M-19's first major operation in January 1974 received wide publicity when members stole a sword of Simon Bolivar, a Colombian national hero, from a museum in Bogota. They left a note containing these words: "His sword now begins new combats. Now it confronts the Yanqui, the exploiter, those who deliver our country to sorrow, the landowner, the capitalist, the oligarch."¹

Ambassador Ascencio stated later that his own "ability to communicate with his captors on various levels was crucial in saving my life." During his sixty-one days of captivity, Ascencio learned a great deal about the motivation and thinking of his captors: "Some were rather mean machines who were older and not very flexible in their thinking; some were interesting and attractive young, idealistic students searching, and more flexible; and finally the adventurers who, if they weren't guerrillas, might be out holding up a bank or something."²

Both the guerrillas and the Colombian government claimed victory when the hostages were released after two months of captivity. Colombian President

Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala called the solution "a triumph for the country," and the terrorists claimed victory even though their major demand for the release of hundreds of guerrillas from Colombian prisons had not been fulfilled. They stated that the operation called world attention to torture and infringement of human rights by the Colombian military.³ They accepted \$2.5 million ransom and safe conduct from the country.

When a Cuban airline jet landed with the hostages and guerrillas at the airport in Havana, a small group of Cubans cheered as the guerrillas left the plane. Fidel Castro granted the guerrillas political asylum; the hostages returned home and the Colombian drama became another forgotten footnote in the history of terrorism.

The seizure of the Dominican embassy had the typical ingredients of a modern terrorist act: masked "heroes" addressing each other with numbers and expressing complete willingness to kill while showing gentlemanly respect for women; press reports focusing on images and surface facts rather than the substance of terrorism; and a few fuzzy signals linking the terrorists with a Communist country.

Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language explains terrorism as "the use of terror and violence to intimidate, subjugate, etc., especially as a political weapon or policy." Terrorist action is usually aimed at publicizing and dramatizing certain causes or inflaming social differences within a society. The classical forms of modern terrorism include airplane hijackings, bombings, political kidnappings, and assassinations, but it is not only the cool determination to kill and engage in violence that characterizes terrorism. To generate fear and paralyze the opponent's defenses, terrorists skillfully exploit the mass media and resort to violence for a symbolic political effect. On many occasions, they issue long communiqués filled with revolutionary slogans and threaten to kill their hostages unless they are published. Television networks have been forced to broadcast videotapes showing terrorists interrogating their hostages or reading long political statements. Thus, publicity and public recognition of their cause is a primary objective.

For the American press the terrorist operation in Bogota was a front page story. Some fifty reporters, including large crews from television networks, invaded the city. They camped in brightly colored tents on the crowded lawn that was set aside for them in the vicinity of the Dominican embassy. Stephen Kinzer of the *Boston Globe* noted: "The American reporters, with their colorful clothes and carefree habits became an item of widespread curiosity both among their Colombian colleagues and, apparently, among the public at large. 'You Americans are the stars here,' said one local reporter, trying to explain the intense interest. 'We've never seen an invasion like this!'"⁴

No reliable figures are available for the period before 1968, but, from 1968 through 1979, 3,336 terrorist incidents resulted in 2,689 deaths and 5,955 wounded. (See Table 9.1.)⁵

Table 9.1. Deaths from International Terrorism According to USNWR (June 16, 1980)

1968	34	1974	315
1969	29	1975	240
1970	110	1976	402
1971	36	1977	235
1972	145	1978	432
1973	124	1979	587

American diplomats or officials were victims of 208 armed assaults: 14, including 5 ambassadors, were murdered, 38 were kidnapped, and 32 were seriously wounded.⁶ 40% of all terrorist attacks in the world were directed against Americans in 1980.

More than 50% of all terrorist acts in the last ten years have been committed in Latin America and Western Europe. The strategically vital region of Central America has been a primary target of Latin American terrorists with close ties to Cuba. After a long bloody war that cost more than 30,000 lives, Marxist Sandinista guerrillas took over Nicaragua in July 1979, and thousands of Cuban advisors drew the new regime even closer to the Soviet bloc. Since their victory, the Sandinistas have spread revolutionary infection to neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala.

Modern industrialized countries with a large, affluent middle class, a free press, and large student communities are particularly vulnerable. Terrorism in these countries is an extremist response to the specialization, bureaucratization, and alienation inherent in highly industrialized societies. Such terrorist groups in Western Europe as the Red Brigades of Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany are anticapitalist, antiimperialist, and antidemocratic, and most of them subscribe to Marxist-Leninist or Maoist doctrines. Others, like the Irish Republican Army, fight for strictly nationalistic causes. Although Marxism is the prevailing political philosophy among terrorist groups, their revolutionary zeal is not inspired by the Soviet Union. They believe that their programs will emerge only through armed struggle, and they argue that revolution was not led by the proletariat in the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China. It was the achievement of professional revolutionaries. They reject discussion, persuasion, and reform. It is the revolt of a generation of young men and women who contend that violence is the only true instrument of rebellion and achievement.

The case of Monika Ertl, who was killed in Bolivia in 1972, exemplifies not only the typical violent zeal of terrorists but also a great deal of political naïveté. The daughter of a prominent German cameraman who came to Bolivia in 1953 and decided to stay, Monika Ertl lived a life of relative luxury as a member of European high society. After an unsuccessful marriage at the

age of 32, Ertl left for West Germany in 1969 and lived for a while in a fashionable commune with a group of disillusioned radical students. The night-long discussions about class consciousness, revolutionary strategy and tactics, and the philosophy of Che Guevara changed Monika Ertl's life. She contacted a representative of the Bolivian revolutionary underground, won his trust, returned to Bolivia, and became a woman with two faces. During the day, she played the role of a successful businesswoman who sold IOS certificates and, at night, she planted bombs. She smuggled weapons from neighboring countries to Bolivia, took part in several bank robberies, and helped to hide a guerrilla instructor from Cuba. She disappeared from Bolivia in 1970 and visited several Communist countries, among them East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. On the final stop of her European trip, she met the Italian millionaire and terrorist Feltrinelli, who had close ties to Eastern Europe. With the help of several Bolivian, West German, and Italian friends, Monika Ertl prepared a plan for the assassination of Quintanilla—the Bolivian consul in Hamburg, West Germany, a former chief of the Bolivian secret service, and supposedly a key figure in the death of Che Guevara. After murdering Quintanilla in his office on April 1, 1971, she inadvertently left behind a blonde wig. The police in Hamburg tried desperately to locate her but she had disappeared. When she surfaced in Bolivia in March 1972, she had only three months to live. Police surprised her one evening in an apartment on the outskirts of La Paz and killed her.⁷

Monika Ertl's adventures supplied the West German press with dramatic stories for a few years, but the stories did not change the Bolivian political system or the suffering of the poor. In fact, the regime became even more oppressive and ruthless. In an unusually candid interview conducted inside a West German prison in 1978, Horst Mahler, one of the original leaders of the Baader/Meinhof terrorist gang in Germany, admitted the foolishness and ineffectiveness of terrorist action. He stated that the working classes were indifferent to all efforts to organize them against the system. "Then we turned to the Third World as our allies against our own country; but there was no response. And, finally, we turned against ourselves and everyone around us, to violence and self-destruction."⁸ In the words of the West German political weekly *Die Zeit*, "Terrorists are idealists. And idealists can be terrible people."

A striking feature of terrorist groups is their arrogant elitism. They claim to speak on behalf of millions and, at the same time, show utter contempt for law, human life, and the everyday struggle of human beings. There has been very little innovation in terrorist tactics and targets. Their principal targets are usually civilians and nonmilitary structures, and their tactics are acts of severe violence complemented with psychological crusades. The only significant change has been the level and severity of their violence. Terrorists in 1980 were more inclined to kill and to accept death than their predecessors. Terrorists of

the previous decade showed little tendency or ability to use sophisticated weapons. Their ultimate access to modern technology, including atomic weapons, is an apocalyptic vision with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire world.

LEFTIST TERRORISM AND THE KGB

The Soviets characterize international terrorism either as an imperialist or a Chinese intrigue and categorically deny their own involvement. An article published in the Soviet newsweekly *New Times* in February 1981 more or less reflects fairly the official Soviet viewpoint:

First there is Right-wing, essentially fascist type terrorism as an attribute of the imperialist system as such. The second is Leftist terrorism. It impedes the development of the national liberation and revolutionary movement. Like the Right-wing terrorism, the Leftist outrages play into the hands of the imperialist reactionaries Leftist terrorism naturally repels people by its cruelty and futility, diverts and alienates the masses from genuine struggle for their rights Needless to say, the Soviet Union has not and cannot have anything to do with the Red Brigades. The actions of these pseudo-revolutionaries run counter to the Communist ideas and practical struggle for a better future for mankind It is nobody's secret that the Red Brigades and kindred groups be they in Italy, Turkey or Spain, are either financed or inspired by the Maoists.⁹

With few exceptions, the Western press is inclined to believe the Soviet interpretation. The *New York Times* suggested in May 1978 that, "apart from the fact that some of the founders of the Red Brigades visited Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, there is no evidence, Western specialists say, of a connection with Eastern Europe. No German, Latin American, Palestinian or Irish strains have been discovered in the organization."¹⁰ As late as September 1981, the *Boston Globe*, in a four-part series dealing with terrorism, maintained that, "despite some evidence of international connections in the nether world of terrorism, an extensive survey found no basis for the claim that the wave of terror that has swept Europe is a coordinated attempt to destabilize the West Terrorism European style, is wild and inchoate." Western journalists argue that the Soviets have always rejected assassinations, not on the grounds that they are immoral but in the sense that Marxists do not view politics in terms of individuals. They argue that Communists perceive individual leaders as exponents of social trends that continue whether or not a leader is removed.¹¹

Official Soviet propaganda does not provide an appropriate key for examining Soviet involvement in international terrorism. Although the Soviet press propagates the Marxist-Leninist view that terrorism is anarchistic, pointlessly destructive, and counterproductive, the KGB considers it an infectious, debilitating disease that weakens the body of Soviet opponents and helps to achieve

the long-term goal of disintegrating the Western establishment. In considering the phenomenon of international terrorism and its connections to Eastern Europe, many Western analysts mistakenly separate terrorism from other forms of Soviet "active measures." The KGB's involvement is covered by several protective layers of tight security rules and the so-called international proletarian help. Even the members of terrorist organizations are unaware of their assigned role in Soviet plans.

Terrorist organizations would not be able to survive for long periods without outside support. The Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Cuba have provided various kinds of assistance to terrorists, including weapons, ammunition and explosives, military training, financing, and sanctuaries where they could plan their operations undisturbed or communicate safely with other terrorist groups.

The Weather Underground in the United States maintained contact with Communist intelligence for years, particularly Cuban, East German, and North Korean.* They supported the Weather Underground with money, equipment, and a safe haven.¹² Larry Gratwohl, a former member of the group, explained that members located other members when cut off from the group in hiding by using a special code name to telephone the Cuban embassy in Mexico or Canada. An operative of the Cuban intelligence stationed at the Cuban embassy would then bring lost members in contact with other members in the area.¹³

The Puerto Rican FALN, a Marxist-Leninist group more or less openly supported by Cuba for years, is another example of support by the Soviet bloc for leftist terrorist groups operating on U.S. territory. In Communiqué No. 6 issued on October 27, 1975, the FALN expressed appreciation for the support: "We especially acknowledge the moral support given to our organization by the Cuban people and government in a speech by Prime Minister Fidel Castro in August [1975] in which he said that the Cuban government would do all it could to support the FALN."¹⁴

But there is no evidence that the KGB or the DGI directs operations by such terrorist groups as the FALN or the Italian Red Brigades. As a matter of fact, the Soviets deliberately refuse to select terrorist targets or direct individual operations. The reason is obvious. Even a very disciplined underground organization cannot avoid occasional failure and violations of secrecy. Public disclosures of KGB involvement in a major terrorist act would seriously damage Soviet foreign policy and eventually paralyze other important intelligence operations. But the KGB and its satellite agencies provide selected terrorist

*The Weather Underground faced a bitter factional fight in 1977. The organization had only a handful of members then, and the internal dispute further damaged its ability to act. The surrender of Bernadine Dohrn and William A. Ayers in Chicago in November 1980 ended the group's activities.

organizations with specialized training, for example, in handling guns and explosives. The Palestine Liberation Organization has quite openly sent its members to the Soviet Union for training. Adnan Jabel, a Palestinian terrorist captured by the Israelis, stated in 1980 that he had received special training in tactics, weapons, and explosives in the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea have provided similar training to other terrorist organizations.

Many terrorist groups are armed with weapons manufactured in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. Some shipments of East European guns destined for Western terrorists have been discovered when they were not properly handled. In 1971, for instance, the Dutch police in Amsterdam confiscated a large volume of Czechoslovak weapons scheduled for delivery to the Irish Republican Army. Later shipments handled more discreetly through several intermediaries made it difficult for Western police to trace the country of origin. Weapons have been supplied directly and openly to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the secret network, in turn, has distributed them to other groups, such as the Red Brigades. West European police have intercepted some of these secret shipments. In January 1983, for example, the Austrian police arrested a Czechoslovak citizen named Petr Bardon at the border. Careful examination of his car revealed 300 undeclared pistols and seven semiautomatic rifles of Soviet design (Draganov) equipped with special night sights.¹⁵

In March 1982, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders disclosed evidence that Cuba was funneling arms and money to Colombian M-19 guerrillas through drug smugglers. The leader of the ring, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug trafficker, visited Cuba twice in 1981 and, on his second trip, received \$700,000 from the Cuban government for purchasing arms that would be delivered to M-19 guerrillas in Colombia. In return for his service, the Cubans provided sanctuary for Guillot's ships loaded with marijuana while they waited for feeder boats to transport the cargo to Florida and the Bahamas.¹⁶

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Palestinian terrorists are divided into more than forty different organizations but the single most powerful terrorist group is undoubtedly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It is an umbrella organization for a number of groups including Al Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, who is also the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization.* With its headquarters in Tunis, the

*The most radical among the PLO members is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by Dr. George Habash, who is ideologically and politically the closest to Moscow. In 1972, the PFLP extorted five million dollars from the West German airline, Lufthansa.

PLO is something like a government for 3.5 million Palestinians scattered around the world.

The PLO became the major symbol of international terrorism after the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the slaughter of innocent school children in Maalot, Israel, in 1974. In the late 1970s, the PLO substantially expanded its international contacts and used them as political weapons to a greater extent than traditional terrorists. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky met with Yasser Arafat in Vienna, and French Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet officially received Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO's political department. By 1980, the PLO maintained representatives in more than fifty countries around the world, and the tactics proved successful. A number of Western countries moved toward recognition of the PLO as the official representative of all Palestinians. British Foreign Secretary Lord Carington, for example, stated in March 1980 that the PLO was probably not a terrorist organization, indicating that even Britain was moving toward official recognition of the PLO. Although the PLO discontinued terrorist actions against non-Jewish targets, it continued the bloody war against Israel.

The PLO is financed primarily by rich Arab oil countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar, but it also collects money worldwide from thousands of Palestinians who pay the organization three to 6% of their gross income.¹⁷ And the Arab countries also provide operational assistance. PLO terrorists have access to Arab business offices, embassies, and consulates that help them secure quick exchanges of passports or movement under diplomatic protection. The embassies of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and South Yemen are particularly helpful in this respect.

A group of Soviet Jews traveling to Israel in September 1973 was abducted by PLO guerrillas on a train from Prague, Czechoslovakia, to Vienna, Austria. Shortly after the train left Czechoslovak territory, they seized three Jews and an Austrian official and threatened to kill them unless Austria disbanded facilities that were providing shelter for Soviet Jews on their way to Israel. Under such pressure the Austrian government agreed. The event illustrates the intricate, complicated relationship between the PLO and the Soviet-bloc countries. They support the Palestinian cause, but they have allowed many Soviet Jews to leave for Israel. They not only give verbal support but also provide training, weapons, ammunition, and explosives for operations like the one on the Czechoslovak-Austrian border.

Among numerous terrorist organizations operating in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, the PLO provides the most convincing evidence of Soviet-bloc involvement. Yasser Arafat first visited the Soviet Union in 1968, and, in 1977, the PLO opened an office in Moscow. But the Soviets offered open diplomatic support for the PLO and labeled it a national liberation movement only after it agreed to rely on political rather than terrorist tactics.

Despite official Soviet denials, members of the PLO have traveled to the Soviet Union since the early 1970s for military training in the use of small arms and explosives, military tactics, and political philosophy. In an interview with the Public Broadcasting Service on September 1, 1979, a United Nations observer for the PLO, Zehdi Labib Terzi, admitted openly that young Palestinians receive training at military schools in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and that the PLO receives arms, ammunition, and explosives from the Soviets.¹⁸ Brigadier Mohammed Ibrahim al-Shaier, manager of the PLO office in Moscow, stated in February 1981 that "the organization is satisfied with this [Soviet] assistance . . . Scores and hundreds of Palestinian officers eligible to command major sectors, such as brigades, have graduated from Soviet military academies." He also stated that some 2,000 Palestinians were studying at Soviet schools and that the schools reserved 300 scholarships a year for the PLO.¹⁹

And evidence collected by the Israelis confirms these official statements by PLO representatives. For example, Adnan Jabel, commander of the Palestinian terrorist squad that killed six Jews in Israel in May 1980, announced at a press conference in Hebron on October 30, 1980, that he had received six months of intensive training in the Soviet Union in 1974. PLO documents captured by the Israelis during their invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and made available to the press only confirmed previously collected evidence.²⁰

Through a network of pro-Soviet sympathizers and recruited PLO agents, the KGB maintains an indirect line of communication with other terrorist organizations, such as the West German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Basque ETA. These groups, on various occasions, have sent members to PLO training camps in Syria and Lebanon. Part of the evidence discovered by the Israelis in Lebanon was correspondence with El Salvador, Haiti, and Turkey regarding guerrillas to be trained by the PLO. The documents also confirmed PLO links with thirty-three different terrorist organizations—ten from Western Europe, seven from South America, three from the Far East, five from the Indian subcontinent, and eight from the Middle East.

THE BASQUES (ETA)

The Basque region, one of the richest areas in Spain, has for decades been torn by political turmoil and violence. With only 6% of Spain's population, the region generates 12% of the nation's taxes and 7.4% of its gross national product. The 2.7 million Basques are devoted Catholics who cherish individualism and perpetuate a unique language. Basques have always wanted to build an independent state comprised of the four northern provinces of Spain and the Basque area of Southern France.

The Basque separatist movement is highly fractured by some twenty organizations, but the ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) is the most violent. It is

a Marxist-Leninist organization whose objective is to create an independent, socialist Basque nation. ETA was established in the 1950s as a college study group to examine the effects of Spanish domination on Basques, but it later became a radical organization that assassinated its first victim in 1968. Between 1968 and 1981, it killed more than 350 individuals, mainly police officers, army officers, and such political figures as Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the designated successor to Franco. ETA tactics have brought bloody and repressive retaliation from Spanish authorities, but the net effect of such action only increased popular resentment and demands for an independent state.²¹

The organization is financed primarily from bank robberies and so-called revolutionary taxes from Basque businessmen and industrialists. In May 1979, it extended these financial demands to doctors, lawyers, architects, and other professionals. Assassination is the fate of a few like the Count of Aresti, a prominent business figure, when they refuse to contribute.

The ETA maintains close contact with intelligence services in the Soviet bloc. From 1977, when the Soviet Union and Spain established full diplomatic relations, to 1980, eight Soviet diplomats and representatives, including Oleg Suranov, manager of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, were expelled from Spain because of their extensive espionage activities or their secret connections with separatists.

ITALIAN RED BRIGADES

There is undoubtedly a direct relationship between the successes of the Italian Red Brigades and the political and economic climate in Italy during the last two decades. The terrorists are only symptomatic of the long-term crisis facing Italian society. In effect, the student rebellion of the 1960s reflected the growing radicalism of Italian youth and distrust of both the Christian Democrats and the Communist party. Young people perceived Italy as fascist and concluded that the masses would soon rise and smash the system.

The organization of Red Brigades was founded in 1969 by Renato Curcio, formerly a practicing Catholic and a student of sociology at the University of Trento. The Trento School of Sociology, with a predominantly Marxist faculty and a student body of some 5,000 students, was the major recruiting ground for ultraleftist radicals and terrorists. Hundreds of doctors of sociology who were leaving the school without hope of finding any meaningful employment contributed to radicalism among Trento students with their sympathy for terrorist tactics. Between 1969 and 1974 the Red Brigades mainly conducted operations against neo-fascist sympathizers and industrial plant managers. In 1972 the director of a Milan plant and in 1974 the personnel director of Fiat in Turin were released unharmed after massive propaganda campaigns. Later, the Red Brigades switched to targets from the governing Christian Democratic

party and the Italian Communist party and their tactics became much more violent. Former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kidnapped in March 1978 and murdered fifty-five days later after a campaign that gave the Red Brigades worldwide publicity.

The Red Brigades are organized in small units, making it very difficult for the police to infiltrate. The hard core of the Red Brigades includes 400 to 500 full-time revolutionaries (as of 1981) who receive a monthly salary roughly equivalent to \$400, the approximate minimum wage of a typical worker in Italy. There are also several thousand cooperators, usually respected members of the society, who drive expensive cars and occupy important positions in government, business, academia, political parties, and even the police. They serve as informants and provide concealment, transportation, and communication facilities, but they know nothing about the nature of specific operations.²² Almost all active members of the Red Brigades are products of middle and upper middle-class families.

During their early years, the Red Brigades limited themselves to the distribution of revolutionary leaflets of a Marxist-Leninist nature and engaged in a few bank robberies and random bombings. Other activities included a small number of kidnappings for their propaganda value, but they held their victims only for short periods and then released them. They began their first major wave of terrorism in 1976 after most of the "old guard" had been imprisoned or killed in action. The bloodiest period, from 1976 to 1980, was dominated by a new generation of brigadists who lacked the intellectual sophistication of their predecessors and resorted to murder as a deliberate, everyday routine. A leaflet distributed in February 1980 by leaders of the Red Brigades stated that the objective of the latest series of killings was to "dismantle the judicial power and destroy the command structure of the country."²³

An internal ideological split led one faction of the Red Brigades in July 1978 to issue a twenty-page document projecting the future direction of the organization. Dissidents went along with the basic philosophy that the social system in Italy could be changed only by armed violence, but they disagreed with the methods used by the leadership to conduct the "armed struggle." The document reviewed the history of political terrorism in Italy and explained that, in the early 1970s, the revolutionary movement in Italy remained ineffectual because it had no leadership and no military organization. The founding members of the organization (like Renato Curcio) were viewed as effective leaders who understood the complexity of the revolutionary struggle, but second generation leaders apparently became "arrogant and presumptuous."²⁴

The Red Brigades never publicly formulated a cohesive ideology, but their occasional statements confirm their devotion to Stalinism, Marxism, Maoism, and Trotskyism and their admiration for Che Guevara. They reject the policy

of the Italian Communist party as bourgeois and imperialistic, and they became increasingly hostile toward the party during the late 1970s. In 1980, they killed Guido Ross, a member of the Communist party and a union leader who testified against them. Ugo Pecchioli, a Communist senator, stated: "We are a part of their target. They see us as an impediment to the proletarian revolution."²⁵ Their objective was to cause revolutionary chaos and create their own Communist society after the collapse of the existing order.

Italian authorities admit that it is extremely difficult to infiltrate the Red Brigades because its members are highly motivated, carefully screened, and constantly threatened with death if they violate the tight security rules. By forcing new members to commit murder shortly after joining the ranks, the organization attempts to block forever the road back to the normal life. According to Italian authorities, 1,300 convicted terrorists and suspected members of the Red Brigades were held in Italian prisons in 1981.²⁶

For a long period, the Italian government was unconcerned about the link between the Red Brigades and countries in the Soviet bloc, but the death of left-wing millionaire/publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in 1972 provided the first serious evidence of Soviet-bloc involvement in Italian terrorism. Feltrinelli, a one-time Communist, became intrigued with Latin American terrorists and, in 1970, established the Partisan Action Group in Milan. This organization pursued a philosophy very similar to that of the Red Brigades. Feltrinelli was killed in March 1972 while attempting to dynamite a high-tension power line in a field near Milan.²⁷ Among his possessions, Italian police found a false passport bearing twenty-two Czechoslovak stamped entries. He was obviously a regular guest.

In the early 1970s, Renato Curcio and other members of his organization maintained direct contact with Czechoslovak intelligence, and, like Feltrinelli, Curcio visited Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, many times. When he was arrested in 1974, Italian police found several fake passports with Czechoslovak entry visas among his possessions. Frequent trips to Eastern Europe served several purposes for Italian terrorists. They used the opportunity to familiarize themselves with weapons manufactured in Eastern Europe and to meet terrorists from other countries, including the Spanish Basques and the West German Red Army Faction. Public exposure of Feltrinelli's and Curcio's trips to Czechoslovakia forced Czechoslovak intelligence to change its operational strategy and sever its connection with the Red Brigades.

The kidnapping and murder of former premier Aldo Moro in 1978 was a showcase of the Red Brigades' operational capabilities. Moro was held for fifty-five days in a "people's prison" before he was killed, and his body, riddled with eleven shots fired into the left side of his chest, was left in a car parked on the street in downtown Rome. Weapon experts identified some of the slugs as ammunition from a Czech manufactured submachine gun.²⁸

More than 50% of the weapons confiscated by the Italian police from the Red Brigades during the last decade have come from Eastern Europe. Several members of the Brigades were caught with two Soviet-made SAM 7 anti-aircraft missiles in November 1979, and, when the police arrested another suspected member in January 1981, they found several Soviet-made RPG7V grenade launchers.²⁹ Weapons of this type and size can be transported from Eastern Europe only with the official permission or knowledge of Communist authorities.

The mass media in Eastern Europe do not treat the Red Brigades favorably and, on several occasions, have pictured them as a CIA creation. When the Italian press mentioned the possibility that Czechoslovak intelligence was involved in Aldo Moro's kidnapping, Prague categorically denied any connection and repeated the disinformation that the CIA established the Red Brigades: "American imperialism is trying to use all its tools, including the CIA in its anti-Czechoslovak campaign, even terrorists including the notorious so-called Red Brigades."³⁰ And the Soviet *New Times* even used an anti-American forgery to prove the American complicity. According to the document, dated January 1970 and labeled FM 30-31B, American army operatives stationed abroad were instructed to infiltrate ultraleftist groups and incite them to violent acts. "The U.S. secret services found the situation highly auspicious for the infiltration of extremist left groups Under Operation Chaos they smuggled quite a number of their agents into these groups, the notorious Red Brigades included."³¹ (Chapter 5 contains more information on the FM 30-31B forgery.)

The Italian police acquired important evidence about the latest connection of the Red Brigades with East European intelligence when they cracked the Dozier kidnapping case on January 28, 1982. Brigadier General James L. Dozier was rescued from the "people's prison" in Padua where he had been held for six weeks after he was kidnapped from his Verona apartment. In the following weeks, the police arrested 375 suspected Red Brigade members, including Antonio Savasta, leader of the unit that abducted General Dozier. Savasta testified on March 16, 1982, that an employee of the Bulgarian embassy in Italy offered them money, arms, and aid after Dozier's abduction. "We didn't want them to have anything to do with the kidnapping, but we considered the money," Savasta said.³²

The CIA study on international terrorism in 1980 predicted a global rise in casualties and more sophisticated attacks because terrorists "may believe that a larger number of casualties are now necessary to generate the amount of publicity formerly evoked by less bloody operations."³³ The study also predicted that terrorists would improve planning, increase technological sophistication of their operations, and change their targets. But, at this writing, the prediction has not materialized.

Moscow is not the center of a monolithic, worldwide terrorist conspiracy, but the Soviets do support, train, and assist terrorists, directly and indirectly, whenever such action suits their purposes. The offensive against this international menace requires toughness and determination, but it also requires political wisdom and the ability to differentiate between an elitist group of terrorists in Western Europe and socialistically oriented mass movements that occasionally use terrorist methods in their struggle for economic and social justice in developing countries.

NOTES

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3. *New York Times*, 30 April 1980, p. A 4.
4. *Boston Globe*, 7 March 1980, p. 6.
5. *New York Times*, 24 April 1981, p. A 17.
6. *U.S. News & World Report*, 29 September 1980, p. 38.
7. *Stern*, Nr. 22, 1973, pp. 54, 60, 163.
8. *New Times*, 6 December 1978, p. 33.
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19. *New York Times*, 18 February 1981, p. A 9.
20. *New York Times*, 31 October 1980, p. 1; *Boston Globe*, 21 July 1982, p. 5.
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22. *New York Times*, 17 May 1978, p. 1.
23. *Boston Globe*, 21 September 1981, p. 2.
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25. *Boston Globe*, 21 September 1981, p. 2.
26. *Boston Globe*, 21 September 1981, p. 2.
27. *New York Times*, 20 March 1972.
28. *New York Times*, 19 March 1980, p. A9; *New York Times*, 11 May 1978, p. 1.
29. *Boston Globe*, 3 February 1982, p. 13.
30. As quoted in the *New York Times*, 23 November 1979, p. 28.
31. *New Times*, No. 4, 1979, p. 28.
32. *Boston Globe*, 17 March 1982, p. 20.
33. *New York Times*, 11 May 1980, p. 14.

Chapter 10

Target: The CIA

The decade of the 1970s was a period of continuing crisis for the Central Intelligence Agency. The once highly secret agency was plagued by serious internal problems and unparalleled public attacks. Investigations by the House and Senate and disclosures of the agency's previous attempts to assassinate foreign leaders, spy on Americans, and engage in other questionable activities shook the agency to its foundations. Although revelations of abuses helped to quell some of the criticism, the agency became fair game, protected neither by the government nor by its own mystique. Growing hostility between career diplomats and CIA operatives, uncooperative ambassadors, reduction of budgets for covert action, and the unwillingness of CIA operatives to accept covert assignments contributed to the decline of the agency's operation capabilities. These developments left American intelligence operations in demoralized disarray and the intelligence community divided and confused.*

Was the decline a natural and spontaneous event? Evidence presented by the American mass media points in that direction, but it leaves some disturbing questions. After all, one of the major objectives of the KGB is to confuse and demoralize its American counterpart.

The Soviet Union enjoys several major advantages in the continuing struggle against the Central Intelligence Agency. The Soviet press is not allowed to publish even the most trivial information about the KGB without its approval, but the Central Intelligence Agency operates in an open society under the control of an inquisitive Congress and an adversary press. And, in its investigatory zeal, the press is sometimes even willing to publish information from

*To improve the CIA's public image, CIA Director Stansfield Turner established the agency's Office of Public Affairs in 1977, with a staff of fourteen. Several hundred unclassified reports made available to the press every year were to contribute to the image of openness. U.S. journalists approved of the practice but it was considered inappropriate by intelligence services of Allied countries and by secret agents working for the CIA overseas because they perceived it as a potential threat to their personal security.

unreliable or highly suspicious sources. In May 1980, for example, the Public Broadcasting Service presented a three-hour program, "On Company Business," characterized as "the story of thirty years of CIA subversion, murder, bribery and torture as told by an insider." The insider was Philip Agee, an ideological defector who made it his mission to destroy his former agency by publicly identifying its operatives around the world. The press investigated every major international event suspected as a CIA project and publicly discussed all real or perceived mistakes.

Thanks to Edwin P. Wilson and Francis E. Terpil, two former CIA operatives, the United States became the major private supplier of weapons and military technology to international terrorists in the late 1970s. The stories of the two Americans printed on the front pages of the world press and broadcast by national television networks of many nations seriously damaged the CIA's image, even without the involvement of Communist intelligence services. And a flood of memoirs by former CIA operatives supplied the KGB with volumes of information about the political atmosphere, people, security regulations, and covert practices. It enabled the Soviets to conduct more realistic and believable covert operations against the agency.

The CIA staff was reduced by several thousand officers during the 1970s. Under Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, 2,800 officers left the agency some of them bitter and angry. A few of them returned to their original professions as lawyers or found new careers as security specialists who trained American business executives against the dangerous traps of international terrorism. But most of these operatives found themselves in a political and professional vacuum struggling for survival. The situation provided an extraordinary opportunity for the KGB to recruit several CIA employees as Soviet agents.

David Henry Barnett spent twelve years with the agency both at CIA headquarters and in overseas areas, including the position as chief of a CIA base in Surabaya, Indonesia. He left the agency in 1970 and established a business in processed food. But, even as a private citizen, Barnett occasionally worked under contract for the agency. When his business soured and Barnett was more than \$100,000 in debt, he decided that the KGB might help him out. For a period of four years, Barnett provided the Soviets with information on the identities of many undercover CIA agents, Indonesians working for the agency, and details of U.S. covert operations in Indonesia. The Soviets rewarded his services with \$92,600. Following Soviet instructions, Barnett tried to infiltrate Senate and House intelligence committees in 1977 and 1978 but did not succeed because there were no openings at the time. He was arrested in 1980 and, a year later, was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. His wife observed that Igor Kazmadze, the KGB officer who recruited Barnett, was

a nice guy with a lot of white hair and he and David understood each other . . . It wasn't an ideological thing, but I think some of his happiest moments were with

the Russian guy . . . intelligence agents appear at times to have more in common with each other than with their countrymen. They are cosmopolitan, articulate technicians who respect each other. It's like a fraternity.¹

Soviet operatives received some of the most precious secrets in America during the 1970s, including secrets involving the Central Intelligence Agency. Thirteen individuals were charged with espionage in the United States from 1975 to 1980, ten of them on behalf of the Soviet Union, and six of the defendants were formerly affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency or one of its contractors. The security system designed by the agency to weed out moles and enemy agents was an obvious failure.

THE SPY-AND-TELL BOOKS

The first person to leave the Central Intelligence Agency and then publicly criticize the agency's activities was Victor L. Marchetti, former executive assistant to the deputy director, Admiral Rufus Taylor. He resigned from his position in 1969 and used his experiences of fourteen years to launch a crusade against his former employer. He was convinced that the agency had become too expensive, too big, and too frozen in cold war attitudes. And he aspired to be a writer. His book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, written with John D. Marks, a former State Department official, and published in 1974 by Alfred A. Knopf, had become a controversial issue even before it appeared on the market.

Shortly after Marchetti's decision to write a factual account of his CIA experience in 1972, federal agents presented him with a temporary restraining order forbidding submission of the manuscript to the publisher until the Central Intelligence Agency had examined it. The agency based its position on the contract restricting present and former employees from revealing anything about agency operations without its prior approval. Marchetti argued that the agency was exercising prior restraint and violating the First Amendment. The agency used considerable manpower for several years to stop publication of substantial portions of the book and, in the judicial battle, was granted 168 of 339 deletions originally requested. Some journalists noted sarcastically that the manuscript resembled Swiss cheese after the agency had carefully scissored out the sensitive information.

According to high-ranking CIA officials, some of the book was true, some of it was slightly wrong, and much of it was totally misleading. Most of the incidents mentioned in the book had appeared in print before: for example, the use of CIA pilots for the uprising against Indonesian President Sukarno in the late 1950s, the release of propaganda balloons over the People's Republic of China during the Cultural Revolution, and training of the Dalai Lama's troops in 1959 after they had been driven out of Tibet.² The book reported that the Central Intelligence Agency spent approximately two-thirds of its

annual budget of some \$750 million on covert operations and only 10% on intelligence gathering. It was surprising, however, that Victor Marchetti, a fourteen-year CIA veteran and expert on Soviet military aid to Third World countries naively believed that disinformation was a CIA specialty.³ The historical context and the continuing, massive intelligence offensive by the Soviet bloc throughout the world was missing in Marchetti's message.

Like his followers, Marchetti did not begin his career as a crusader. He appeared to be something of a Boy Scout to his colleagues, and it was appropriate that Boy Scouts first caused him to have misgivings about his employment. "Eagle Scouts came around me with their long hair, telling me they were not going to Vietnam. I had a hard time arguing with them. It seemed to me that the world was changing quite a bit, and neither the CIA nor the Government was changing with it."⁴

Even more damaging to U.S. foreign policy than Marchetti's public testimony was the book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, written by Philip Agee, who described U.S. foreign policy as a web of deceit and corruption and a frightening picture of conspiracy, assassination, and pressure. His diary, covering twelve years with the agency, named some 250 officers, agents, contacts, and cover organizations used by the agency during his intelligence operations in several Latin American countries. To avoid Marchetti's experiences with the U.S. courts, Philip Agee published his book in England. It became a best-seller in 1975 and forced the Central Intelligence Agency to reorganize all of its operations in Latin America.

The notoriety of Philip Agee's case infected other CIA officials, and the writing of anti-CIA memoirs became a contagious disease. Since the spilling of official secrets was not a crime in this country, the only legal recourse was a civil damage suit of the sort brought by people after an automobile accident. A year later, Frank Snepp, who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency from 1968 until January 1976, published *Decent Interval*, a personal account of the hectic last days before Saigon's fall in April 1975. The thirty-one-year-old Snepp, a senior analyst and briefer for the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon, was one of the last Americans to be evacuated from the roof of the U.S. embassy. He had this to say about his experience:

It is not too much to say that in terms of squandered lives, blown secrets and betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators, our handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace. Not since the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 had the agency put so much on the line, and lost it through stupidity and mismanagement.⁵

Like any other newcomer to the Central Intelligence Agency, Snepp signed a secrecy agreement as a prerequisite to accepting the job, but he refused when the agency demanded to see his manuscript. It was later found that he had negotiated an agreement with Random House to write a book even before he left CIA employment.⁶ Like other former CIA officers who decided to go

public with their intimate knowledge of CIA operations, Mr. Snepp claimed, in the court battle that followed, that his private rights of free expression were protected under the First Amendment. For a while, the press could not understand the sudden change in his behavior. *New Times* stated that Frank Snepp loved the Central Intelligence Agency and the whole sense of being a CIA agent. "He was an extremely proud spook His turning on the agency obviously had to do with his anguish over the institutional disaster [in Vietnam]." Snepp's book surprised many journalists who covered the Vietnam War, not because of its content but because of its author, Frank Snepp.

Snepp was not only everyone's favorite CIA source during his two tours (69-70 and 72-75), but also the spitting image of what an agent SHOULD be: handsome, athletic, paranoid, gung-ho. He was never without his .45 and his CIA bleeper, which he always concealed in his briefcase There was, of course, a harder edge to this Bondian fantasy. Snepp would regale his friends with accounts of a bar shoot-out in which one Vietnamese officer was left dead. And then there was his blonde girl friend, whom he claimed he discovered to be a Soviet agent. Asked how he solved that problem, Snepp explained to friends that he placed enough dope on her to get her thrown out of the country, and then had a few of her friends killed.⁷

The February 1980 decision of the Supreme Court curtailing the right of former government employees to write about their experiences has left Frank Snepp bitter and broke. It permanently enjoined him from circulating any writing based on his years in the Central Intelligence Agency unless he first cleared it with the agency, and it ordered him to pay all present and future profits from *Decent Interval* to the government, approximately \$142,000. The Supreme Court made it clear that Snepp's failure to clear his writing could cause the United States "irreparable harm and loss," and it violated his contract with the Central Intelligence Agency.⁸ While, in Victor Marchetti's case, courts held that the Central Intelligence Agency had the right to obtain an injunction against publication of a book that divulges *classified* information in violation of a secrecy agreement. In the Snepp case, the Supreme Court upheld the secrecy agreement even with regard to *unclassified* information.

In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story, a 285-page book published by John Stockwell in 1978, deals with CIA operations in Angola. An ex-Marine lieutenant and a friend of Frank Snepp, Stockwell spent twelve years with the agency, resigned in 1977, and, like Snepp, published his book without CIA permission. His major charge was that the United States, not the Soviet Union, was responsible for the escalation of the war in Angola. According to Stockwell, the Central Intelligence Agency tried to slow down the progress of the pro-Moscow Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and shore up two other guerrilla groups—the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Stockwell argues that a total of \$31.7 million was spent for military supplies channeled through Zaire for UNITA and FNLA, but

instead of stopping the MPLA, these efforts only spurred Soviet and Cuban assistance that enabled the MPLA to win the war.⁹ Stockwell stated that the agency should have stayed out of Angola altogether or should have *moved in much more forcefully* in the beginning.

Like Marchetti and Snepp, Stockwell advanced a confusing political message. He advocated a more effective CIA but rejected secrecy, the most important ingredient of any effective intelligence service. According to Stockwell, "Secrecy breeds arrogance and inefficiency. The CIA has become careless even of its own security abroad, and its covert operations have been almost comical in their clumsiness." He felt guilty for his activities during his years with the CIA, but he admitted that he would have had different feelings if operations in Angola or Vietnam had been successful.

In the last 70 years, we have forgotten our unique constitutional heritage, and created both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA, granting them blind charter to run secret operations at home and abroad. We got what we deserved. While both the FBI and CIA have seriously violated our civil liberties, neither has been remarkably effective against their theoretical adversaries, the Mafia and the KGB.¹⁰

The Central Intelligence Agency has not been "remarkably effective" against the KGB because of a lack of discipline within its ranks and a continuing massive violation of basic rules governing professional secrecy.

The phenomenon of anti-CIA memoirs is a complex problem, but the above mentioned CIA officer-critics share certain characteristics that make it possible to predict future disillusioned writers of anti-CIA memoirs:

- They show typical American middle-class origins;
- They join the Central Intelligence Agency with a vision of patriotic service;
- They are attracted by the CIA's aura of intrigue, secrecy, and drama as depicted by the mass media;
- They become disillusioned and frustrated when the espionage establishment fails to conform to the romantic image created by the media;
- They turn, in the name of the First Amendment, to the mass media to help them resolve *personal* problems.

Every espionage organization is a highly structured social institution with a set of bureaucratic procedures and rules that do not conform to the expectations of romantically inclined and politically naive individuals. Highly emotional, super patriotic candidates do not necessarily become reliable operatives capable of withstanding the everyday stress of their jobs. Rigorously enforced discipline and a strictly controlled press in Communist countries leave no opportunity for disillusioned officers to go public. And a high incidence of alcoholism and suicide, as well as defection, are symptoms of the same disease.

The process of disillusionment within CIA ranks was enhanced by growing public sentiment against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and subsequent unprecedented exposure of the CIA's past by the mass media made every CIA officer a social outcast, if not a political criminal. The spy-and-tell books by former CIA operatives became a literary genre of the 1970s and contributed directly to the paralysis of American intelligence operations. Each case gave the controversial individual, who customarily lived in a strictly anonymous environment, heavy media exposure and notoriety and encouraged other individuals with similar emotional problems to follow the examples of their predecessors. Furthermore, the new literary genre inspired Soviet propagandists to step in and contribute their skills and materials to the anti-CIA campaign. They knew, of course, that their involvement in a long-term operation of this magnitude had to be concealed from the American public. The man who helped them resolve this operational problem was Philip Agee.

Philip Agee began his life in a conventional middle-class home in Tampa, Florida, where the atmosphere, according to Agee, was "politically reactionary-no-say-conventional." He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1957 with a sense of patriotism and public service and, for a couple of years, perceived his job as intellectually stimulating and challenging. His ideological break with the agency and American foreign policy supposedly began in the years from 1963 to 1966 during his assignment to Uruguay where his official mission was to direct operations against Cubans and build up local security forces.¹¹ Disillusioned and frustrated in 1969, he left the agency in search of a cause and a philosophy that would resolve burning questions about his existence. He found the philosophy and the cause in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He announced his intention to expose CIA operatives and agents and to take measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they operated. "I aspire to be a Communist and revolutionary," he said.¹² Unlike numerous disillusioned CIA operatives who left the agency and, for one reason or another, wanted to expose and correct past CIA mistakes, Philip Agee became an ideological defector who willingly cooperated with Soviet-bloc intelligence in the anti-CIA campaign.

After the commercial and political success of the book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, Agee and Louis Wolf put together a collection of articles, including a guide for identifying CIA officers, primarily from lists of State Department and military personnel. It appeared under the title, *Dirty Work I: the CIA in Western Europe*, and it included a 386-page appendix listing the names, career histories, and, in many cases, current positions of 841 men and women who were supposedly CIA officers operating under cover in Western Europe.

When the book was published, Agee included the following comments:

Of course, this book will again raise the cry that we are 'trying to get someone killed' But as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the

mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to the desk inside the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way, the CIA will protect the operatives named—and also the lives of their potential victims.¹³

At the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana in August 1978, the Cubans staged a propaganda orgy against the United States in general and the CIA in particular, under the heading, "Youth Accuses Imperialism International Tribunal." Eight judges led by a Uruguayan physician, Hugo Villar, heard numerous witnesses, including Philip Agee, who delivered highly propagandistic, ideologically slanted testimonies against "the CIA crimes."¹⁴

The book *Dirty Work II: the CIA in Africa*, published in January 1980, included two essays written by Agee. He attacked CIA covert activities of the CIA in Africa and argued that the agency was impeding African independence. The book listed some 700 alleged CIA officers stationed in Africa and made them potential targets for terrorists. And the press, in its daily search for human drama and the spectacular, gave Agee major exposure. Here was a man challenging one of the world's most powerful institutions, the Central Intelligence Agency. He was an underdog taking on a giant, and the press loves an underdog. The CIA was virtually helpless for years. Civil charges against Agee for breaking his contract were ineffective because Agee was living abroad. Several European countries, including Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, ordered his deportation on the grounds that he maintained regular contacts with foreign intelligence agents. The State Department revoked Agee's passport in January 1980, but the action had no effect on his anti-CIA zeal or mobility.

Is Philip Agee a KGB agent? Agee's statements and activities are primarily an account of his ideological conversion from an old-fashioned American patriot to a revolutionary socialist who considers the Central Intelligence Agency a murderous tool in a worldwide conflict of classes. He became a newborn Marxist who wants his readers to adopt his political philosophy. "The only real solutions are those advocated by the Communists and the others of the extreme left," he said.

He does not belong to the category of disillusioned CIA operatives who, for one reason or another, want to correct what they perceive as illegal and immoral CIA practices of the past. He willingly cooperated with intelligence services in the Soviet bloc, accepted information from them, and used it in the worldwide anti-CIA campaign. As a professional in intelligence, Agee knew that evidence of his secret connection with Soviets would be extremely hazardous and could eventually paralyze his personal and political vendetta. He thus made several public statements openly admitting *official* contact with what he

called "Communist authorities." And, in an interview with the *Washington Post* in July 1974, Agee stated that he had made three trips to Cuba since 1971 "to conduct research" for his book, *Inside the Company*, and "to witness the results of a successful socialist revolution."¹⁵ He acknowledged in the same book that "in Havana, the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí and Casa de Las Americas provided special assistance for research and helped find data available only from Government documentation." Only one institution in Cuba could provide him with research material on the Central Intelligence Agency—the Cuban intelligence service (DGI).

Agee does not object to international deception per se, but he perceives covert action, disinformation, and international dirty tricks as noble weapons only if they are used by the right person for the right cause. "I wouldn't object to it if it were on behalf of a national liberation movement," he said.¹⁶ The end justifies the means, and, in his fight against the capitalist class in the United States, Philip Agee is prepared to use the same dirty weapons and tricks that he opposes in the CIA. He does not consider himself a secret agent of the KGB but, regardless of his public statements, his activities in the last ten years brand him the most effective collaborator and anti-American propagandist that ever worked for the Soviet disinformation service.

THE ANTI-CIA MAGAZINES

The initiative for a systematic, well orchestrated, worldwide campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency originated in 1965 with the East German disinformation department.¹⁷ In cooperation with the KGB and the Czechoslovak department for active measures, the East Germans published *Who's Who in CIA* by Julius Mader, an author known in Europe for his propaganda attacks against Western intelligence services. *Who's Who in CIA* contains material from Communist intelligence archives, various directories, and telephone and diplomatic listings. It includes a mixture of genuine CIA officers and the names of American diplomats, public officials, and even USIA employees who have never had any CIA connections. Among the so-called CIA operatives are such notables as former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg and the late Senator Frank Church. The purpose of the book is to paralyze the CIA and other governmental and private institutions involved in foreign policy.

Widely quoted by leftist publications around the world, the book inspired the anti-intelligence movement in the United States to establish regular publications of its own. As of December 1981, two periodicals systematically revealed names of alleged CIA agents stationed abroad: *Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB)* and *Counterspy*, both published in Washington, D.C. For their numerous inside stories and the identities of CIA operatives,

both *CAIB* and *Counterspy* have used three major sources: (1) testimony of former CIA operatives who left the agency in the late 1960s and the 1970s because of disillusionment, feelings of guilt, or changes in political philosophy; (2) documents and sources from the Library of Congress, such as old copies of the State Department's *Biographic Registrar* which, until 1975, was a public document. The false job titles given to CIA officers as covers were easily identified.* *CAIB* admitted that it has a worldwide network of cooperators who conduct research or verify information about CIA operatives from books, magazines, telephone directories, diplomatic lists, etc., or simply call the U.S. embassy and ask for Joe Smith whom they suspect is a CIA officer; and (3) materials from East European and Cuban intelligence archives circulated by a few "reliable" individuals, like Philip Agee, who write for *CAIB* or *Counterspy*. Most of these identifications have been accurate. With Philip Agee as the major spiritual force, *CAIB* provided 4,000 subscribers with slanted articles on covert CIA action and, until March 1982, a regular feature called "Naming Names."** Louis Wolf, editor of the *CAIB*, boasted in 1980 that he helped to disclose the identities of more than 2,000 American intelligence agents stationed around the world. Published six times a year, *CAIB* is supposedly dedicated to openness, accountability, and continuing reform of American society, and it uses investigative journalism with "the intent to expose illegality" and to "engender greater morality in government." In testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on January 31, 1980, a *CAIB* representative remarked:

Our publication . . . is devoted to exposing what we view as the abuses of the western intelligence agencies, primarily, though not exclusively, the CIA; and to exposing the people responsible for those abuses. We believe that our nation's intelligence activities should be restricted to the gathering of intelligence, in the strictest sense.¹⁸

The representative also mentioned the disinformation book *Who's Who in CIA* as a legitimate research source.

When Congressman McClory referred to the KGB as the major threat to First Amendment rights, the *CAIB* editor had this to say:

We don't know very much about the KGB but you should understand that if they are doing the same things that we say we don't like the CIA doing, we don't like their doing it either. We are trying very hard to make it, in our opinion, a better

*The Central Intelligence Agency distinguishes two types of cover: shallow cover for diplomatic or other government officers representing the United States, and deep cover for businessmen and journalists with no immunity from arrest. Since its founding in 1978, *CAIB* has concentrated primarily on the names of CIA officers with shallow cover.

**In March 1982, the editors of *CAIB* decided to suspend the practice of naming covert agents of the CIA.

government. We certainly hope that there are citizens of the Soviet Union trying hard to make their government a better government. We hope that there are people like that everywhere.¹⁹

The statement reflects considerable political naiveté or ignorance because journalists in the Soviet Union are not allowed to engage in public criticism of the KGB or public exposure of KGB agents. Even in the West, many journalistic attempts to balance the public image of the KGB and the CIA have failed.

A Greek reporter, Taki Theodoracopulos, observed that "three out of twelve Athenian dailies are said to get money from the Soviet or European Communist parties. The publisher of the paper that printed the list of CIA personnel in Greece, Yannis Horn, refused to publish an offered list of KGB people."²⁰

Despite the fact that Richard Welch, a CIA station chief in Athens, was assassinated in 1975 by unknown terrorists shortly after his name was published, the naming of CIA operatives became widespread and, to a degree, fashionable among leftist publications. The radical French paper, *Liberation*, published, on January 13, 1976, the names of thirty-two CIA operatives stationed in France. *Liberation* stated that the article was the fruit of several weeks of research in Paris, London, and Washington. Similar articles were published in Mexico, Great Britain, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, and Spain. And, in June 1980, the home of an American official stationed in Jamaica was sprayed with submachine gun bullets after an employee of *CAIB* asserted at a press conference that the official was actually an intelligence agent.²¹

Counterspy was another journal specializing in attacking the United States intelligence agencies and publishing the names of their operatives. Analysis of its No. 1, Vol. 4, 1980 issue revealed considerable political bias and disregard for journalistic balance and fairness. The issue contained the following major stories: "U.S. intervention in Afghanistan" (justifying the Soviet invasion), "Joan Baez, Tom Dooley of the 80s" (ridiculing the singer for her concern over Vietnamese and Cambodian atrocities) and "Princeton-CIA-Middle East" (attacking the U.S. academic community and comparing the CIA to the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst). Peter Gribben's article on the "CIA in Indonesia 1965," published in the same issue, is typical of this highly subjective journalism. Gribben is probably correct when he states that the Central Intelligence Agency never objected "to the vicious murder of one million innocent Indonesian workers, students, and peasants" after the unsuccessful Communist coup in September 1965. The author does not object to political murder per se; as a matter of fact, he believes that Indonesian Communists were too humanistic and selective in choosing their victims.

In the early hours of October 1, [1965] six of the members of this council [Generals' Council] were abducted from their homes, taken to the rebels' head-

quarters outside Djakarta and then murdered later that morning. The mistakes these junior officers made: letting one General Nasution escape and leaving another, General Suharto, off their list completely, proved their undoing.²²

Rather than deal specifically with CIA involvement in Indonesia before, during, and after the Communist coup attempt, the article presents selected quotations from various scholarly publications, studies, and newspapers. It accuses the United States, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, of "nation-building" in Southeast Asia through the creation of Western-trained military elites, military aid to the Indonesian armed forces, economic exploitation of Indonesia by American companies, manipulation of the Indonesian labor movement through the AFL-CIO, and misuse of student and cultural exchange programs. The author has this to say about the political atmosphere in Indonesia before the coup:

The purpose of the CIA's efforts in this regard was to counter a rising anti-Americanism on the part of the Indonesian people which was evidenced by the successive sackings and closings of the USIS libraries in late 1964 and early 1965. These attacks on centers of U.S. propaganda dissemination reflected the rising consciousness of Indonesians, workers in particular

Students occupied the U.S. embassy in Djakarta in March 1965 to protest the murder of Malcolm X in New York City, and they read a petition demanding the ouster of Ambassador Howard Jones, the closing of all remaining USIS libraries, and withdrawal of all Peace Corps volunteers from Indonesia. Finally, the article states that the American press made no mention of the blood bath that followed the unsuccessful Communist coup and that it played the role of CIA apologist.²³

Gribben's article is interesting only because it is a classic anti-CIA diatribe that totally avoids the question of involvement by the Soviet bloc in the Indonesian events of 1964 and 1965. The anti-American demonstrations were not entirely spontaneous events; they were the results of a concerted plan devised by intelligence agencies in the Soviet bloc. Code-named Operation Palmer, the campaign to whip up anti-American hysteria was actually the work of the disinformation department of Czechoslovak intelligence. The plan was inspired in 1964 by a newly emerging movement in Indonesia demanding an embargo on American films. Known as the Action Committee for the Boycott of United States Films, the group was convinced that American movies were demoralizing the Indonesian people and their government, and the Czechoslovak service thus began assembling a dossier on William Palmer, director of the American Film Importers in Indonesia. With his contacts in the highest Indonesian political and social circles and his seemingly inexhaustible financial resources, Palmer seemed the perfect candidate for portrayal as an "ugly American." He was destined to become a symbol of American imperialism and its "brain trust," the Central Intelligence Agency.

By using scraps of trivial but realistic information, the Czechoslovak disinformation department compiled a file showing Palmer as the CIA's number-one man in Indonesia. Several disinformation channels were used at the beginning of the operation, among them was Mr. Arit (not his real name), one of the Indonesian ambassadors to Europe. A protégé of Indonesian Prime Minister Subandrio, Mr. Arit served abroad in a diplomatic and intelligence capacity, and Prague maintained a close personal relationship with him. Strongly nationalistic and politically sympathetic to the Chinese model of communism, he knowingly participated as a channel in delivering various anti-American messages to the Indonesian government. Even more important, several Indonesian journalists—Czechoslovak agents—were furnished with outlines for appropriate news stories designed to intensify the anti-American campaigns. Their job was to embellish the details with their journalistic style and the Indonesian idiom. Anonymous channels were also called into play, and forged documents with unsigned cover letters were mailed to Indonesian politicians and newspapers.

The opening sequences of Operation Palmer occurred outside Indonesia. Material accusing Palmer of subversive activities appeared in the *Ceylon Tribune* on September 12, 1964, and it was reprinted on September 30 in a Singapore bulletin published by *Barisan Sosialis*. It stated:

This espionage ring is using an organization, the Association of American Film Importers, as its cover. It is reported that this organization represents nine American film companies. Its monthly income amounts to not less than two million. The money is used to finance reactionary political parties and organizations as well as to bribe political leaders, important executive officials, and other secret activities . . . William Palmer is the manager of the association. He is an active United States chief agent in Indonesia. He has been associated with the Indonesian rebels, the Masjumi Party [A moslem organization], all anti-government, anti-Sukarno, and reactionary influences . . . William Palmer has also set up his cells in political parties, government departments, and armed forces to help him gather information and intelligence . . . Despite his long term activities, William Palmer has not been uncovered, and his base for further subversion cannot remain. He has to leave Indonesia. What puzzles the British authorities in Singapore is that London allowed him to operate in Malaysia. Apparently, this has something to do with the whole process of United States control and influence over Malaysia.

The articles on Palmer drew attention in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia and gave new impetus to the Action Committee, which called a five-day conference at the end of 1964. The committee resolved to continue the boycott of American films and categorically insisted on an immediate halt to all activities of the American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia.

Torn by economic chaos, inflation, internal strife and hatred for Malaysia, Indonesia was ripe for Communist intrigue. People were ready to make American imperialism the scapegoat for a nation's ills and they began to act.

Throughout December 1964, student demonstrators demolished USIA libraries and postal and telecommunications workers confiscated USIA publication in Djakarta and other cities. On February 28, 1965, students attacked the residence of the American ambassador, and, a week later, the Indonesian women's movement, GERWANI, sent the country's leaders, including President Sukarno, the following telegram demanding

The expulsion of Bill Palmer of the American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia by declaring him *persona non grata* The demand is made in view of Bill Palmer's subversive activities as a member of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which operates in the interest of American imperialism and which aids in counter-revolutionaries' and neocolonialists' projects of Malaysia.²⁴

When Ivan Agayants, the commanding officer of the Soviet disinformation department, arrived in Djakarta in April 1965 to evaluate the situation, the United States had already sharply curtailed its presence in the country. Most USIA libraries were closed and Peace Corps volunteers were accused as CIA spies. Indonesia's foreign minister, Subandrio, and President Sukarno received reports through Czechoslovak disinformation channels that William Palmer was responsible for the failure of Indonesian intelligence in Malaysia. The disinformation reported that Palmer had compromised the Indonesian underground and had betrayed it to Malaysian authorities. "Proof" was manufactured that the CIA and Palmer had personally plotted the assassination of Sukarno, Foreign Minister Subandrio and army commander General Yani. America looked more and more like a faithful ally of the hated Malaysia.

The news broke like a bombshell on the annual meeting of Indonesia's regional military commanders on May 28, 1965, when Sukarno announced that the imperialists planned to kill him and destroy the Indonesian revolution. In the speech, he labeled William Palmer a CIA agent and stated that vital evidence had been found in Palmer's residence after it was ransacked by anti-American demonstrators. Shortly after Sukarno's speech, the Indonesian Students Federation demanded the death sentence for Palmer, and the Djakarta prosecutor opened an official investigation.

The final scene in the drama was the so-called British-American Joint Plan to Invade Indonesia. Great Britain was drawn into the campaign to give the plan greater credibility. Since Malaysia, the supposed launching point for the invasion, harbored British bases, it would have been unlikely for the United States to conduct an extensive military operation or build up on Malaysian soil without tacit British consent. A forgery produced as evidence purported to be a report from Her Majesty's ambassador in Djakarta to the British Foreign Office. Dated March 12, 1965, the document contained the following statement:

I have held discussions with United States Ambassador Jones about the matters contained in letter No. 67785-65. U.S. Ambassador Jones has in principle agreed

with our stand. However, he asked for more time to study the matters from several other angles.

In reply to a question about the possible influence of the visit made by Bunker, President Johnson's personal envoy, to Djakarta to discuss the improvement of American-Indonesian relations, the Ambassador said that he did not see any possibility for improving the situation, and that it would not alter the plan, but that on the contrary, it would provide time to make more thorough preparations. Ambassador Jones also recalled the necessity of new steps to effect better coordination and said that there was no need to emphasize the necessity of making the plan a success. I have promised to make necessary preparations, and I will report my views on the subject at a later date.

Several Czechoslovak disinformation channels leaked the forgery to the Indonesian foreign ministry, and it was expected to surface at a conference of Asian and African leaders in Algeria. Although the conference was postponed, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio granted an interview to the semiofficial Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* and revealed the "plot." The dramatic story of an American plan to invade Indonesia and a copy of the forgery were published on July 5, 1965. British and American authorities immediately and pointedly denied the authenticity of the document, but their denials only served as further fuel for the anti-American fire in Indonesia. On August 1, 1965, the *New York Times* reported the observation of a Western diplomat in Djakarta: "There is really nothing the Americans can do. It's just like the tide coming in."

Operation Palmer initially appeared to be an unqualified success in pushing Indonesian-American relations to their lowest point in history. The Soviets had set off far stronger public attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency than they had expected, and they had skillfully manipulated Sukarno. At this point, Indonesia's Communists, unaware of the disinformation game played by the Soviet bloc, took matters into their own hands. On September 30, 1965, they staged a coup complete with the murder of the generals described by Gribben, and lost.

Communist intelligence came out in 1978 with another anti-CIA publication called *CIA Insider*. The first and thus far the only issue was supposedly compiled by seven journalists—volunteers "who think their duty is to put an end to perverted abuse by the CIA of press and information freedom." The whole issue was devoted to a list of supposedly paid CIA agents in the world mass media and a list of mass media used as cover by the Central Intelligence Agency. Among the individuals listed as CIA agents were Eric Bourne of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Seymour Hersh, Harrison E. Salisbury, and Tad Szulc, former correspondents of the *New York Times*, who are known for their anti-CIA sentiments. *CIA Insider* was mailed to many individuals and media representatives round the world, but the response was not very enthusiastic. The list included the name of Karel Beran, former correspondent for the West German news magazine *Der Spiegel* in Austria. The fact that Karel

Beran was a correspondent for the Czechoslovak press agency CTK in Austria and an agent of Czechoslovak intelligence until his defection in 1968 suggests that the real publisher of *CIA Insider* was Czechoslovak rather than Soviet intelligence.

The U.S. Congress finally ended public exposure of CIA operatives in the United States in 1982 when it approved the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Under this law, government employees who expose American spies living under cover in foreign countries can be imprisoned for periods up to ten years and fined \$50,000, and individuals outside the government, including journalists and scholars, can be imprisoned for the same delict for periods up to four years and fined \$15,000. The law makes it possible to prosecute someone for publishing information of this type, even though it has been previously published.

The act was quickly condemned by the press and a number of public interest groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. The press perceived it as a serious threat to rights under the First Amendment and failed to recognize the fact that the KGB was the real target of the legislation. In any event, the practice of exposing CIA operatives continues outside the United States.

USE OF DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS

Another technique frequently used by the Soviets in their campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency is to inform foreign governments of CIA operatives stationed within their borders. These official communications are mixtures of facts (names and basic data about CIA operatives posing as diplomats) and fiction (plans to assassinate a prime minister or organize a military coup). Since these communications contain some verifiable data and supposedly dangerous warnings, they are usually taken seriously.

The campaign is designed to create conflict between a target country (usually a developing nation) and the United States and to prevent closer relationships. The KGB selects an American diplomat or businessman stationed in a target country and presents him as a gravely dangerous CIA man. The 1980-81 campaign against George G. B. Griffin, a senior American diplomat stationed in the embassy at Kabul, Afghanistan, is typical of these tactics.

Griffin, a Foreign Service officer with long experience in countries of the Indian subcontinent, had previously served in India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Griffin made several trips to India to see his wife and occasionally briefed reporters on the situation in the occupied country. His contact with the Western press annoyed the Soviets, who wanted Afghanistan off the front pages as soon as possible. As in other campaigns, the disinformation story was featured initially in the local (Indian) press, subsequently distributed by TASS throughout the world, and even broadcast back to India by Moscow radio under the operational direction of the KGB disinformation directorate.

The first story accusing Griffin of spreading falsehoods about the situation in Afghanistan appeared in a newspaper called the *Patriot* on December 4, 1980. Five months later (May 4, 1981), the weekly *Blitz* labeled him a CIA operative in charge of operations against the Afghan government. In both instances, TASS picked up the story and distributed it throughout the world.

When the State Department decided to transfer Griffin to India, the Soviets intensified their campaign:

Griffin, a major specialist of the CIA, who from Pakistani territory guided secret operations of the American spy department against Afghanistan, is being transferred from Pakistan to New Delhi . . . Now his bosses are sending him to a new sector of work, which will signify broadening of diversionary and spy activities of the CIA in India.²⁵

The Indian government's refusal to accept him in July 1981 was based largely on Soviet disinformation.

A similar incident occurred in Mozambique in February 1981 when four U.S. diplomats accused as CIA spies were ordered to leave the country. The Mozambique government charged the U.S. embassy with collecting information on President Samora Machel in order to assassinate him. Several days before the expulsion, a group of twelve Cuban officials headed by two senior intelligence agents and assisted by Mozambican officials had forcibly detained an American diplomat for more than four hours in an attempt to recruit him as a spy for Cuba.²⁶ When he refused, the Cubans advised the Mozambican government to take severe action against the so-called U.S. spy nest.

The Soviet campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency scored major successes in the late 1970s when post-Vietnam weariness and the changing political mood in the United States created extremely favorable conditions for this type of maneuver. The United States drastically reduced its covert action program at the time; hundreds of publicly exposed CIA operatives were reassigned or fired, and contact between West European intelligence services and the CIA was visibly curbed. But Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, drastic suppression of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, and growing Soviet involvement in Central America eventually brought changes in the American political climate and the realization that effective defense against the Soviet threat requires reliable and dedicated intelligence service. Nevertheless, the Soviet campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency will undoubtedly continue because it is one of the permanent battles in the invisible war between East and West. But the lessons of the past decade should provide sufficient guidelines for the future.

NOTES

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3. *Boston Phoenix*, 23 July 1974, p. 3.
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7. *New Times*, 9 December 1977, p. 21.
8. *New York Times*, 11 March 1980, p. C 5.
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22. *Counterspy*, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 23.
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Chapter 11

Business, Science, and Technology

BEND A LITTLE TO THE LEFT, PLEASE

The KGB often uses the Institute of the United States of America and Canada in Moscow as a respectable facade for personal contacts with Western social scientists and researchers targeted for recruitment. The official mission of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada is to supply information and expertise about the opponent to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The major sources of the institute's studies are Western literature and the press, Soviet diplomatic reports, TASS dispatches, and oral information from visiting American and Canadian scholars.

Constitutional Interrelationships between the President and the Congress of the United States of America in the Sphere of Foreign Policy, a study by Yuri I. Nyporenko, a Ukrainian academician associated with the institute, analyzes conflicts between the branches of American government and contradictions that may be exploited in developing foreign policies favorable to the Soviet Union. Although the book is written in scholarly language, it is unusually frank about the opportunities for behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Washington. It also deals with the relative advantages of various party alignments between the White House and Congress for "progressive forces." As the best possible combination, the author cites a Republican president "balked" by a Democratic Congress; the least favorable combination is a Republican president with a Republican Congress.¹

But Nyporenko's book is not a typical product of the institute. According to Galina Orionova, a former research fellow of the institute who defected during a visit to Great Britain in April 1979, scholarship among researchers at the institute is restricted to reporting from published sources, such as American newspapers, magazines, and books. "We presented an accurate picture because we were commanded to present an accurate picture which was based on American facts and American analysis and American ideas. We were not asked to give any policy recommendations."² Rather than functioning as a source of new and provocative ideas, concepts, and recommendations for dealing with the United States, the institute, with a staff of 350 members, is known as a propaganda institute for explaining Soviet foreign policy to American academia, press, and government and as a cover for numerous KGB

operatives who use it to enhance contacts with American scholars, journalists, and politicians.

The institute has three main departments: one studies U.S. domestic and foreign policies; a second deals with the U.S. economy, and a third, officially listed as the Department of Ideology, manages the library, conducts secret activities, and hosts American and Canadian visitors. This department also has a special section on U.S. military affairs, headed by General Mikhail Milshteyn, a GRU (military intelligence) operative.³

Galina Orionova states that she

frequently attended parties or meetings with Americans where senior members [of the Institute] reeled off comments they knew were false, but which they also knew, from familiarity with American writings, would please their visitors. For instance, they would deplore Castro's militarism in Africa and regret that Moscow could not control him.⁴

After the visitors left, the staff members completed two forms. One form contained information on the visitors' itineraries, their activities, and any significant comments. The other contained information on the visitors' private lives, political philosophies, and personal weaknesses.

The Director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada is Georgi Arbatov, an intelligent, world-wise operator who lists Russian as his nationality although his colleagues state that he is Jewish. Arbatov is a skillful propagandist whose articles and lectures are well-balanced mixtures of rational statements, intelligently designed half-truths, and skillfully covered distortions and omissions presented in calm, politically acceptable language. A leading expert on the United States and a member of the Communist party's policymaking Central Committee, Georgi A. Arbatov has visited the United States many times. Numerous requests for interviews and invitations for television discussions allow him to spread the Soviet message, but his American counterparts have no access to Soviet mass media, unless they agree to make statements in support of Soviet policies.*

CIA investigations by the House and Senate and an anti-CIA atmosphere in the American academic community preclude use of domestic academic positions as covers for CIA operatives, but the Soviets are not bothered with such problems. Arbatov's prestigious position, his calm statements on foreign policy, and his civilized behavior open the door to many American universities, foreign policy institutes, and government agencies, and KGB operatives masquerading as scholars and researchers in Arbatov's institute do the rest.

The KGB is well aware that a dozen research institutes, think tanks, and foundations in the United States exercise considerable influence on govern-

*The Reagan administration retaliated in April 1981 by denying visa extensions to Arbatov and his deputy Mikhail A. Milshtein, and prevented their appearance on *Bill Moyers' Journal*.

ment operations and legislative actions, as well as the press and public opinion. The Soviets are particularly interested in such liberal think tanks as the Institute for Policy Studies in the United States and the International Peace Research Institute in Sweden. The antigovernment prejudice and political leanings of these organizations make them potentially easy targets. The Institute for Policy Studies, with a staff of eighty, conducts research in the areas of the international economic order, national security, and disarmament. The nucleus of the institute is researchers and scholars with Marxist perceptions that Soviet foreign and military policies pose no threat to Western democracies. In 1982, for example, a seminar on disarmament cosponsored in Moscow by the institute and the Soviet Academy of Sciences had considerable propagandistic value for the Soviets, but it did nothing for American objectives.⁵ Both the Institute for Policy Studies and the International Peace Research Institute use totally different criteria to evaluate the performance of the U.S. and Soviet governments. They label CIA contacts with U.S. academic and research institutions as major violations of academic freedom and ignore systematic KGB penetration of the same institutions.

There is a misconception that Soviet front organizations and foreign academic centers must be financed directly from Moscow to serve basic Soviet interests. Although this is true in some cases, various academic action centers on the radical left receive most of their financial support from genuine Western foundations and donors. In the 1950s, a number of front organizations, such as the International Union of Students and the World Peace Council operated under the strict guidance of Soviet intelligence, but the Soviets have adopted a more flexible strategy during the past two decades. The KGB relies on the traditional compromised structure of front organizations primarily in developing countries, but in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, it prefers to penetrate and manipulate legitimate foundations and well-established leftist organizations because this tactic is less risky, both politically and financially.

The International Peace Research Institute, established in 1966, is officially an organization that provides independent analyses of armaments and the global balance of power. It is funded by the Swedish government and directed by a board of governors consisting of a Swedish chairman and members from West Germany, Norway, Finland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia, but its assessments are far from objective. In its 1981 yearbook, for example, it dispenses with East European military expenditures in a single paragraph, concluding that "there is very little hard factual information about military matters in the public domain."⁶ A number of incidents in 1981 and 1982 revealed the Institute's anti-NATO bias. For example, a former researcher complained that a Czechoslovak consultant with the institute censored her work on Soviet military bases and that the institute is interested primarily in NATO activities. Owen R. Wilkes, a researcher hired by the institute for a

project on foreign military bases worldwide, was arrested in Norway and, in June 1981, was given a six-month suspended sentence for endangering Norwegian security. And, in March 1982, the same person was arrested in Sweden on charges of illegally collecting information on Sweden's air defense network, sentenced to six months in prison, and expelled from Sweden.⁷

Even more interesting than the International Peace Research Institute is the Institute for Policy Studies, a research organization described by Rael Jean Isaac as an "enormous intelligence operation practicing both covert action and subversion. It is itself an adaptation of the multinational corporation, and serves as an 'imperial' nerve center, with endless subsidiary operations that in turn influence and shape a whole series of ostensibly independent groups."⁸ Isaac argues that the institute perceives no distinction between research and political action. "Major targets of IPS have been [U.S.] government intelligence agencies for their spying, covert action, and subversion; the corporation, especially the multinational corporation; and U.S. imperialism." These targets and long-term objectives obviously coincide with the goals of active measures conducted by the Soviet bloc against the United States.

The institute was established in 1963 as a genuine outlet for such leftist and liberal foreign policy theorists as Marcus Raskin, who served as a staff member of the National Security Council and then became alienated and hostile toward the entire military-industrial establishment, and Richard Barnet, a former deputy director for political research of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Rael Jean Isaac states that the "IPS Fellows are enthusiastic about Third World terrorist and revolutionary movements and the states that embody them While the Soviet Union is not always defended as flawless, the United States is consistently portrayed as the aggressor in U.S.-Soviet relations." They argue that America provides the "procedural" freedoms (speech, press, assembly), but the Soviets have the "substantive" freedoms (medical care, jobs, housing). In this view, Soviet foreign policy is defensive and the Soviet military poses no threat to the United States.⁹

The Institute for Policy Studies actively participated in the worldwide campaign against U.S. intelligence agencies and contributed to the birth of *Counterspy*, a publication systematically revealing the identities of CIA operatives around the world. Among the members of the advisory board for the organization that originally published *Counterspy* was IPS codirector Marcus Raskin.¹⁰ The institute helped CIA defectors with research material for their anti-CIA books, particularly Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, and also participated in making several films on CIA defectors. By encouraging whistle-blowing in the federal government and spying on the spies in Washington, by advocating radical changes in America, and by applying these principles through former IPS Fellows who later became government officials at various levels, the Institute for Policy Studies became a multinational corporation with considerable influence on the American democratic process.

Is there convincing evidence of a connection between Communist intelligence and the institute? Radical leftist bias does not mean, of course, that most Fellows serve on the KGB payroll and that every IPS research study is inspired and approved by the KGB. The influence is more subtle. The case of Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean foreign minister who served in the Allende government, lived as a political exile in the United States, and worked as Director of the Transnational Institute (the international arm of the Institute for Policy Studies) can serve as an example. In September 1976, Letelier and an IPS staff member named Roni Moffitt were assassinated in Washington, D.C., by Chilean secret agents. Documents found in his briefcase and his apartment revealed that Letelier had received a lump sum and regular payments of \$1,000 a month from Cuba through Beatriz Allende Fernandez, the wife of a Cuban intelligence officer. An internal memorandum dated September 9, 1976, by Transnational Institute suggested that this sensitive fact should not be entered on the books. Although the institute explained later that these funds had been collected by the Chilean Socialist party in Western Europe and deposited in Havana, the explanation is not convincing. From documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, *Accuracy in Media Report* offers this analysis of the Letelier case:

FBI intercepts of telephone conversations between Letelier and Julian Rizo, then Castro's top intelligence agent in the U.S., revealed that Letelier had been asked to arrange meetings for Rizo with the Institute for Policy Studies' people. Moreover, at the time he was killed, Letelier was about to depart on a trip to Cuba, and he was carrying in his briefcase a letter from one of his IPS associates, Saul Landau, to be delivered to a friend in Cuba.¹¹

Accuracy in Media Report's analysis of the connection between the Institute for Policy Studies and Cuban intelligence has been ignored or pushed aside by most American mass media as a product of new McCarthyism.

SCIENCE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES

When thirty-one-year-old Werner Stiller, a lieutenant in the East German intelligence service, defected to West Germany in 1978 and the West German police began rounding up suspects identified by Stiller as spies, most of them were scientists: Alfred Bahr, a physicist in the solar-power division of Munich's Messerschmitt Bolkow-Blohm aerospace plant; Karl Hauße, head of the organic chemistry department at Göttingen University; Günther Sanger, an engineer with Siemens electronics corporation; Gerhard Arnold, an executive of a Munich computer company; and Johannes Koppe, a nuclear physicist.¹² The priority given by Soviet intelligence to scientific and technological information is second only to military information.

The Scientific and Technical Directorate (Directorate T) of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB is the most profitable component of the Soviet espionage establishment. KGB operatives claim that, in terms of money, the contri-

bution of the Scientific and Technical Directorate to the Soviet economy far outweighs the cost of maintaining the entire Soviet intelligence system. It is entrusted with the theft of Western industrial, scientific, technological, and economic secrets, including data about nuclear and space research. Consisting of more than 500 operatives, mainly graduates from Soviet universities and technological institutes, and a large number of consultants, advisors, and agents in prominent research and industrial centers, the directorate reflects the fastest growth of any operational element of Soviet foreign intelligence during the past twenty-five years. The mission of the directorate is to supply the Soviet economy and the military with technological and scientific data that would cost millions of dollars to develop at home. It cooperates closely with the State Scientific and Technical Committee, which coordinates and regulates basic scientific research and dictates scientific priorities according to directives from the Central Committee of the Communist party.

Throughout the late 1970s until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, every Aeroflot flight from Moscow carried a number of Soviet scientists every time it landed at Dulles Airport near Washington. Large-scale Soviet-American cooperation in science opened many sensitive American scientific areas to inquisitive Soviet eyes. According to Michael Taksar, a Soviet mathematician who emigrated in 1977, most Soviet scientists sent to the United States on exchange visits are either ideologically reliable, or bureaucrats with no scientific credentials, or spies.¹³

American-Soviet relations in science and technology were virtually nonexistent until 1955 when the two countries agreed to exchange medical scientists. In 1958, they signed the Bilateral Exchanges Agreement, which provided that individual scientists interested in the exchange program could spend one or more months in a laboratory of the foreign partner. In 1970 and 1971, U.S. officials explored the possibility of expanding this cooperation into joint projects focused on the solution of specific problems. The summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in May 1972 gave formal recognition to the idea and opened the door for "American and Soviet scientists to work cooperatively on problems and to promote technological and scientific progress for the benefit of both countries and all mankind." Four executive agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States provided for problem-solving cooperation in science and technology, environmental protection, space exploration, medical science, and public health. Under these programs, the number of participants visiting the other country increased from 508 in 1972 to 2,284 in 1975.¹⁴ But more realistic assessment of mutual benefits derived from these programs in recent years has led to a reduction in the number of participants.

From the outset of the exchange program, the United States obviously did not expect much in the way of hard scientific returns from the projects; it was more interested in establishing rapport and developing friendly relationships with the Soviets. Although many American scientists favored the program in

general, they expressed concern that the projects provided an unbalanced exchange of technology in favor of the Soviet Union. They also complained that, during their trips to the Soviet Union, they spent too much time on unproductive jaunts through Soviet cities and research institutes and only limited time in scientific work.

The Soviets also enjoyed other advantages not available to the Americans. They were able to select either private or governmental avenues in their search for American technology, but U.S. officials seeking access to Russian technology were allowed to use only governmental avenues. For example, the Soviets officially requested a visit to Grand Coulee Dam, the largest dam in the United States, but the U.S. government rejected the request because Soviet officials had rejected three U.S. requests to visit a comparable dam in the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets contacted a major American industrial company that provided equipment for the Grand Coulee Dam and were given a two-day tour of the facilities. As a result, the United States lost its bargaining power in its quest for permission to visit the Soviet dam.

American scientists undoubtedly have something to learn from Soviet science in certain areas. The Soviet Union has invested more human resources in science than any nation on earth. In April 1980, a statistical study by Louvan E. Nolting and Murray Feshbach of the U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that the number of Soviet scientists quadrupled between 1950 and 1980. In 1978 the Soviet Union had 828,100 scientists, compared to 595,000 in the United States. The Soviet system generously supports scientific research in such areas as space, defense, and agriculture. In 1980 the Soviets spent approximately 3.4% of their gross national product on research in comparison to 2.2% by the United States. They are well ahead of the United States in some areas, such as the physics of fusion, metallurgy, and mathematics. In fact, research into fusion at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Princeton is based almost entirely on Soviet concepts. Soviet scientists are also preeminent in applied areas, such as climatology, meteorology, oceanography, and polar research. Malcolm W. Browne points out that "among the important strengths of the Soviet science are 'the blackboard' sciences—those requiring intellectual effort but not laboratory experimentation. These include the theoretical branches of mathematics, physics, astronomy, electrochemistry, fluid dynamics, and other basic sciences."¹⁵ Both countries are more or less at the same level in weapons technology. According to one U.S. government expert,

Most of our weapons are based on scientific research that was carried out in the 1940s and 1950s. Suppose the Soviets had no scientific research of their own but had to rely solely on Western research published openly in our professional journals. That would mean they would always lag behind us in basic science by approximately three years. But in weapons technology, a science lag of three years is virtually no lag at all.¹⁶

Scientific and technological exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union were quite extensive from 1972 to 1979, but drastic Soviet measures to suppress such dissidents as Andrei Sakharov and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 had a profound impact on scientific cooperation between the two countries. By September 1980, some 7,900 prominent scientists and technological experts from forty-four nations had suspended their relations with the Soviet Union, and, by the end of 1980, officially sponsored U.S.-Soviet contacts stood at only 25% of their 1979 level.

Most American scientists contacted during this study agreed that the Soviets have gained more scientific benefits from the exchange than the United States, but they favored continued cooperation. They admitted that both the U.S. and Soviet governments were guilty of some attempts at scientific manipulation, but they were certain that scientific verity would quickly uncover any deliberate distortion of research data. The interviews also revealed considerable political naiveté and ignorance about KGB involvement in international scientific contacts. The idea that the Soviets would try to recruit American scientists or deliberately mislead them was rejected as a residuum of the Cold War era or political fiction.

The Senate Intelligence Committee reported in 1976 that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Soviet students who had come to the United States between 1965 and 1975 were intelligence officers or agents. The efforts of Soviet-bloc agents to penetrate U.S. scientific centers have intensified since the early 1970s, both in number and aggressiveness. Some 5,000 Soviet students, scientists, artists, and scholars, as well as commercial representatives, entered the United States every year, and many of them came with specific secret assignments.¹⁷

A former Soviet engineer (under the assumed name of Joseph Arkov) testified before Senate investigators in the spring of 1982 that the KGB sends scientists, students, and trade officials to the United States with detailed "shopping lists" of sensitive equipment needed and wanted by Moscow, including makes and model numbers. Among the top priorities are lasers; guidance technology for missiles, aircraft, and submarines; missile defense; aircraft technology, such as lightweight composites; computer-assisted design; antisubmarine weapons and equipment; submarine quieting equipment; computer equipment; and smart bombs capable of hitting mobile targets.¹⁸ American students going to Russia are usually in their twenties, with degrees in the humanities, but Soviet students coming to the United States are usually in their thirties, with advanced degrees in electrical engineering or physics. A veritable explosion of Soviet students, professors, and commercial delegations came to the United States in 1976 and 1977, and all of them were interested in one subject—lasers.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have stepped up their work on so-called beam weapons, such as lasers, high-energy lasers, and charged parti-

cle beams.* They realize that whoever develops operational beam weapons will have immediate strategic superiority. With the help of Western technologies, the Soviets have achieved significant advancements in their military equipment, particularly in the area of computers, microelectronics, signal processing, communications, guidance, navigation, radars, and sensors of various types. According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, recent Soviet military breakthroughs linked to stolen Western technological secrets include the "huge Typhoon-class attack submarine and the Alfa-class submarine, faster and deeper diving than any U.S. rival; laser equipment for potential use in space warfare; and data about the most modern anti-tank weapons."¹⁹

Almost 11,000 American businesses have access to classified defense information, and some 120,000 of their employees hold top secret clearances.²⁰ Many of them are careless in handling critical information and they unwittingly help the Soviets. For years, the United States largely ignored the enormous theft of its technology by Soviet-bloc countries. It even tolerated serious violations by Soviet-bloc scientists, technicians, and students under the theory that the visitors were in the country only for a short time and their expulsion would have been meaningless. FBI Director William Webster estimated in December 1980 that Soviet-bloc operatives made approximately 25,000 contacts every year in the United States, and he expressed concern about the growing Soviet effort to steal American scientific and technological secrets.

I think it is one of the more serious problems, because of the damage it can do to our national security In terms of manpower, we are outmanned around the world by our competition, but in technology we maintain a superiority that could disappear if it is eroded.²¹

KGB operatives fish systematically for victims, particularly among employees and business representatives of companies in financial difficulties. These individuals will sometimes accept lucrative contracts from small, even suspicious appearing foreign companies without questions. For example, the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, Ricardo Escartin, was expelled from the United States in February 1981 for attempting to lure American businessmen into illegal trade and to persuade them to violate the U.S. trade embargo. Escartin traveled widely around the United States, worked closely with congressmen, organized their visits to Cuba, and arranged traps for their recruitment.²²

Computers are another source of valuable operational data for the KGB. Their use for storing, processing, and transferring sensitive data about indi-

*A laser generates a beam so powerful it can burn through hardened steel; charged particle beam devices do not melt the surface as lasers do, but slice right through it.

viduals in private sectors, such as banking and medicine and state or federal revenue sectors, opens new fields for Communist intelligence services. KGB operatives in the United States are very interested in computer encoding research, both military and civilian. Access to this magic key would enable the KGB to penetrate the privacy of almost every American without getting involved in risky and time-consuming operations. More important, the KGB would be able to pollute the computer system with disinformation about individuals or companies, seriously damage their lives, and paralyze their operations.

A major source of valuable information for use in economic active measures is a vast network of eavesdropping facilities that spy on U.S. telecommunications. The United States did not officially recognize this problem until 1974 because of an apparent gentlemen's agreement that allowed the KGB to eavesdrop on American companies while the National Security Agency listened more or less undisturbed to Soviet communications. The problem was first mentioned publicly in Nelson Rockefeller's 1975 report on possible CIA abuses: "Americans have a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and business activities, which they freely discuss over the telephone, could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers."²³ Shortly thereafter, the government rechanneled its own telephone communication system and warned U.S. business about the danger of Soviet eavesdropping.

The largest Soviet electronic eavesdropping facility, with some 1,500 technicians, is located in Lourdes, Cuba. With acres of antenna fields and intelligence monitors targeted on the United States, the Lourdes center can intercept all international voice and data messages reaching the United States by satellite, as well as a considerable portion of domestic long distance telephone calls relayed by satellites. The intercepted information gives the Soviets the opportunity not only to listen but also to manipulate commercial markets and commodities. Raymond Tate, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency, states that the Soviets simply "turn their intelligence system around and use it to get all sorts of data they can actually use in commercial ventures" whenever they have a serious cash-flow problem.²⁴

PLAYING WITH GOLD

On the banks of the Kama River, 600 miles east of Moscow, sits a new large Soviet industrial enterprise. The \$5 billion truck factory, encompassing forty square miles and a new city of 500,000 individuals, is the world's largest industrial complex and is capable of manufacturing 150,000 three-axle trucks and 250,000 diesel engines annually. Included in the Kama River complex is \$500 million worth of American technology represented in the foundry, tools, and IBM computers. More than eighty American firms participated in the project and often competed with foreign businesses for portions of the com-

plex. The Kama River operation more than doubled the production of trucks and spare parts in the Soviet Union, and it enabled the Soviets to redesign the standard GAZ-51 truck for the first time in twenty-four years. The United States government allowed American businesses to participate in the project because of official Soviet pronouncements that the complex was intended solely for peaceful purposes. The factory does, indeed, produce agricultural vehicles but, thanks to the updated equipment, the Soviets modernized trucks used by army regiments at West German borders and supplied troops entering Afghanistan with heavy-duty, diesel-powered trucks incorporating American technology to withstand the mountain runs. Soviet strategy of deception paid off.

Manipulation of the marketplace is an old capitalist technique widely used by large companies of all nationalities. But, in comparison to their foreign counterparts, Soviet businesses have the advantage of a powerful ally in the KGB. The major long-term objective of Soviet economic active measures is to deceive Western analysts about the real goals and needs of the Soviet economy, pushing the United States step by step out of the Third World, and damaging American commercial operations anywhere the opportunity arises. Representatives of American businesses abroad are labeled as CIA operatives, and numerous disinformation campaigns encourage acts of terrorism against U.S. property. In a 1980 analysis of Soviet economic warfare the Central Intelligence Agency included such acts as preemptive buying and selling of commodities, either for stockpiling purposes or for denying crucial products to the enemy, and manipulation of the international market to accomplish specific political and economic objectives. In 1979, for example, the Soviet Union offered to sell coal to several West European countries at a price below the European market price in an attempt to gain political influence.

The largest number of economic active measures are designed to help the Soviet economy circumvent the Western embargo on strategic products and raw materials. These measures range from diversion of strategic equipment through transshipments by seemingly legitimate middlemen to outright thefts. If a new technological product cannot be purchased legally, the KGB handles the purchase as well as the shipment.

The mechanism for accomplishing these measures is a group of Eastern-bloc multinationals or, as they are sometimes called, Red multinationals. These industrial, financial, and trade companies maintain headquarters in Moscow, East Berlin, Prague, and Budapest and branches all over the world. Their major operational area, however, is Western Europe. The growing network of Red multinationals serves several purposes:

- Channels for the transfer of privileged economic and financial information;
- Open and secret economic transactions benefiting the East European economy;

- Vehicles for intelligence penetration and manipulation of Western companies; and
- Secret channeling of financial support to various political movements, organizations, and enterprises.

In the early 1980s, Red multinationals controlled some 544 companies throughout the world. In Genoa, Italy, for example, the Soviet multinational *Dolphin* established a shipping agency that controlled approximately thirty vessels in the Mediterranean by the end of 1982.²⁵ In addition to shipping, Soviet multinationals in Italy operate in construction, petroleum, timber, fishing, machine parts, and brokerage industries. Among the Red multinationals are twenty-two banking and financial institutions, such as the Commercial Bank for North Europe in Paris, Moscow Narodny Bank in London, and Ost-West Handelsbank in Frankfurt.

To gain access to sensitive information on employees working in Silicon Valley, California, the Soviets secretly tried to purchase one of the local banks—the Peninsula National Bank of Burlingame. Through the Moscow Narodny Bank, the KGB sent \$70 million in letters of credit to a businessman in Hong Kong to purchase the bank. The purchase would have given the KGB access to highly sensitive personal information about people in financial trouble and susceptible to blackmail. The transaction failed, but it might have succeeded in other cases.²⁶

The Red multinationals are also used for transactions involving highly sensitive technological products that cannot be legally sold to Communist countries. These transactions are usually conducted through numerous dummy companies established in Canada, Israel, Austria, Holland, and Sweden only for these illegal shipments. For example, goods bearing false labels are sent from the United States to Canada or Western Europe and then to the Soviet Union. The number of arrests of American and foreign businessmen in recent years illustrates the seriousness of the problem. In 1979, I. I. Industries, a Sunnyvale company, was prosecuted in federal court in San Francisco, and the owners were convicted of shipping equipment to the Soviets without a government license. The company labeled the strategic equipment “commercial washing machines” and “industrial ovens” and shipped it first to Canada, then to Switzerland and finally to Russia.²⁷ The middleman was identified as Richard Mueller, a German national with ties to the Soviet Trade Ministry.*

In May 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a thirty-one-year-old Belgian businessman, Marc André DeGeyter, at Kennedy Airport in New York after he tried to bribe American industry for some of its top secrets in

*When the Soviet operation was discovered, U.S. customs agents decided to play a game of their own. They took out the electronic equipment from the final shipment and substituted six tons of sandbags that were then delivered via Canada and Switzerland to Moscow.

computer technology. For more than a year, FBI agents followed DeGeyter around the United States, tracing his contacts and business dealings. Documents found in DeGeyter's luggage indicated that he was seeking a new type of computer technology known as a source code, which is a computerized means of storing billions of pieces of data so that the information can be indexed and then encoded in such a way that outsiders cannot read it.²⁸ He tried to ferret out information mainly from employees of Software AG and even raised his bribe from \$150,000 to \$500,000. Mr. DeGeyter also had a contract with him between Computer Engineering and Services Accounting, a company he runs in Brussels, and Techmashimport, a Soviet international trading company. He was sentenced in August 1980 to four months in prison after pleading guilty of attempting to take the computer design out of the country without an export license and of committing commercial bribery by offering to buy a trade secret.

Marian Zacharski, an operative of Polish intelligence, was sent to California in 1977 as a West Coast representative of the Polish American Machinery Corporation. A short time later, he met William Holden Bell at the Hughes Aircraft Company in suburban El Segundo, California. Bell, a radar expert with the company, needed money to finance a recent divorce and remarriage. From 1978 until April 1981, Bell delivered a number of critical documents to Zacharski, including a quiet radar system for B-1 and Stealth bombers; the vital look-down, shoot-down radar system; an all-weather radar system for tanks; and a shipborne surveillance radar. For this information, he received approximately \$110,000 in cash and gold coins. In November 1981, he was sentenced to a term up to eight years in prison and fined \$10,000, but Zacharski received a life term.²⁹

Mikhail N. Abramov, a Soviet trade representative, was expelled from Canada on April 1, 1982, for attempting to purchase products prohibited from sale to the Soviet Union. Royal Canadian Police arrested him while he was offering a large sum of money to the president of the Canadian Northumberland Cable Company of Petitcodias in New Brunswick for fiber optics* and other products.³⁰ Soviet foreign trade companies receive regular help from the KGB in the form of confidential information about foreign businesses with which they deal. In some cases, this help involves playing one foreign company against the other or supplying disinformation about the trade partner.

Certain economic active measures are designed to disorient and confuse Western analysts and business executives about Soviet economic resources, plans, and operations, such as the long-term game with oil. The Soviet Union is the world's largest producer of petroleum although it uses most of the oil domestically or sells it to its Eastern allies. Oil is not only an important

*Fiber optics involve flexible glass strands that can transmit large numbers of simultaneous voice or data items by light.

medium of exchange but also a key political device. As an element of East-West relations with a potential impact on the political future of Europe, Soviet production of oil is subject to regular scrutiny by a number of Western research institutes and intelligence analysts. Senator William Proxmire once stated that prospects of Soviet oil production "have major political implications for the United States and the West. Erroneous estimates undoubtedly influence U.S. attitudes and policies toward the Soviets and the Mideast."³¹

American and West European mass media reported in December 1981 that the Soviet Union had made the largest oil find in history with proven reserves in Siberia of 4.5 trillion barrels. For several days, the news about the new oil field and its reserves—much larger than those in the Middle East—made front-page news. The *Wall Street Journal* reported that the stories about the new Russian oil had "sent oil stock prices—and the rest of the stock market—reeling." The prices of oil were temporarily reduced, and several Soviet satellites hastily bought oil on the spot market. The story originated in Malmö, Sweden, with a small consulting firm known as PetroStudies, which specializes in analyses of oil and gas industries. According to several journalistic sources, it is nothing more than a two-man outfit, without a geologist, established in 1976 and headed by a certain M. M. Jermol, an exile from Communist Yugoslavia.³² The company maintains close ties with the Soviet embassy in Stockholm.

It was not the first time that PetroStudies came out with a sensational report about Soviet oil. The firm claimed in September 1978 that the Soviets could double their crude oil production by 1990 even without any spectacular new discoveries, and, years later, it intensified the rumors by adding that Soviet oil reserves were larger than those of Saudi Arabia. Other prognoses followed the same lines.* In a 260-page study based, ostensibly, on Soviet documents, PetroStudies held that the Soviet Union would be able to maintain production at the twelve million-barrels-a-day mark and perhaps elevate it to sixteen million barrels a day by the end of the decade.³³ Some sources indicate that PetroStudies might be a channel for Soviet disinformation. The KGB occasionally uses various small market research groups and consulting firms in the West as disinformation channels to confuse analysts and influence the

*In 1977, the CIA forecast that the Soviet Union would remain self-sufficient in oil through 1985 and in the following years would need to import 3.5 million barrels of oil a day. Four years later, the CIA said, "All the problems that we foresaw the Soviets facing are emerging, although output in the near term will be somewhat higher than we anticipated in 1977. Despite extremely costly efforts, Soviet output at most is likely to remain at about present levels of 12 million barrels per day for one to three years and then begin to decline . . . Only the rapid discovery of very large amounts of new oil can avert this outcome." Other studies, such as a 1980 Exxon Corporation report, do not share the CIA's conclusions. They predict that the Soviet output "will be relatively stable in the 11 to 12 million barrels per day range through the year 2000."³⁴

market. In some instances, they are not aware of the role assigned to them by the KGB.

The short-term benefit of PetroStudies' disinformation for the Soviets is obvious. Sensational reports of that type send the price of oil down for several days, long enough for Soviet satellites to buy oil on the international market at advantageous prices. Periodic rumors of growing Soviet oil resources is part of a long-term measure to dampen anti-Sovietism in Western Europe. The Soviets believe that to secure a steady flow of oil to their national economies at reasonable prices, these countries might eventually make considerable political compromises vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Every Communist country desperately needs hard Western currency. Espionage networks supply East European economies with many scientific, trade, and industrial secrets that would cost millions of dollars and years of hard work to develop at home, but these organizations consume great chunks of the foreign currency budget every year. To relieve this burden, Moscow encourages its intelligence organizations to involve themselves in international business transactions, such as smuggling hard drugs, marijuana, and cigarettes, so that they are more financially self-supporting.³⁵ These economic active measures are not only profitable; they are useful tools for undermining capitalist establishments.

NOTES

1. *Boston Globe*, 28 September 1981, p. 15.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Atlantic*, November 1980, pp. 42-50.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
5. *New York Times*, 22 April 1983, p. A 16.
6. *New York Times*, 23 May 1982, p. 4.
7. *New York Times*, 23 May 1982, p. 4.
8. Rael Jean Isaac, "The Institute For Policy Studies: Empire on the Left", *Midstream*, June/July 1980, p. 3.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 2, 6.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
11. *AIM Report*, Vol. X., 1 March 1981, No. 5, p. 2.
12. *Time*, 5 February 1979, p. 115.
13. *New York Times*, 17 May 1983, p. C 1.
14. *Science*, 27 October 1978, pp. 383-389.
15. *New York Times*, 16 May 1980, p. A 20; 20 May 1980, pp. C 1, C 3.
16. *Ibid.*, p. C 1.
17. *Los Angeles Times*, 12 December 1978, p. 1.
18. *Newsweek*, 26 April 1982, p. 19; *U.S. News & World Report*, 3 May 1982, p. 44.
19. *U.S. News & World Report*, 8 February 1982, p. 39.
20. *Newsweek*, 12 November 1979, p. 43.
21. *Boston Globe*, 17 December 1980, p. 33.
22. *New York Times*, 12 February 1981, p. A 9.

23. *Boston Globe*, 5 April 1983, p. 40.
24. Ibid.
25. *Panorama*, 10 January 1983, reprinted in *World Press Review*, April 1983, p. 52.
26. *U.S. News & World Report*, 25 May 1981, pp. 39-41.
27. *Wall Street Journal*, 28 April 1981, p. 1.
28. *New York Times*, 23 July 1980, p. 1.
29. *New York Times*, 29 April 1982, p. B 14.
30. *New York Times*, 2 April 1982, p. A 6.
31. *Boston Globe*, 29 May 1981, p. 3.
32. *AIM Report*, 1 March 1981, No. 5.
33. Ibid.
34. *Boston Globe*, 20 May 1981, p. 3; *New York Times*, 13 July 1981. p. A 15.
35. *Boston Globe*, 3 April 1983, p. 15.

Epilog

WHAT WE MUST DO

Espionage is an expanding international game and, in recent years, disinformation and other active measures have also expanded. With more than sixty years of experience and more than 20,000 operatives stationed in Moscow and almost all capitals of the world, the First Main Directorate of the KGB is today the largest and most aggressive intelligence service in the world. When Yuri Andropov became its chairman in 1967, the KGB expanded its domestic and foreign activities, established a new directorate for dealing with dissident Jews and the underground press, institutionalized the misuse of psychiatry for political purposes, and substantially increased the use of active measures. Even its repertoire has changed and terrorism has again become a standard technique.

The West learned more about the new offensive in active measures conducted by the Soviet bloc after the defection of several Communist agents, among them Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major who coordinated Soviet active measures in Japan from 1975 to 1979. His experiences reveal that Soviet operations are much broader and more effective than originally expected. Among their agents of influence in Japan, for example, were several prominent Japanese politicians and journalists.

Active measures are conducted under the direction of the International Department of the Communist party. The KGB, the main participant, is responsible for actions that can never be openly associated with the image of the motherland of communism, such as acts of terrorism and forgeries. Active measures involve certain political risks, of course. The perpetrator of an unsuccessful, publicly exposed operation faces humiliation and eventual retaliation by the victimized country. Nevertheless, the Soviets are convinced that the cumulative impact of successful disinformation operations justifies the risk of occasional political embarrassment.

Soviet active measures have become more ambitious and their impact much broader in the last decade. They have skillfully exploited social and economic discontent in the West; aggravated chronic political instability in many developing countries; manipulated world public opinion; provided money, training, and military equipment to various paramilitary and terrorist organizations; and, in a number of cases, have deceived Western military experts about their military strength and intentions.

Communist countries consider disinformation, like propaganda, a powerful political instrument. Soviet bloc propagandistic disinformation is systematically polluting international relations with massive dosages of distorted or totally false messages to influence public opinion. The messages usually play upon existing political conflicts and cultural prejudices and try to convince the public that the United States is directly or indirectly responsible. Since they are an integral part of Soviet foreign policy, their impact can be measured only in conjunction with the successes or failures of the major Soviet foreign policy campaigns.

While they officially endorse and propagate the spirit of détente, the Soviets have used it for an unprecedented espionage offensive against the West and against the United States in particular. The conditions have been quite favorable: the Left in Europe, such as the Social Democratic party in West Germany, the British Labor party, and the Socialist party in France, adopted more radical anti-American attitudes; increasingly divergent political views and disagreement about defense strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc have weakened the NATO Alliance; the Third World countries have become more aggressive in their demands for new economic and information order; and American military involvement in Vietnam, the Watergate affair, the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime, and the results of the Senate investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency have had a paralyzing influence on American foreign policy and public opinion. In many instances, the Soviets have been able to increase tensions between the developing countries and the West and foment public anger against the United States. As a result, Third World nations voted with the Soviet Union an average of 83.4% of the time in the 1982 U.N. General Assembly and only 20.4% of the time with the United States.

The press tends to consider Soviet active measures as easily recognizable forgeries or political tricks without a noticeable impact on public opinion or political processes. It is true that some anti-American disinformation campaigns aimed at proving American interference in the domestic affairs of various countries are transparent and clumsily implemented. Forgeries are usually slightly "improved" copies of genuine American documents anonymously distributed among American, West European, or Third World journalists. With few exceptions, these forged miniscandals endure for only short periods and have a limited impact.

As shown by the evidence in this study, the spectrum of active measures and their influence is much broader. With the help of such front organizations as the World Peace Council, the Soviets have launched a number of massive campaigns without the risk of being labeled as the secret manipulator. The campaign for peace and against the neutron bomb in Western Europe and the United States, for example, appeared as unsolicited public reaction to a militaristic American foreign policy. The KGB served as a silent, invisible operator

secretly connecting broken communication lines and using agents of influence to intensify the campaign. In these instances, the Soviets quite skillfully employed both overt and covert techniques and channels. Both Western and Soviet intelligence analysts consider the campaign for peace as one of the most successful propaganda campaigns of the last decade.

Nevertheless, the KGB's anti-American propaganda scored major successes in the Third World by taking advantage of the existing prejudices and stereotypes and magnifying every mistake in American foreign policy. As a result, the Soviets have expanded their sphere of influence and have helped to establish governments that operate under their direct political and military control in several countries including Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Harder to detect and far more dangerous than propagandistic disinformation are agents of influence. The cases of Günther Guillaume, close aide, advisor and personal friend to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt; Charles Pathé, the French journalist and member of French high society; and Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire of Switzerland are clear proof that the influence of Soviet-bloc intelligence on Western political processes and military decisions is much greater than most sources originally believed. They also revealed serious shortcomings and weaknesses in the security procedures of the Western community. The Soviets enjoy a number of advantages in their battle with the West. Whenever the KGB wants to use the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TASS, or any other governmental branch or communication channel, the centralized system provides easy coordination and orchestration. In the West, they operate in open societies that tolerate and even respect different political views and concepts. The adversary relationship between the press and the government allows them to hide behind the mask of legitimate political opposition. The press is constitutionally assigned the role of watchdog to detect, analyze, and publicize mistakes and weaknesses of the government. A journalist who works as a secret agent can operate undetected for many years behind this protective wall.

Defections are the major weakness in the Soviet intelligence system. Despite careful ideological and security screening and regular checks of all Communist intelligence personnel the rate of defections is staggering. A number of prominent defectors brought with them a whole gamut of secret information about the KGB's internal structure, methods, and agents, as well as disinformation and active measures. As far as active measures are concerned, their major weakness is stereotyped execution. Whenever one operation succeeds, the same method is used again in a number of other cases and the pattern becomes a key for eventual identification and public exposure.

The State Department, the CIA, and the USIA have, since 1980, publicly exposed large numbers of Soviet deceptions that had been polluting the international climate. The tactics seem to work in the sense that they alert journalists and educate the public about this international menace. In the final

analysis, they limit the perpetrator's options and tactics, but the contest will continue. Successful defense against Soviet-bloc disinformation and active measures depends largely on broad and sound knowledge of their methods, weapons, and tactics. The author hopes that this volume is a worthy contribution to that effort.

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